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Preface 
This thesis is the result of a unique Joint PhD project between Ghent University and 
Belarusian State University, first of its kind to be concluded between the two institutions, and, 
likely, in the practice of the two countries. The topic of the thesis warranted such an endeavour 
for at least two reasons. First, both Belgium and Belarus are founding members of respective 
organizations: the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. Moreover, Brussels is 
the seat for the majority of the EU institutions, and Minsk is the seat of the EAEU Court. 
Second, the nature of the subject required expertise from specialists from both the “West” and 
the “East”. Such a “double hat” helped enormously in this project since I had constant guidance 
from both sides and constant access to all necessary materials. 
At the same time, these benefits required reaching a certain compromise. Therefore, 
this thesis has become a result of a compromise between the requirements of the two 
institutions, which is reflected in its overall structure, approaches and eventual output. Ghent 
University has quite some autonomy to define its own rules and regulations, and, in my 
experience, it relies primarily on customs of academic excellence. The requirements on the 
other side are mandated by the central state body overseeing awarding of advanced academic 
degrees—Higher Attestation Commission of the Republic of Belarus (VAK). Requirements 
for a PhD thesis, or, more correctly, a dissertation for the degree of ‘Candidate of Sciences’,3 
are rather detailed, mandating comprehensively different aspects of the research output, 
including full structure of the dissertation, the contents of its parts, and the word limit.4 This 
is not to say that one approach is better than the other, but only to state that they differ and are 
results of different historical developments. It must be noted that best academic institutions 
worldwide can have approaches that often differ significantly from one another.5 
As for legal research as such, there are also differences between Western and post-
Soviet legal research practices. This concerns, in particular, the methodology, since the former 
suggests using certain methods, which are not common in the tradition of the latter and vice 
3 All translations from Russian into English are by the author of the present work unless otherwise noted. 
4 Postanovlenie Vysshei attestatsionnoi komissii Respubliki Belarus' No.3. Ob utverzhdenii Instruktsii o 
poriadke oformleniia kvalifikatsionnoi nauchnoi raboty (dissertatsii) na soiskanie uchenykh stepenei kandidata 
i doktora nauk, avtoreferata i publikatsii po teme dissertatsii. 28 February 2014. 
5 For instance, word limit for PhD theses are often found in many universities worldwide, including the top 
ones. For a strict word limit see e.g. para 35.5 of the Regulations for Research Degrees of the London School of 
Economics, available at https://info.lse.ac.uk/Staff/Divisions/Academic-Registrars-Division/Teaching-Quality-
Assurance-and-Review-Office/Assets/Documents/Calendar/RegulationsForResearchDegrees.pdf; or Law 
Degree Committee requirements of the University of Cambridge, available at: 
https://www.cambridgestudents.cam.ac.uk/your-course/examinations/graduate-exam-information/submitting-
and-examination/phd-msc-mlitt/word#law. 
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versa. For example, the method of interviews is less common in legal research in the post-
Soviet space. On the contrary, provision of policy proposals is not a standard practice in legal 
research within Western research degrees.  
The compromise explains certain peculiarities of this output, including certain features 
of the structure of the thesis, its volume, the annexes providing for particular legislative 
amendments, and others. My hope is that this inevitable compromise has been not only without 
detriment to the substance of the project, but in fact contributed to it in a positive and 
innovative way. This is of course only for the distinguished reader to judge. 
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English Summary 
The Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter ‘EAEU’) is a new international 
organization established in the post-Soviet space. It is based upon past regional integration 
initiatives, but also claims to follow best European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) practices. One of 
the clearest indications thereof in the legal field is the abundance of references to the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which can be found in the rulings of the EAEU 
Court. 
The dissertation explores the legal nature and functioning of the EAEU by taking the 
theoretical framework of legal order autonomy, which is largely associated with the EU and 
the case law of its Court of Justice. Therefore, the aim is to find out whether the EAEU can be 
qualified as an autonomous legal order. This research has developed a number of indicia of 
internal and external legal order autonomy, which, in the absence of a definition of the latter, 
has proven to be a useful tool to unpack the complex legal system and functioning of the 
EAEU. 
Whereas the indicia are manifestations of legal order autonomy, there are certain 
essential preconditions, which must be met first, i.e. the existence of a legal order and 
international legal personality. Chapter 1 further identifies the following indicia of legal order 
autonomy: self-referential character of law; supranational judicial mechanisms (a mechanism 
ensuring uniform application and interpretation of law in all member states and a mechanism 
ensuring exclusive jurisdiction); supranational effect of legal norms (direct effect and 
primacy); interpretation of distribution of powers; and institutional supranationality. 
The next chapter sets out the historical background, evolution, and context of Eurasian 
integration, including the legal nature of the EAEU and the entities it has been built upon. Four 
relevant stages of Eurasian integration have been identified in Chapter 2. It is demonstrated 
that although there were many failures along the way, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
managed to create a rather viable core capable of pushing integration forward and eventually 
formalize it in the EAEU Treaty. 
Chapter 3 explores the functioning of the EAEU in terms of its institutional structure 
and decision-making, with a particular focus on the Eurasian Economic Commission as the 
main regulatory body of an alleged supranational character. This research challenges this idea 
of supranationality by uncovering the predominantly intergovernmental mode of operation not 
only of the EAEU as such, but also of the Commission. The chapter also focuses on the 
structure of the Court as the major institution on which legal order autonomy depends. It was 
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demonstrated that the history of its establishment and the rules regarding its formation raise 
the question of judicial independence. 
Thereafter, this research focuses on the powers of the EAEU. Similarly to the EU, the 
principle of conferral is the basis of the EAEU’s functioning, and a number of areas fall under 
its exclusive competence. However, the range of such powers is rather limited and there is no 
clear typology of competences. Specific attention is devoted to the doctrine of implied powers 
as a manifestation of the Court’s ability to interpret powers and the attempt of the Member 
States to curtail this option on the basis of the EAEU Treaty. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the 
EAEU Treaty provisions do not in effect preclude the Court from finding a balanced approach 
to the implied powers. Therefore, it is enabled to exercise its authority to interpret competences 
in this respect and enhance legal order autonomy. 
In Chapter 5, the EAEU legal system is further explored. It is found that the EAEU 
Treaty established its own legal order and its sources under the heading of ‘Union Law’. 
However, the hierarchy of rules and even the legal force of some of the acts is not always 
clear. Further, a problematic issue concerns the compatibility between the national 
constitutional law of EAEU Members and their obligations under the EAEU legal framework, 
especially in the cases of Russia and Belarus. The former has rather activist courts, which have 
and still can challenge the authority of the EAEU Court; while the latter effectively allows for 
the Constitutional Court to check the compatibility of decisions of the Commission with 
national laws and decrees. It is argued in this chapter that some of the concerns can be 
mitigated through an increased interinstitutional dialogue between the judicial authorities and 
a ‘living document’ constitutional interpretation. 
The ability of the EAEU Court to fulfil its aim of ensuring uniform application and 
interpretation of Union law is the main focus of Chapter 6. It is illustrated that some basic 
judicial remedies available in the EAEU are similar to those in the EU. However, most 
importantly, it is also established that procedures, crucial for legal order autonomy, are absent 
and no suitable substitutes to replace them are available. Thus, there is no viable mechanism 
ensuring uniform application and interpretation of Union law in all Member States; and the 
Commission cannot challenge Member States’ infringements in the Court. It is argued in the 
chapter that these challenges are the hardest to overcome. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated 
that, in particular, regardless the absence of a provision on exclusive jurisdiction, the Court’s 
kompetenz-kompetenz to determine its jurisdiction coupled with the duty of loyal cooperation 
can play a key role in establishing it. Further, it is argued that the limitation on the creation of 
new norms by the Court is virtually impossible to uphold in practice. 
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Overall, this research demonstrates that the EAEU fulfils certain requirements of an 
autonomous legal order. In the first place, it complies with the essential preconditions through 
its system of Union law and international legal personality. There are also certain 
manifestations of the indicia of legal order autonomy. In particular, the supranational effect of 
legal norms is manifested in an established direct applicability of a range of rules: the EAEU 
Treaty establishes direct applicability of Commission decisions and the Court has already 
interpreted competition law provisions as well as certain international agreements as directly 
applicable. It does not automatically mean that this will lead to the recognition of a full-fledged 
direct effect in the legal order of EAEU Member States, although the Court is seemingly 
moving in this direction. The Court has also started incorporating the discourse of primacy in 
its rulings, which is not necessarily in line with the approach of the Member States’ judiciary. 
Nevertheless, the lack of an advanced mechanism ensuring uniform application and 
interpretation of Union law in all Member States (i.e. preliminary ruling) is the gravest concern 
for legal order autonomy as it endangers the ability of the legal order for self-maintenance. 
Moreover, coupled with the Commission’s inability to prosecute Member States, this increases 
the risk of misapplication of Union law and fragmentation of the legal system. 
The Court is also limited in its ability to interpret the powers of the Union as certain of 
its interpretations can be overruled by the Member States, and there is a clear restriction on 
vesting institutions with new powers (i.e. implied powers). However, this research 
demonstrates that the former has its limits and the latter can be overcome without 
encroachment on the principle of attributed powers. 
Institutional supranationality is almost non-existent in the EAEU, with the exception 
of the Commission Board and the Court. The issue whether Union law is of self-referential 
character is more controversial and is subject to continued monitoring of the development of 
the EAEU legal discourse. However, there are indications that favour this reading at least when 
the internal dimension of legal autonomy is concerned. 
To conclude, the EAEU legal order is without doubt far from the same type of legal 
order autonomy developed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
EAEU possesses a number of similar autonomy features allowing to say that the organization 
has a limited autonomy of the legal order. Nevertheless, it has troubles demonstrating some of 
the indicia. Even though this research demonstrates that certain limitations can be mitigated 
through interpretation, others are beyond the scope of pure interpretative powers and require 
Treaty amendments. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
De Euraziatische Economische Unie (EEU) is een nieuwe internationale organisatie 
opgericht op het grondgebied van de voormalige Sovjet-Unie. Het is gebaseerd op eerdere 
initiatieven tot regionale integratie en is, volgens de initiatiefnemers, geïnspireerd door het 
voorbeeld van de Europese Unie (EU). Dit blijkt onder andere uit de verschillende 
verwijzingen naar de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie (HvJ) in de 
jurisprudentie van het Hof van de EEU.  
Deze doctoraatstudie onderzoekt de juridische eigenschappen en werking van de EEU 
door het theoretisch kader van de rechtsautonomie van de rechtsorde dat voornamelijk 
geassocieerd wordt met de EU en de rechtspraak van het HvJ. De doelstelling van dit 
onderzoek is om na te gaan of de EEU gekwalificeerd kan worden als een autonome 
rechtsorde. Deze studie heeft verschillende criteria ontwikkeld het concept autonome 
rechtsorde. Bij gebrek aan een duidelijke definitie van een autonome rechtsorde bleken deze 
criteria nuttig om het complexte juridische system van de EEU te onderzoeken. 
Er zijn essentiële randvoorwaarden waaraan een autonome rechtsorde moet voldoen, 
zoals het bestaan van een rechtsorde en internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid. Hoofdstuk 1 
identificeert verder de volgende criteria: een zelfreferentieel karakter van het recht, 
supranationale juridische mechanismen (een mechanisme dat de uniforme interpretatie en 
toepassing van het Unierecht in alle lidstaten en exclusieve jurisdictie verzekert), 
supranationaal effect van juridische normen (directe werking en voorrang), interpretatie van 
bevoegdheidsverdeling en institutionele supranationaliteit. 
Het volgende hoofdstuk onderzoekt de historische achtergrond, evolutie en context van 
de EEU, inclusief het juridische karakter van de EEU en de verschillende entiteiten waarop 
het is gebaseerd. Hoofdstuk 2 identificeert vier relevante periodes in de ontwikkeling van de 
EEU. Ondanks het feit dat deze periodes niet succesvol waren slaagden Wit-Rusland, Rusland 
en Kazakstan er in om de funderingen uit te bouwen voor integratie en om dit te formaliseren 
in het Verdrag van de EEU. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de werking van de EEU inzake institutionele structuur en 
besluitvorming met een specifieke focus op de commissie van de EEU als het voornaamste 
regulerend orgaan waarvan er wordt beweerd dat het een supranationaal karakter heeft. Dit 
hoofdstuk spreekt deze bewering  tegen door te wijzen op de voornamelijk 
intergouvernementele werking van de EEU en de Commissie van de EEU. Dit hoofdstuk 
analyseert ook de structuur van het Hof van de EEU als de belangrijkste instelling waarop de 
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autonome rechtsorde is gestoeld. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat de geschiedenis van de oprichting 
van het Hof van de EEU en de regels betreffende haar samenstelling vragen oproepen met 
betrekking tot rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid.  
Vervolgens wordt de focus gelegd op de bevoegdheden van de EEU. Net zoals in de 
EU is het principe van bevoegdheidstoedeling de basis van de werking van de EEU. Een aantal 
bevoegdheden vallen onder de exclusieve bevoegdheid van de EEU, maar deze zijn echter 
beperkt en er is geen duidelijke typologie van bevoegdheden. De doctrine van impliciete 
bevoegdheden wordt onderzocht als een manifestatie van de mogelijkheid van het Hof van de 
EEU om bevoegdheden te interpreteren en de poging van de lidstaten om deze optie teniet te 
doen. Hoofdstuk 4 demonstreert dat het Verdrag van de EEU het Hof van de EEU niet 
onmogelijk maakt om tot een gebalanceerde doctrine te komen met betrekking tot impliciete 
bevoegdheden. Het Hof is daarom in staat om haar bevoegdheid inzake 
bevoegdheidsverdeling uit te oefenen en de autonomie van de rechtsorde van te versterken.    
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt het juridisch systeem van de EEU verder onderzocht. Er wordt 
geconcludeerd dat het Verdrag van de EEU een eigen rechtsorde en rechtsbronnen opricht 
onder de titel ‘Recht van de Unie’. De hiërarchie van de rechtsregels en hun juridische 
afdwingbaarheid zijn echter niet altijd duidelijk. Bovendien is de compatibiliteit tussen het 
nationaal grondwettelijk recht van de EEU lidstaten en de verplichtingen onder het juridisch 
kader van de EEU problematisch, vooral in het geval van Rusland en Wit-Rusland. Rusland 
heeft activistische rechtbanken die reeds de bevoegdheden van het Hof van de EEU hebben 
betwist. In Wit-Rusland kan het grondwettelijk hof de compatibiliteit van beslissingen van de 
commissie van de EEU met nationaal recht controleren. Er wordt geargumenteerd in dit 
hoofdstuk dat dit probleem gedeeltelijk kan worden opgelost door een sterkere 
interinstitutionele  dialoog tussen de verschillende gerechtelijke autoriteiten en een actieve 
grondwettelijke interpretatie. 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt of het Hof van de EEU een uniforme interpretatie en 
toepassing van het Unierecht kan garanderen. Er wordt aangetoond dat enkele standaard 
rechtsmiddelen in de EEU gelijkaardig zijn aan die in de EU. Er wordt echter aangetoond dat 
procedures die cruciaal zijn voor een autonome rechtsorde afwezig zijn. Er is daarom geen 
degelijk mechanisme aanwezig dat de uniforme interpretatie en toepassing van het Unierecht 
in alle lidstaten kan garanderen. Bovendien kan de commissie inbreuken van de lidstaten niet 
aanvechten voor het Hof. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat deze beperkingen moeilijk te 
overbruggen zijn. Desalniettemin wordt er aangetoond dat, ongeacht de afwezigheid van een 
bepaling betreffende exclusieve bevoegdheid, de kompetenz-kompetenz om de jurisdictie te 
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bepalen, gekoppeld aan de verplichting tot loyale samenwerking, een belangrijke rol kan 
spelen om exclusieve bevoegdheden uit te bouwen. Er wordt ook geargumenteerd dat de 
beperking voor het Hof om nieuwe regels uit te vaardigen in de praktijk niet houdbaar is. 
De algemene conclusie is dat de EEU aan bepaalde criteria van een autonome 
rechtsorde voldoet. In de eerste plaats voldoet het aan de essentiële randvoorwaarden door 
haar system van Unierecht en internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid. Er wordt ook gedeeltelijk 
aan enkele bijkomende criteria voor een autonome rechtsorde voldaan. Zo er een 
supranationaal effect van juridische normen door de directe toepasbaarheid van verschillende 
rechtsregels; het Verdrag van de EEU voorziet in de rechtstreekse toepasselijkheid van 
beslissingen van de commissie en het Hof heeft al rechtstreekse toepasselijkheid toegekend 
aan mededingingsregels en verschillende internationale overeenkomsten. Dit betekent niet dat 
dit automatisch zal leiden tot de erkenning van een volwaardige directe werking in de 
rechtsorde van de lidstaten van de EEU (ook al gaat het Hof in deze richting). Het Hof gebruikt 
nu ook verwijzingen naar het principe van voorrang in haar rechtspraak, ook al is dit niet 
noodzakelijk in lijn met de rechtspraak van de rechtbanken van de lidstaten van de EEU. 
Desalniettemin, het gebrek aan een mechanisme dat een uniforme interpretatie en 
toepassing van het Unierecht garandeert in alle lidstaten (bv. een prejudiciële procedure) is de 
belangrijkste tekortkoming. Dit, gekoppeld met de onmogelijkheid van de commissie om 
lidstaten voor het Hof te brengen, verhoogt het risico dat het Unierecht niet correct wordt 
toegepast en dat het juridisch systeem fragmenteert.  
Het Hof heeft ook beperkte mogelijkheden om de bevoegdheden van de Unie te 
bepalen aangezien de lidstaten dit in sommige gevallen kunnen verwerpen. Bovendien kan het 
Hof de bevoegdheden van de instellingen van de EEU niet verder uitbreiden (bv. door 
impliciete bevoegdheden). Institutionele supranationaliteit is bijna volledig afwezig in de 
EEU, met uitzondering van de Raad van de Commissie en het Hof. De vraag of het Unierecht 
zelfreferentieel is, is moeilijk te beantwoorden. Dit vereist een continue opvolging van de 
ontwikkeling van de autonomie van de rechtsorde van de EEU. Er zijn echter positieve 
aanwijzingen dat dit het geval is met betrekking tot de interne dimensie van de autonomie van 
de rechtsorde.  
De conclusie van dit onderzoek is dat de autonomie van de rechtsorde van de  EEU 
veraf staat van die van de EU (zoals ontwikkeld in de rechtspraak van het HvJ). De EEU deelt 
enkele kenmerken met de EU waardoor er geconcludeerd kan worden dat de organisatie een 
beperkte autonome rechtsorde heeft. Aan sommige criteria wordt echter niet voldaan. Dit 
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onderzoek toont aan dat sommige van deze beperkingen inzake autonomie van de rechtsorde 
kunnen worden opgelost door interpretatie, andere beperkingen kunnen echter alleen worden 
opgelost door het Verdrag van de EEU te wijzigen. 
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Беларускае рэзюмэ 
Еўразійскі эканамічны саюз (далей – ЕАЭС)  – гэта новая міжнародная 
арганізацыя на постсавецкай прасторы. Яна створана на аснове рэгіянальных 
інтэграцыйных ініцыятываў, але таксама сцвярджае пра выкарыстанне лепшых практык 
Еўрапейскага саюза (далей – ЕС). Адным з відавочных паказчыкаў гэтага ў прававой 
сферы з’яўляецца мноства спасылак на судовыя справы Суда ЕС у рашэннях Суда 
ЕАЭС. 
Дадзеная дысертацыя даследуе прававую прыроду і функцыянаванне ЕАЭС праз 
тэарэтычную канцэпцыю аўтаномнага правапарадку, якая ў значнай ступені 
асацыюецца з ЕС і судовымі рашэннямі Суда ЕС. Такім чынам, дадзенае даследаванне 
спрабуе знайсці адказ на пытанне ці можна кваліфікаваць ЕАЭС як аўтаномны 
правапарадак? У рамках даследавання быў выпрацаваны шэраг адзнакаў унутранай і 
знешняй аўтаноміі правапарадку, якія, у адсутнасці дэфініцыі апошняга, сталі зручным 
інструментам для раскрыцця складанай прававой сістэмы і функцыянавання ЕАЭС. 
У той час як дадзеныя адзнакі з’яўляюцца праяўленнем аўтаноміі, існуюць 
пэўныя неабходныя перадумовы, якія павінны быць выкананыя перадусім, а менавіта 
наяўнасць правапарадку і міжнародная правасуб’ектнасць. Раздзел 1 таксама вызначае 
наступныя адзнакі аўтаноміі правапарадку: самаадносны характар права; 
наднацыянальныя судовыя механізмы (механізм, які забяспечвае аднастайнае 
прымяненне і тлумачэнне права ва ўсіх дзяржавах-чальцах, і механізм, які забяспечвае 
выключную юрысдыкцыю); наднацыянальнае дзеянне прававых нормаў (прамое 
дзеянне і вяршэнства); тлумачэнне размеркавання паўнамоцтваў; і інстытуцыйная 
наднацыянальнасць. 
У наступным раздзеле разглядаецца гісторыя, эвалюцыя і кантэкст еўразійскай 
інтэграцыі, уключна з прававой прыродай ЕАЭС і ўтварэнняў на аснове якіх ён 
сфармаваны. У Раздзеле 2 вызначаюцца чатыры рэлевантныя стадыі еўразійскай 
інтэграцыі. Пазначаецца, што нягледзячы на шэраг няўдалых спробаў, Беларусь, 
Казахстан і Расія здолелі стварыць адносна жыццяздольнае ядро, якое можа штурхаць 
інтэграцыю наперад і, у выніку, фармалізаваць яго ў Дамове пра ЕАЭС. 
Раздзел 3 раскрывае функцыянаванне ЕАЭС датычна інстытуцыйнай структуры 
і сістэмы прыняцця рашэнняў з адмысловым фокусам на Еўразійскай эканамічнай 
камісіі як асноўнага рэгулятыўнага органа, які, як сцвярджаецца, мае наднацыянальны 
характар. Дадзенае даследаванне аспрэчвае дадзеную ідэю наднацыянальнасці праз 
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раскрыццё пераважна міждзяржаўнага спосабу функцыянавання не толькі ЕАЭС, але і 
самой Камісіі. Гэты раздзел таксама разглядае структуру Суда ЕАЭС, як галоўнага 
органа, ад якога залежыць аўтаномнасць правапарадку. Гісторыя яго станаўлення і 
нормы, паводле якіх ажыццяўляецца яго фармаванне выклікаюць пытанне судовай 
незалежнасці. 
Далей, даследаванне факусуецца на паўнамоцтвах ЕАЭС. Падобна да ЕС, 
функцыянаванне ЕАЭС заснавана на прынцыпе перададзеных паўнамоцтваў, і шэраг 
сфераў падпадаюць пад яго выключную кампетэнцыю. Аднак колькасць такіх 
паўнамоцтваў даволі абмежаваная, і адсутнічае іх дакладная тыпалогія. Адмысловая 
ўвага надаецца дактрыне меркаваных паўнамоцтваў, як праяўленню здольнасці судовай 
установы тлумачыць паўнамоцтвы, а таксама дзеля спробы дзяржаваў-чальцоў 
абмежаваць такую мажлівасць у Дамове пра ЕАЭС. Раздзел 4 паказвае, што адпаведныя 
нормы Дамовы пра ЕАЭС насамрэч не прадухіляюць Суд ЕАЭС ад вызначэння 
збалансаванага падыходу да меркаваных паўнамоцтваў. Такім чынам, у Суда ёсць 
мажлівасць інтэрпрэтацыі паўнамоцтваў у тым ліку і ў гэтым аспекце і забяспечваць 
аўтаномію правапарадку. 
У Раздзеле 5 аналізуецца праўная сістэма ЕАЭС. Дамова пра ЕАЭС вызначыла 
ўласны правапарадак і сістэму крыніцаў права, аб’яднаных у “Права Саюза”. Аднак, не 
заўжды мажліва вызначыць іерархію нормаў і, нават, праўную сілу некаторых актаў. 
Больш за тое, праблемным пытаннем з’яўляецца сумяшчальнасць нацыянальнага 
канстытуцыйнага права дзяржаваў-чальцоў ЕАЭС і іх абавязкаў у рамках права Саюза, 
асабліва ў выпадку Расійскай Федэрацыі і Рэспублікі Беларусь. У Расіі досыць 
праактыўныя судовыя ўстановы; а Канстытуцыйны Суд Рэспублікі Беларусь можа 
правяраць акты Камісіі на адпаведнасць законам і дэкрэтам прэзідэнта. У дадзеным 
раздзеле сцвярджаецца, што некаторыя праблемы можна змягчыць праз павелічэнне 
міжінстытуцыйнага дыялогу судовых установаў і праз інтэрпрэтацыю канстытуцыі як 
“жывога дакумента”. 
Здольнасць Суда ЕАЭС забяспечыць дасягненне мэты па забеспячэнні 
аднастайнага прымянення права Саюза з’яўляецца асноўным фокусам Раздзела 6. 
Вызначаецца, што некаторыя асноўныя сродкі судовай абароны даступныя ў ЕАЭС 
падобныя да тых, якія ўласцівыя ЕС. Аднак, што найбольш важна, таксама вызначаецца, 
што сродкі судовай абароны, якія маюць вырашальнае значэнне для аўтаноміі 
правапарадку, адсутнічаюць і не маюць прыдатных заменаў. Так, адсутнічае 
паўнавартасны механізм забеспячэння аднастайнага прымянення і тлумачэння права 
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Саюза на тэрыторыі ўсіх дзяржаваў-чальцоў; а Камісія не можа звяртацца ў Суд у 
выпадку невыканання абавязкаў у рамках Дамовы пра ЕАЭС дзяржавамі-чальцамі. 
Прыводзяцца аргументы, што гэтыя выклікі найбольш складана пераадолець. Тым не 
менш, паказана, што нягледзячы на адсутнасць палажэнняў пра выключную 
кампетэнцыю, Суд валодае kompetenz-kompetenz па вызначэнні ўласнай кампетэнцыі, 
што, сумесна з абавязкам дзяржаваў-чальцоў па “лаяльным супрацоўніцтве” можа мець 
ключавую ролю ў яе забеспячэнні. Звыш таго, прыводзяцца аргументы, што 
абмежаванне па стварэнні новых нормаў Судом не мажліва ажыццявіць на практыцы. 
Агулам, праведзенае даследаванне паказала, што ЕАЭС адпавядае некаторым 
патрабаванням аўтаномнага правапарадку. У першую чаргу, ён выконвае асноўныя 
перадумовы праз уласную сістэму права Саюза і міжнародную правасуб’ектнасць. 
Таксама відавочныя пэўныя праяўленні паказчыкаў аўтаноміі правапарадку. 
Наднацыянальнае дзеянне праўных нормаў праяўляецца ў вызначаным непасрэдным 
прымяненні шэрагу з іх: Дамова пра ЕАЭС вызначае непасрэднае дзеянне  рашэнняў 
Камісіі і Суд ужо інтэрпрэтаваў палажэнні права канкурэнцыі і некаторыя міжнародныя 
пагадненні, як тыя, якія прымяняюцца непасрэдна. Гэта не азначае аўтаматычна, што 
прызнаецца паўнавартасны наўпросты эфект ў правапарадках дзряжаваў-чальцоў, хаця 
Суд, падаецца, рухаецца ў дадзеным накірунку. Суд таксама пачаў інкарпараваць 
дыскурс ‘вяршэнства’ ў свае рашэнні, што не абавязкова супадае з падыходамі судовых 
установаў дзяржаваў-чальцоў. 
Тым не менш, адсутнасць механізму забеспячэння аднастайнасці прымянення і 
тлумачэння права Саюза ва ўсіх дзяржавах-чальцах (прэюдыцыі) з’яўляецца найбольш 
сур’ёзным выклікам для аўтаноміі правапарадку, паколькі гэта ставіць пад небяспеку 
здольнасць правапарадку да самападтрымання. Больш за тое, у спалучэнні з 
немажлівасцю Камісіі звяртацца ў Суд датычна парушэнняў дзяржаваў-чальцоў, 
павялічваецца рызыка неадпаведнага прымянення права Саюза і фрагментацыі 
прававой сістэмы. 
Суд таксама абмежаваны ў сваёй здольнасці тлумачыць паўнамоцтвы Саюза, 
паколькі пэўная яго інтэрпрэтацыя можа можа быць скаcаваная дзяржавамі-чальцамі, і 
існуюць пазітыўна-прававыя абмежаванні па надзяленні органаў Саюза новымі 
паўнамоцтвамі (меркаванымі паўнамоцтвамі). Аднак, дадзенае даследаванне паказала, 
што першае мае межы, а другое можа быць пераадолена без парушэння прынцыпа 
перададзеных паўнамоцтваў. 
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Інстытуцыйная наднацыянальнасць практычна адсутнічае ў ЕАЭС за 
выключэннем Калегіі Камісіі і Суда. Пытанне самаадноснага характару права Саюза 
з’яўляецца больш спрэчным і патрабуе далейшага маніторынгу развіцця праўнага 
наратыву ЕАЭС. Аднак, ёсць прызнакі на карысць дадзенага прачытання, ва ўсялякім 
разе датычна ўнутранага аспекту аўтаноміі правапарадку. 
На заканчэнне, правапарадак ЕАЭС без сумневу далёкі ад таго тыпу аўтаномнага 
правапарадку, які быў выпрацаваны у судовай практыцы Суда ЕС. ЕАЭС валодае 
шэрагам падобных характэрных рысаў аўтаноміі, што дазваляе казаць пра абмежаваную 
аўтаномнасць правапарадку. Тым не менш, існуюць праблемы з выяўленнем некаторых 
адзнакаў. Нягледзячы на тое, што дадзенае даследаванне паказала мажлівасць 
змягчэння пэўных абмежаванняў праз тлумачэнне, іншыя выходзяць за межы выключна 
інтэрпрэтацыйных паўнамоцтваў і патрабуюць зменаў ў Дамову пра ЕАЭС. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Regional economic integration has become a widespread phenomenon proliferating to 
various regions of the world.6 Multiple reasons of political and economic character can be 
given to explain the process. Some of the reasons are well-grasped in Ravenhill’s analysis: 
using economic means for political ends, such as improvement of relations between states or 
enhancing security in a region; improving of negotiating position with other trading partners 
and transnational corporations; enhancing the credibility of domestic economic reforms; 
necessity of deeper cooperation of states for mutually beneficial economic development, 
which is easier to achieve in a regional framework due to a limited circle of stakeholders; 
ability to protect economic areas, which would not be able to withstand global competition; 
ability to ensure deeper integration in the region due to easier negotiation of agreements with 
fewer members; creation of a larger market; attracting investments, and others.7 
Albeit the list is not complete, this tendency has put to the forefront the issue of 
effective regulatory framework for such processes. Regional economic integration and related 
regulatory issues are relevant for the post-Soviet region since significant political, economic 
and legal changes have been taking place in the last decades. Since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, new constitutions were adopted with a view to accommodate the new national 
and international realities and discourses. In the meantime, independent states almost 
immediately pursued integration processes. Three of them—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—
started the long process of integration into the European Communities and, later, the EU.8 
Most other post-Soviet countries pursued integration among themselves, leading to new 
regional international organizations, free trade areas, customs unions, and bilateral integration 
initiatives.9 
The latest example of regional integration in the post-Soviet space is the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), which is an international organization established on 1 January 
2015 and currently consisting of five Member States: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The organization builds upon past regional integration initiatives, 
                                                 
6 For an overview and monitoring of the dynamics see P. De Lombaerde, Indicator-based monitoring of 
regional economic integration (New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017), 7. 
7 J. Ravenhill, Global Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2008), 8-27. 
8 For a profound study of this process from legal and political perspectives see P. Van Elsuwege, From Soviet 
republics to EU member states : a legal and political assessment of the Baltic states' accession to the EU, 2 
vols. (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 
9 See A. Libman and E. Vinokurov, 20 Years of Post-Soviet Integration: Holding-Together Regionalism (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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namely the Eurasian Economic Community (hereinafter ‘EURASEC’) and the Russia-
Kazakhstan-Belarus Customs Union. Apart from importance of profound research on the topic 
for the regional actors, it also has relevance for the ΕU. Even though there are no official links 
between the two organizations, there are discussions flowing about bringing them closer 
together.10 The primary interest, however, is on the EAEU side, not the least because it has 
been constantly reiterated in public discourse, including the highest political level, that the 
EAEU follows the best practices of the most successful example of supranational 
integration—the EU. 11  The case law of the EAEU Court, as well as its predecessor the 
EURASEC Court, shows abundance of references to the case law of the ECJ. Indeed, about 
half of the rulings of both the EAEU and EURASEC Courts cite the case law of case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter ‘CJEU’) (see Annexes I and II). After 
all, the EU experience is a sort of laboratory from which other international organizations can 
learn.12 As one of the interviewees from the EAEU Court opined, the is closer to the EAEU 
Court in terms of competence, as compared to other international tribunals, and many pertinent 
issues have already been solved there.13 However, the specifics of Eurasian integration must 
be taken into account. 14  Indeed, given that the EU has achieved the highest degree of 
integration, its experience is relevant at least a maiori ad minus.15 However, this becomes 
relevant if the context of European integration is taken into account, as just a copy-paste 
exercise does not seem to work, possibly ending as just a corpus alienum.16 
This study of the EAEU is also very timely as the organization has been relatively 
recently created and relatively little legal research has been done on the topic, especially as far 
as English-language literature is concerned. Most of the literature on the EAEU is still in the 
field of political science or economics,17 whereas the few legal studies often predate the 
                                                 
10 E.g., A. Sytas, "Exclusive: EU's Juncker dangles trade ties with Russia-led bloc to Putin," Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-juncker-russia-idUSKCN0T821T20151119. 
11 See G. Van der Loo and P. Van Elsuwege, "Competing Paths of Regional Economic Integration in the Post-
Soviet Space," Review of Central and East European Law, no. 37 (4) (2012): 433; See also R. Goncharenko, 
"Russia plans Eurasian Union on EU model,"  http://www.dw.de/russia-plans-eurasian-union-on-eu-model/a-
15615047. 
12 W. Friedmann, The changing structure of international law (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1964), 
113-14. 
13 Interview 3 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
14 Ibid. 
15 B. Simma, "Self-contained regimes," Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 16 (1985): 124. 
16 H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 4th rev. ed. 
(Boston, Mass.; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), 838; See also Annika Björkdahl et al., Importing EU norms : 
conceptual framework and empirical findings, United Nations University Series on Regionalism (Cham: 
Springer, 2015). 
17 See e.g. G.G. Mokrov, Evraziiskii ekonomicheskii soiuz: instrumenty zashchity vnutrennego rynka ot 
nedobrosovestnoi konkurencii (Moscow: Prospekt, 2016); P. Dutkiewicz and R. Sakwa, eds., Eurasian 
Integration - The view from Within, Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series (Routledge, 
2014); D. Cadier, ed. The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, LSE IDEAS Reports (LSE, 2014); Y. 
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establishment of the EAEU,18 or are done in the form of textbooks rather than profound 
researches.19 However, it must be noted that the establishment of the EAEU has spurred active 
usage of the concept of integration law in the post-Soviet academic space: both textbooks20 
and monographs21 have been published under this title.22  Albeit the concept is not well-
developed and is not without critics,23 the EAEU (and always the EU), among others, is 
studied under this heading. 
Regardless these developments, only one PhD thesis has been defended on EAEU law 
so far,24 and there is only a handful of theses devoted to its predecessors EURASEC and 
Customs Union, which are focused primarily on economics and politics.25 
                                                 
Vymyatina and D. Antonova, Creating a Eurasian Union: Economic Integration of the Former Soviet 
Republics (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014); Evraziiskii ekonomichiskii soiuz: makroekonomicheskaia 
stabil'nos't' i ekonomicheskii rost,  (Moscow: Eurasian Economic Commission, 2014); Among textbooks see 
A.V. Zhurova, Torgovlia uslugami v Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom soiuze (Moscow: Prospekt, 2016). 
18 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, eds., Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013); A. Kashirkina and A. Morozov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovye modeli Evropeiskogo soiuza i 
Tamozhennogo soiuza: sravnitelnyi analiz (Moscow: Institut zakonodatelstva i sravnitelnogo pravovedeniia pri 
Pravitelstve RF; Iuridicheskaia firma 'Kontrakt', 2012); Z. Kembayev, Legal Aspects of the Regional 
Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Area (Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer, 2009); S.Y. Kashkin, ed. Osnovy 
pravovogo regulirovaniia integratsionnykh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve (Moscow: Norma, 2013). 
19 K. Bekiashev and E. Moiseev, Pravo Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza (Moscow: Prospekt, 2016); E. 
Moiseev, ed. Mezhdunarodno-pravovye osnovy sozdaniia i funkcionirovniia Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo 
soiuza (Moscow: Prospekt, 2015); S. Kashkin, ed. Pravo Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza (Moscow: 
Prospekt, 2016); Among the few exceptions see A.I. Chuchaev, ed. Pravovoe obespechenie integratsionnykh 
protsessov v ramkakh Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza (Moscow: Prospekt, 2017); S.A. Glotov, ed. 
Pravo Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza: teoriia i praktika (Moscow: Galleia-print, 2016); K.A. 
Ponomareva, Pravovoe regulirovanie nalogooblozheniia pribyli i dokhodov v Evropeiskom soiuze, Evraziiskom 
ekonomicheskom soiuze i Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: Infotropik Media, 2017); S.V. Starodubtsev, Sistema 
tamozhennogo prava Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza (Moscow: EAAN, 2015); For a general study of 
legal aspects of regional economic integration, which also covers the EAEU see T.N. Mikhaliova, Pravovoe 
regulirovanie regional'noi ekonomicheskoi integratsii: vyzovy i perspektivy (Minsk: Institut radiologii, 2016); 
For an attempt to create a rather wide concept of 'Eurasian law' see R.A. Kurbanov, Evraziiskoe pravo: 
teoreticheskie osnovy (Moscow: UNITI-DANA, 2015); Evraziiskaia integratsiia i pravo (Moscow: UNITY-
DANA, 2016). 
20 S.Y. Kashkin, ed. Osnovy integratsionnogo prava (Moscow: Prospekt, 2014); Integratsionnoe pravo 
(Moscow: Prospekt, 2017); V.A. Shamakhov, V.P. Kirilenko, and S.Y. Kashkin, eds., Mezhdunarodnaia 
integratsiia i integratsionnoe pravo (Saint Petersburg: IPTs SZIU, 2017).  
21 S.Y. Kashkin, ed. Integratsionnoe pravo v sovremennom mire: sravnitel'no-pravovoe issledovanie (Moscow: 
Prospekt, 2017); K.A. Ponomareva, Nalogovoe pravo integratsionnykh ob"edinenii: opyt Evropeiskogo soiuza i 
Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza (Omsk: Izdatel'stvo Omskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2016); 
S.Y. Kashkin and K.I. Trubacheva, eds., Novye tendentsii razvitiia integratsionnogo i evropeiskogo prava 
(Moscow: Iustitsiia, 2016).  
22 It has been complemented by the notion of integration justice devoted to courts. See e.g. S.Y. Kashkin, ed. 
Integratsionnoe pravosudie v sovremennom mire: osnovnye modeli (Moscow: Norma; Infra-M, 2014); 
Integratsionnoe pravosudie: sushchnost' i perspectivy (Moscow: Norma; Infra-M, 2014). 
23 See e.g. A.S. Ispolinov, "Chto skryvaetsia za broskim terminom "integratsionnoe pravosudie"," Pravo. 
Zhurnal Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, no. 3 (2017). 
24 P.P. Myslivsky, "Mezhdunarodno-pravovoe regulirovanie sozdaniia Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza i 
sposoba razresheniia sporov" (National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2015). 
25 T.A. Mansurov, "Metodologicheskie i institutsionalnye osnovy integratsii stran EvrAzES" (Institut 
ekonomiki RAN, 2012); A.L. Moiseev, "Razvitie integratsionnykh obrazovanii na postsovetskom prostranstve: 
Na primere EvrAzES" (Uralskii gosudarstvennyi ekonomicheskii universitet, 2006)ibid.; A. Aituar, "The 
Impact of the Eurasian Customs Union on the Economy of Kazakhstan" (The University of Reading, 2016); 
 4 
This thesis will therefore close this gap by providing an analysis of the legal nature and 
functioning of the new entity. The theoretical framework taken for this research is the concept 
of legal order autonomy. To start from afar, the idea behind choosing this framework follows 
from one of the main objectives of the EAEU, which is “to create proper conditions for 
sustainable economic development of the Member States in order to improve the living 
standards of their population”. 26  This objective is therefore set to address the economic 
problems people experience, and the framework tool adopted thereto is closer economic 
integration. From the economic point of view, the assumption is that economic integration 
brings about economic prosperity. From the legal point of view, one has to believe in some 
degree of autonomy of the institutions established and of the ensuing legal order to bring about 
this economic integration. 
Legal order autonomy is largely associated with the EU,27 and the autonomy of the EU 
legal order is widely accepted in practice and doctrine, and therefore, constitutes an intriguing 
framework for analysing the regulatory framework of the EAEU. After all, policy makers 
explicitly referred to the EU as a source of inspiration for the EAEU.28 
The key research question of this thesis is based on these considerations and is 
formulated as follows: can the EAEU be qualified as an autonomous legal order, comparable 
to that of the EU? The answer to this question will require exploration of a number of sub-
questions: What are the constitutive elements of an autonomous legal order? What is the legal 
nature of the EAEU? What is the rationale of the EAEU institutional structures? Is there a 
definite legal system in the EAEU? Given the crucial role the EU judiciary has played in the 
European integration process and formation of the autonomous legal order, is the EAEU Court 
capable of playing a similar role? The identified questions require determining key concepts 
and comprehensive unpacking of the legal changes that accompany the creation and 
functioning of the EAEU. 
                                                 
Among the theses devoted to the EAEU, albeit not in legal field, see M. Hamilton, "The Eurasian Economic 
Union and the Prospects of Monetary Integration" (The Claremont Graduate University, 2018); S.A. Avarskii, 
"Osobennosti formirovaniia i perspektivy razvitiia Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza" (Rossiisii 
ekonomicheskii universitet im. G.V. Plekhanova, 2017); L.A. Arakelyan, "The Eurasian Union: Do Not Count 
Your Member States before they are Hatched" (University of Miami, 2015). 
26 Art.4 TEAEU. This is not to deny the existence of other objectives, both explicit and implicit, including 
(geo)political ones. 
27 See Chapter 1. 
28 See e.g. Putin’s special article on Eurasian integration: V.V. Putin, "Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii 
- budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia," Izvestia, https://iz.ru/news/502761. The English version of the 
article is available here: "A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making," Izvestia, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-
ru/dv/dru_2013_0320_06_/dru_2013_0320_06_en.pdf. 
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Overall description of the study 
1.1 Methodology 
This study employs a multiplicity of methods to answer the research question. It mainly 
follows the critical-analytical doctrinal approach to examining the problems, explaining the 
EAEU legal order, and identifying the new features the EAEU legal order has brought about, 
if any. This approach consists of desk research of primary legal sources, case law, and doctrine. 
Although the EAEU has been established relatively recently, some important consequences of 
the established legal order have already occurred in practice showing important empirical 
evidence. Thus, although a foundational examination of the functioning of the EAEU legal 
order needs to be made on a legal positivist basis first by examining the law as it is, the study 
necessarily brings inputs from relevant judicial practice. Observation and analysis of how the 
text of the law translates into practice was considered an important addition to the analysis of 
the ‘law in books’. 
Qualitative research methods were applied in this study to complement desk research.29 
The aim of the qualitative research was to gather information on how the EAEU judges and 
their apparatus perceive EAEU law and experience its application. The methodological 
choices were guided by the research question, rather than theoretical considerations. One of 
the sources of qualitative information consisted of interviews with the representatives of the 
EAEU Court. The interviews were conducted primarily for the purpose of clarifying certain 
features of the EAEU legal order and approaches to their interpretation, when the information 
was not available otherwise or more precision was needed. The great advantage of the EAEU 
Court’s functioning for the research purposes is that judges are allowed to deliver dissenting 
opinions,30  an opportunity they actively exploit.31  This has been an additional source of 
information into the judges’ thinking.32 However, such a public expression of their views does 
not necessarily always reflect all of it. Therefore, a number of semi-structured anonymized 
                                                 
29 The primary source used to gain background information on these methodological approaches was A. 
Bryman, Social research methods, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
30 Art.79 Rules of Procedure of the Court adopted by Reshenie Vyshshego Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo 
soveta No.101. Ob utverzhdenii Reglamenta Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza. 23 December 2014. 
Although for the purposes of development of the legal system and for the issues of independence existence of 
dissenting opinions is a debatable question, which is touched upon in Chapter 3. 
31 They give dissenting opinions not only to judgments and advisory opinions, but also to resolutions 
dismissing the case, e.g. dissenting opinions of judges Neshataeva and Chaika to the Opinion SE-2-1/3-17-BK, 
Customs Duties (17 January 2018). 
32 Apart from their academic publication activity. 
 6 
interviews have been conducted33 on different levels of the Court: with an advisor within the 
Secretariat of the Court, advisor to a judge,34 a judge, and a President of the Court. 
Recognizing that the EAEU legal order requires a complex research of its various 
aspects, the methodological basis is further founded on three methods of general and 
specialized scientific inquiry: historical-legal, comparative and systems methods. The 
historical-legal method allows determining the historical evolution of the Eurasian integration 
process in the relevant international agreements and case law, discover legal forms, general 
principles and major stages of its development. Further, this study relies on the comparative 
method to juxtapose comparable situations and rules in the EAEU and the EU (as well as 
international practice in general where necessary). However, given the limited space (see 
foreword) and recognizing that, as Mallarmé suggested, ‘any comparison is, in advance, 
defective,’35 I try to avoid one-to-one comparison of many aspects of the functioning of the 
two organizations and stick to the most essentially necessary ones to answer the research 
question. This is clearly visible in e.g. Chapter 3, where I make only a basic comparison of the 
institutional designs of the two organisations and in Chapter 2, where I do not review the EU’s 
integration history for comparative purposes, or in Chapter 6, where I give a comparative 
overview of judicial remedies, but for functional reasons in the majority of cases (for situating 
the EAEU judicial remedies to make it clearer for the reader), focusing only on the most 
pertinent aspects (such as the preliminary ruling procedure). Therefore, foremost, I analyse to 
what degree the experience and the legal principles developed within the EU’s autonomous 
legal order can be relevant for the EAEU, and to which degree the EAEU has borrowed those 
from the EU. One of the indicators used has been the references to ECJ case law in the practice 
of the EAEU Court and EURASEC Court (see Annexes I and II). The comparative method 
has been actively used when analysing the treaties on which the two organizations are based 
and the case law of the respective courts. The legislation and case law of national judiciaries 
of member states have also been actively engaged with comparatively, which is true not only 
to the member states of the respective organizations, but also other jurisdictions, in particular 
the case law of the US Supreme Court and of the International Court of Justice. 
Further, the systems method has been used, the essence of which is to study the 
organisation in its entirety, which means that the examination of the interplay of such relevant 
                                                 
33 Although not all of them have been explicitly cited in this thesis. The author conducted several other 
interviews with the officials from the EAEU institutions; however, these were not explicitly mentioned in this 
thesis. 
34 On the differences of these roles see Chapter 3. 
35 S. Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes, ed. B. Marchal, vol. 2 (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2003), 138. 
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factors as organisational structure, competences, institutions and their functioning is studied 
as much as each individual factor in itself.36 Under the umbrella of the theoretical  framework 
of legal order autonomy chosen for this research, the approach taken builds upon an interactive 
landscape of jurisdictions and legal orders rather than on a hierarchical model.37 
The systematic and composite application of the aforementioned methods in 
accordance with the research question ensures the comprehensiveness, completeness and 
depth of the research without losing the particular focus on identifying and analysing the most 
problematic and challenging concepts and norms, and on eventual deconstruction of the 
apology for existence of certain norms and their intended effects. 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
The aim of this study is to uncover whether the EAEU legal order qualifies as  
autonomous comparable to that of the EU. In order to achieve this aim, the following 
objectives have been set out: 
• to identify the indicia of an autonomous legal order; 
• to delimitate the boundaries of Eurasian integration; 
• to uncover the main issues related to the effective functioning of the EAEU legal order; 
• to discover the legal nature of the EAEU; 
• to explore the institutional functioning of the EAEU; 
• to analyse the power structure of the EAEU; 
• to trace the genesis of the implied powers doctrine; 
• to unpack the concept of “Law of the Union”; 
• to analyse the EAEU judiciary; 
• to discover which legal order autonomy indicia the EAEU legal order fulfils and to what 
degree; 
• to formulate proposals of rules relevant to the EAEU legal order autonomy to be 
included in the EAEU Treaty, its annexes, and international agreements within the 
EAEU. 
                                                 
36 M. Sørensen, "Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of 
International Organisations in the World Legal Order," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 32, 
no. 3 (1983). 
37 In this respect, mutatis mutandis, see the observation of Neil MacCormick that ‘<...> the most appropriate 
analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than monistic, and interactive rather than 
hierarchical.’ in N. MacCormick, "The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now," European Law Journal 1, no. 3 
(1995): 264. 
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The subject matter of the research is the EAEU as an international organization. The 
choice of the research object is determined by the aim and objectives of the research. 
The scope of the research is the legal framework of the formation and functioning of 
the EAEU, including the essential characteristics and features of the EAEU legal order. The 
research is based on studying doctrinal approaches, terminology, that is used in this field 
(‘autonomous legal order’, ‘supranationality’, ‘direct effect’, ‘implied powers’, ‘Eurasia’, 
etc.), international agreements, decisions of international institutions, national legislation of 
the Member States, international and national case law. 
1.3 Statements submitted for the defence 
Due to lack of a single doctrinal approach, the author developed indicia of an 
autonomous legal order. 
It is submitted that it is hardly possible to 1) identify strict criteria of legal order 
autonomy, and 2) make a comprehensive list thereof. This follows from the notion of an 
autonomous legal order as an essentially contested concept, which makes both the term itself 
and the criteria subject to constant contestation and change. However, it is possible to find 
evidence indicating a possibility for an autonomous legal order without implying an 
established system of requirements strict compliance with which delimits an autonomous legal 
order. Moreover, some of such indicia are not necessarily requirements of legal order 
autonomy, but are in fact inherent manifestations thereof. Further, it is claimed that legal order 
autonomy and supranationality are interconnected and have overlapping features. Based on 
these considerations, the following indicia of an autonomous legal order have been identified: 
self-referential character of law; supranational judicial mechanisms (comprising two sub-
indicia: mechanism ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all member states; and 
mechanism ensuring exclusive jurisdiction); supranational effect of legal norms (comprising 
two sub-indicia: direct effect; and primacy); interpretation of distribution of powers; 
institutional supranationality. 
The author proposes stages of Eurasian integration leading to the establishment of the 
EAEU-proper. 
International legal scholarship does not provide a single approach to Eurasian 
integration and its stages. With regard to the creation of the EAEU on the basis of the Customs 
Union, and guided by the aim to create a research tool focusing on the process that led to the 
formation and functioning of the EAEU, and distinguishing it from other integration projects, 
 9 
it is proposed to distinguish four consecutive stages of integration under the following time 
periods. The first stage (1992–1999) saw initial attempts to create a customs union through 
setting out objectives, which saw only limited implementation in practice. The second stage 
(2000–2006) was manifested by the formation of the EURASEC, which, regardless certain 
improvements, did not implement the objectives to a feasible extent. The third stage (2007–
2014) saw practical implementation of the concepts of multi-level and multi-speed integration, 
which led to finalization of the customs union. The fourth stage (2015 and after) is defined by 
the establishment and development of the EAEU. 
This periodization favourably differs from those proposed by scholarship to date, as it 
detaches the EAEU project from other integration projects, making it a useful research tool 
for this thesis and beyond. 
The Eurasian economic commission lacks institutional supranationality. 
Some scholarship and the official vocabulary of the Eurasian Economic Commission 
claiming it the first supranational institution in the post-Soviet space are unfounded.38 The 
Commission has a hybrid structure with different formation and decision-making systems. 
Within this structure only the Commission Council has elements of institutional 
supranationality, while the Commission Board is entirely an intergovernmental body. 
Therefore, the claim is that the EAEU Commission, as a whole, cannot qualify as a 
supranational institution in such a setting. Only the Commission Board can claim possession 
of elements of institutional supranationality. 
Deficiencies of the EAEU law concerning interrelation of legal force of EAEU acts, 
international agreements and national legal acts will lead to irregularities within the EAEU 
legal order. 
EAEU law requires settlement of the issues relating to the force of EAEU international 
agreements with third countries; effect of international agreements concluded by Member 
States without EAEU participation; interrelation of international agreements concluded by the 
EAEU with third countries and internal EAEU acts. The latter can lead to complications in 
case of norms contradicting to EAEU law. The issue becomes more problematic since such 
agreements have third parties as stakeholders, which are not EAEU Member States and are 
not bound by EAEU law. In case of a collision of legal rules, this situation can lead to 
complications in legal implementation and to disputes, including with third parties. 
                                                 
38 See e.g. self-description of the Commission on its official web-site: "About the Eurasian Economic 
Commission," Eurasian Economic Commission, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/Pages/about.aspx. 
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Ambiguous provisions of national law may lead to complications in enforcement of EAEU 
law. Thus, it may lead to priority of certain national rules over Union law and inability of 
individuals to protect their rights and legitimate interests. 
The EAEU Court is incapable of ensuring uniform application of EAEU law and 
effectiveness of the EAEU legal order. 
The EAEU Court will struggle to ensure effective functioning and autonomy of the 
EAEU legal order within the available legal framework due to limited competences and 
absence of the preliminary ruling procedure and virtual inability to prosecute infringements 
by Member States. The predicted effect of the current legal framework will lead to conflicting 
application of EAEU law by Member States. Three major attacks on the EAEU legal order 
have been identified. Firstly, it is the elimination of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
Secondly, it is a direct ban on “creating new norms”. Thirdly, it is a direct ban on the ability 
of the Court to establish implied powers. It is argued that these evolutions affect the potential 
of the EAEU to develop into an autonomous legal order comparable to that of the EU. 
The EAEU legal order fulfils conditiones sine qua nons for an autonomous legal order, 
possesses certain elements of most of indicia of an autonomous legal order, and lacks one 
indicium altogether. 
It is argued that the preconditions for internal and external legal order autonomy are in 
place. Moreover, the EAEU possesses a number of similar features of legal order autonomy 
as the EU does, which allows to say that the organization has certain autonomy of the legal 
order. At the same time, the EAEU has certain troubles demonstrating some indicia of legal 
order autonomy. It is fragile due to a lack of a number of tools to reinforce and maintain it. 
The most problematic points are necessarily the virtual inability of the EAEU Court to 
maintain the unity and uniform interpretation of law in all Member States. Therefore, the 
EAEU legal order requires solving certain fundamental issues in order to become an 
autonomous legal order comparable to the EU. 
1.4 Personal contribution of the defendant 
This research has been done independently by the author. All the statements that are 
submitted for the defence, conclusions and synthesis belong to the author and reflect his point 
of view regarding the functioning of the legal order of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
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1.5 Approbation of research results 
Statements and conclusions of the thesis were reported at the XVIII April International 
Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development (National Research University 
Higher School of Economics, Moscow 2017); Harvard Law School Institute for Global Law 
and Policy (IGLP): African Regional Workshop (University of Cape Town, Cape Town, 
January 2016); International Workshop “Regional and Constitutional Structures in Tension” 
(University of Geneva, Geneva, April 2016); International Conference “Development of 
Russian Law-IX: Russian Law and Globalization” (University of Helsinki, Helsinki, October 
2016); International Society of Public Law (ICON-S) Conference “Borders, Otherness and 
Public Law” (Humboldt University, Berlin, June 2016); First Annual Tartu Conference on 
Russian and East European Studies (University of Tartu, Tartu, June 2016); International 
Workshop “The Eurasian Economic Union: A significant legal actor?” (Ghent University, 
Ghent, December 2016); Institute for Global Law and Policy International Conference 
“Heterodox Traditions: Global Law & Policy” (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, June 
2015); Round Table “Legal Problems of Regional Integration: between European and Eurasian 
Integration Projects” in the framework of the II Moscow Legal Forum “State Sovereignty and 
Rule of Law: International and National Dimensions” (Moscow State Law Academy, 
Moscow, April 2015); 72nd Scientific conference of bachelor, master and PhD students of the 
Faculty of International Relations of the Belarusian State University (Belarusian State 
University, Minsk, April 2015); Round Table “Contemporary problems of regional economic 
integration” in the framework of the V Scientific Conference of Young Scholars of the Faculty 
of International Relations of the Belarusian State University “International relations: history, 
theory, and practice” (Belarusian State University, Minsk, February 2015); Institute for Global 
Law and Policy International Workshop (Education City, Doha, Qatar, January 2015); 
International Workshop “The Eurasian Economic Union: A new player on the international 
arena” (Ghent University, Ghent, October 2014); International Seminar “Eastern Partnership: 
challenges after the “Maidan” Revolution” (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, April 2014); 
International Workshop “The Eurasian Economic Union: A new player on the international 
arena” (Ghent University, Ghent, October 2014); International Jean Monnet Conference 
“European Union and the Republic of Belarus: cooperation prospects” (Belarusian State 
University, Minsk, June 2014); XXI and XXII International Conference of Students, PhD 
Students and Young Scholars “Lomonosov” (Moscow State University, Moscow, April 2014, 
April 2015); Seminar “Integration challenges on the way to the Eurasian Economic Union” 
(Belarusian State University, Minsk, December 2013); Round table “Belarus and the Eastern 
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Partnership Initiative: achievements and prospects” in the framework of the XII international 
scientific conference “Belarus in the contemporary world” (Belarusian State University, 
Minsk, October 2013); First republican scientific conference of young analysts “Agenda-
2015” (Minsk, September 2013); International scientific seminar “Eurasian integration: 
effectiveness, competitiveness, prospects” (Belarusian State University, Minsk, October 
2012); XI, XII, and XIII international scientific conferences “Belarus in the contemporary 
world” (Belarusian State University, Minsk, October 2012, October 2013, October 2014); 
International Workshop “Legal Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood of the European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space?” (Ghent 
University, Ghent, June 2012); II, IV, and V Scientific conferences of young scholars of the 
Faculty of International Relations of the Belarusian State University “International relations: 
history, theory, and practice” (Belarusian State University, Minsk, February 2012, February 
2014, February 2015). 
1.6 Publication of research results 
The author has published 10 publications on the topic of the dissertation: 4 academic 
articles (8.3 author’s sheets), all of which correspond to the requirements of para. 18 of the 
Regulation on awarding scientific degrees and conferring scientific tile in the Republic of 
Belarus, and two of which are indexed in the Web of Science and Scopus; 4 book chapters (6 
author’s sheets), all of which correspond to the requirements of para. 18 of the Regulation on 
awarding scientific degrees and conferring scientific tile in the Republic of Belarus, and one 
of which is indexed in Scopus; 2 working papers (4 author’s sheets). Altogether 18.3 author’s 
sheets were published. 
1.7 A note on terminology 
In order to eliminate confusion and improve readability of this study, certain 
terminological choices have been made. These choices are generally followed and consistent 
throughout the thesis, unless otherwise specified or it is clear beyond reasonable doubt. 
Quotations are also kept intact, and these rules do not apply to them. The major choices are 
the following. 
Treaties v agreements 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereinafter ‘VCLT’) 
stipulates, that  
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‘”Treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.’39 
If follows that there is no difference between treaties and agreements.40 In order to 
reduce possible confusion and for the ease of comprehension, I reserve the term ‘treaty’ for 
the major, foundational texts of the EAEU and EU. This means that the Treaty on the Eurasian 
Economic Union, Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union are referred to as treaties throughout this research. Other international instruments, such 
as international agreements within the EAEU, international agreements with third countries, 
other bilateral or multilateral agreements the EAEU, the EU, and/or member states are parties 
to, are referred to as agreements (unless the context and quotations require otherwise). More 
specifically, uppercase the ‘Treaty’ refers to the EAEU Treaty. 
Organizations, institutions, bodies, and organs 
Any international organization referred to in this thesis, be it a supranational or an 
intergovernmental one, generally fall under the rubric of ‘organization’ and never as 
‘institutions’. The latter term is reserved, on equal terms, for bodies of an organization. 
I will use the word-combination ‘international organization’ when referring to the EU 
and EAEU, even though, at least in the case of the EU, there are scholars who are against 
that.41 This issue is however contested by both other EU scholars and international lawyers, 
who include the EU into the category of international organizations.42 Moreover, the ECJ itself 
has never formulated a strong objection against viewing the European Community (hereinafter 
‘EC’) or the EU as international organizations’.43 
Powers v competences 
                                                 
39 Art.2(1)(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 23 May 1969. (emphasis added) 
40 See also Anthony Aust, Modern treaty law and practice, Third edition. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
41 J.H.H. Weiler and U.R. Haltern, "Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal 
Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz," in The European Courts and National Courts: 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence, ed. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and Joseph H. H. Weiler (Hart 
Publishing, 1998), 342. 
42 J. Klabbers, "Sui Generis? The European Union as an International Organization," in A Companion to 
European Union Law and International Law (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2016). 
43 B. de Witte, "European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?," Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
65, no. 1 (2010): 147. 
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Although there are differences between the notions of powers and competences, 
especially when applied in certain contexts,44 this research uses both terms interchangeably. 
Legal order v legal system 
Similarly, some may argue that these two terms have different connotations, but they 
are not distinguished for the purposes of this research and the notions are used interchangeably. 
Member States v member states 
Member States are written in uppercase letters when EAEU countries are referred to, 
while member states of other international organizations and integration entities, including the 
EU, EURASEC, Customs Union, etc., are written in lowercase letters. This is done for the 
purposes of convenience and in order to avoid confusion and by no means is intended to 
indicate anything else. 
EU law, European law, and Community law 
I use the terms ‘EU law’ and ‘European law’ interchangeably. I flag distinctions in 
cases where they are necessary. As a general rule, the term Community law or EC law 
regarding the law preceding the Lisbon Treaty are not used and fall under the umbrella of 
EU/European law, unless a historical context requires it.  
The Commission 
The “Commission” is reserved for the Eurasian Economic Commission. Other similar 
bodies are referred to in full, i.e. European Commission in case of the EU, Customs Union 
Commission, in case of the Customs Union within the EURASEC framework. One more 
commission that appears in this research and has an identical designation, is the European 
Commission for the Danube, and it is referred to in full. 
The Court 
Following the logic spelled out regarding the Commission, a similar approach has been 
chosen for the ‘Court’ as referring to the EAEU Court. The EU judiciary is generally referred 
to using the ‘ECJ’ abbreviation, unless circumstances require specifications, e.g. using ‘CJEU’ 
for the system of the EU courts, or when referring to both the European Court of Justice and 
General Court; and when singling out the General Court is necessary. In addition, sometimes 
the respective courts are also referred to as the Minsk Court and Luxembourg Court. 
                                                 
44 See e.g. V. Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes. Contribution à 
l'étude de la nature juridique des Communautés (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1974), 82-83. 
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1.8 Structure of this research 
This thesis is structured in a way to ensure a coherent narrative. Therefore, even though 
the idea is to identify the criteria of legal order autonomy and have the EAEU legal order 
checked against them, the narrative is not rigid and is not structured around them. It is rather 
a flow where the criteria are organically checked against. 
Chapter 1 sets the scene by exploring the concept of legal order autonomy. This chapter 
does have an ambition to dig deep into the concept on a theoretical level. However, since the 
concept is not well developed, it would be challenging to apply it to the EAEU without having 
a good understanding thereof. Even relying on this notion as it is understood in EU law does 
not remove the challenge. Even though it has been getting more attention, it has still not 
received as much comprehensive academic coverage as, for example, other major EU law 
doctrines, such as primacy and direct effect.45 As the idea of a legal order autonomy is a 
judicial construct, it is presented as a particular narrative of its own. Further, given the prima 
facie interrelations between autonomy and supranationality, the latter is also explored in this 
chapter by analysing the concept of supranationality of international organizations in the 
Western and post-Soviet legal scholarship. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to setting out the historical background, evolution, and context of 
Eurasian integration. This is necessary as the EAEU has been built upon previous integration 
entities, and therefore is crucial for understanding the EAEU legal nature. As there is no aim 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the history of Eurasian integration, it focuses 
                                                 
45 Among the major contributions to the study of legal order autonomy are the following: R. Barents, The 
autonomy of Community law (The Hague ; London: Kluwer Law International, 2004); R. Collins and N.D. 
White, eds., International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the 
International Legal Order, Routledge Research in International Law (Routledge, 2011); R.A. Wessel and S. 
Blockmans, Between autonomy and dependence : the EU legal order under the influence of international 
organisations (The Hague; Berlin: T.M.C. Asser Press; Springer, 2013); Nicholas Tsagourias, 
"Conceptualizing the autonomy of the European Union," in International Organizations and the Idea of 
Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, ed. Richard Collins and Nigel D. 
White (Routledge, 2011); Wessel and Blockmans, Between autonomy and dependence : the EU legal order 
under the influence of international organisations; S. Szurek, "Du particularisme à l’autonomie? Esquisse des 
rapports du droit international et du droit communautaire," Annuaire de droit européen 5 (2007); Witte, 
"European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?."; J. Czuczai, "The autonomy of the EU legal 
order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most 
recent practice," Yearbook of European Law 31, no. 1 (2012); E. Dubout, "La relativité de la distinction des 
norms du droit de l’Union européenne et du droit international," in Les interactions normatives. Droit de 
l’Union européenne et droit international, ed. L. Burgorgue-Larsen, et al. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 2012); L. 
Kirchmair, "The 'Janus Face' of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A Theoretical Appraisal of the EU 
Legal Order's Relationship with International and Member State Law," Goettingen Journal of International 
Law 4, no. 3 (2012); I. Pernice, "The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order – Fifty Years After Van Gend," in 
50ème Anniversaire de l’arrêt/50th anniversary of the judgment in Van Gen den Loos, 1963-2013, ed. A. 
Tizzano, J. Kokott, and S. Prechal (Luxembourg: Office des publications de l’Union européenne, 2013); P. 
Eeckhout, "Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law – Pluralism or Integration?," Current Legal Problems 
66, no. 1 (2013). 
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primarily on its legal garment. In fact, in order to be able to assess legal order autonomy, the 
idea behind this chapter is to delimitate as much as possible the boundaries of Eurasian 
integration by distinguishing stages and entities that led to EAEU-proper. In order to do so the 
chapter first clarifies some terminological issues given the different understandings of 
‘Eurasia’ in social sciences, and various classifications of ‘integration’. It eventually proceeds 
chronologically, starting with the early attempts to create a customs union in the post-Soviet 
space to establishing the EAEU itself. This instrumental function allows understanding the 
changes that took place in setting up the EAEU which will be relevant to future chapters. 
Eventually a prima facie legal nature of the EAEU is explored, since at this stage of thesis 
development it is only possible to do primary by looking at the way the EAEU is self-described 
in the Treaty. 
Chapter 3 explores the functioning of the EAEU in terms of its institutional structure 
and decision-making. It is particularly focused on the Commission among other institutions 
due to its alleged supranational character. It challenges this idea of supranationality of the 
Commission and hints at the general intergovernmental mode of operation of the EAEU. 
Another focus of the chapter is the Court as the major institution relevant for legal order 
autonomy. The chapter analyses the history of its establishment and the issue of independence 
of the judges and the institution as such. 
Chapter 4 delves into the powers of the EAEU. It addresses the concept common to all 
international organizations—attributed competences—and the way it is addressed in the 
EAEU. A special place in this chapter is devoted to the doctrine of implied powers due to 
importance of the ability to interpret powers and the fact that this ability has been the object 
of a backlash on the part of the Member States. When doing this research, it turned out that 
there is no consistent theory of implied powers in the doctrine. Therefore, the structure of this 
chapter had to be modified in order to form at least the basics of the theory. This required to 
explore and track this concept from its inception to inclusion into various legal orders. 
Chapter 5 looks closely into the notion of law of the Union established by the EAEU 
Treaty (hereinafter also ‘TEAEU’). It analyses the sources of law of the Union, both internal 
and external to the EAEU and proceeds with clarifying their legal force. It also analyses the 
place of direct applicability, direct effect and primacy in the EAEU legal order. Eventually it 
turns to the provisions of Member States’ national legislation vis-à-vis EAEU law. The three 
founding member states—Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia—have been deeply entrenched into 
Eurasian integration and they took an active part in drafting the TEAEU. This process required 
alignment with the generally recognised principles of international law, national legislation of 
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Member States, taking into account international experience, but first and foremost with the 
national constitutions. Therefore, in principle, tensions between the legal orders of the EAEU 
and member states should have been minimized from the beginning. This chapter explores 
whether it is so in two case studies: Russia and Belarus. The reason for the choice of these two 
jurisdictions is that the former has had the most controversial encounters with the EAEU legal 
order in a practical sense. The latter has the strictest constitutional limitations which have 
direct bearing on the EAEU legal order.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to the functioning of the EAEU Court and its ability to fulfil its 
aim of ensuring uniform application of EAEU law. For these purposes, the chapter explores 
judicial remedies available in the EAEU and compares them to the EU counterparts. However, 
the main focus is on the remedies that are in fact absent and could be deemed of paramount 
importance for legal order autonomy. It addresses the issues of preliminary ruling and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. As the EAEU Court has a number of other limitations, the 
chapter tries to answer why they are in place. 
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1 Autonomy of a legal order—Odysseus’s vessel 
‘[Μ]ε δεσμῷ δήσατ᾽ ἐν ἀργαλέῳ, ὄφρ᾽ 
ἔμπεδον αὐτόθι μίμνω, ὀρθὸν ἐν ἱστοπέδῃ, ἐκ 
δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πείρατ᾽ ἀνήφθω. εἰ δέ κε λίσσωμαι 
ὑμέας λῦσαί τε κελεύω, ὑμεῖς δὲ πλεόνεσσι 
τότ᾽ ἐν δεσμοῖσι πιέζειν.’ 
Ὀδύσσεια46 
1.1 Introduction 
The epigraph to this chapter, quoting Odysseus approaching Sirens, as well as the 
reproduction of the painting by John William Waterhouse at the beginning, seemingly 
irrelevant to the subject-matter of the current endeavour, have in fact a direct connection. As 
will be explored further in the chapter, this literary reference can be conceived as a portrayal 
of autonomy. The chapter itself explains what autonomy of a legal order is since it is the 
theoretical framework of this research. Therefore, prior to delving into the substance of the 
research question in the chapters that will follow, it gives an overview of the notions of 
autonomy and autonomous legal order in their various forms. However, this is a brief 
introductory exercise with some general remarks rather than a full analysis of the autonomy 
theory(-ies), which is far beyond the scope of this study.47 Therefore, there is also no ambition 
to introduce a full-encompassing definition of an autonomous legal order. More importantly, 
in this chapter I identify the indicia of an autonomous legal order. The looser notion of indicia, 
which is used in international legal scholarship and law-making,48 has been chosen instead of 
the stricter notion of criteria. This follows from the approach I am taking towards the idea of 
an autonomous legal order as an essentially contested concept.49 By this I mean that the 
concept of an autonomous legal order is inherently unstable, where its features are subject to 
                                                 
46 ‘[D]o ye bind me with grievous bonds, that I may abide fast where I am, upright in the step of the mast, and 
let the ropes be made fast at the ends to the mast itself; and if I implore and bid you to loose me, then do ye tie 
me fast with yet more bonds.’ Homer and A. T. Murray, The Odyssey, 2 vols. (London; New York: 
Heinemann; G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1919). 
47 Thus, Barents devoted a whole book to the exploration of the autonomy of legal order of only one entity—
the European Community: Barents, The autonomy of Community law. 
48 See e.g. Ian Brownlie, The rule of law in international affairs : international law at the fiftieth anniversary of 
the United Nations (The Hague; Boston, Cambridge, MA: M. Nijhoff Publishers; Kluwer Law International, 
1998), 36; Dan Sarooshi, International organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 68-69; "Report of the International Law Commission: Sixtieth session (5 May-6 June 
and 7 July-8 August 2008),"  (New York: United Nations, 2008), 95. 
49 On the idea of essentially contested concepts, see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, no. 1 (1956); See also K. Kekes, "Essentially Contested Concepts: 
A Reconsideration," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10, no. 2 (1977); J.N. Cray, "On the contestability of social and 
political concepts," Political Theory 5, no. 3 (1977); W.E. Connolly, The terms of political discourse, 3rd ed., 
Princeton paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 10 et seq; J. Waldron, "Is the Rule of 
Law an Essentially Contested Concept?," Law & Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2002). 
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contestation and change.50 This leads to an absence of a single definition of this concept. 
Internal complexity of the concept leads to a possible disagreement about which aspect or 
component features are sufficient or necessary for that concept to apply, or even whether all 
aspects need to be present for the concept to apply.51 As Beck argues about certain concepts 
in general, ‘the disagreement cannot be overcome because there is no agreement about the 
order of significance and relative weight or importance of the various aspects, or even about 
their precise number; nor indeed about whether all aspects are mutually compatible.’ 52 
However, it is possible to find evidence indicating a possibility for an autonomous legal order 
without implying an established system of requirements strict compliance with which delimits 
an autonomous legal order. Moreover, some of such indicia are not necessarily requirements 
of legal order autonomy, but are in fact inherent manifestations thereof. 
Even though the indicia could be used for other entities, there is no ambition to create 
a one-size-fits-all system. Indeed, I do not believe it is possible, primarily since law is a 
language subject to various interpretations, often equally convincing,53 and each entity being 
individual in its discourses and practices. Nor is it possible to have a solely plausible doctrine 
of autonomy of a legal order. Therefore, the main purpose of this exercise is to develop a 
framework, which will help in answering the research question. The indicia identified in this 
chapter will be used throughout the thesis with regard to the EAEU. 
1.2 The concept of autonomy and the autonomous legal order of 
international organizations 
The notion of autonomy is complex as it can be viewed in various forms and can be 
applied to different entities. Even though our primary interest is a specific type of autonomy—
autonomous legal order of international organizations—it is not possible to disregard the 
ubiquitous character of the notion of autonomy as such, which also explains the lack of 
complete clarity about related notions. 
                                                 
50 ‘Essentially contested concepts [are] appraisive and applicable to objects of an internally complex character 
that may be described in various ways by altering one’s view of the significance of descriptions of their 
component features.’ S. L. Hurley, Natural reasons: personality and polity (New York; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 46-47. 
51 Gunnar Beck, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, Modern studies in European law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2012), 64. 
52 Ibid., 65. 
53 See generally M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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The notion of autonomy is used in various fields of knowledge, be it medicine,54 
physics,55 sociology,56 philosophy,57 international relations,58 etc. To understand the ubiquity 
of the term, it is useful to trace the etymology of the word itself. The word ‘autonomy’ comes 
from Ancient Greek: αὐτο- is ‘self’ and νόμος is ‘law’. This essentially could be understood 
as ‘independent, living by one’s own laws’ or ‘one who gives oneself one’s own law’.59 The 
usage of the word can be traced back to Aristotle, who described and compared Greek city-
states and their constitutions with its help.60 Aristotle’s meaning of autonomy was closer to 
what has become known as sovereignty.61 Later, in the 17th century, autonomy referred to 
‘self-government within a certain framework set by a central authority.’ 62  Up to today, 
autonomy can be describing the relations that exist within a state between different entities. 
These are, for example, relationships between a central government and local authorities, but 
could also be with a minority or local population. It is also used in national legal systems to 
define a hierarchical relationship between state organs.63  
However, the idea of ‘self-rule’ or ‘self-government’ can also be applied to individuals, 
which is the way autonomy is generally understood in moral and political philosophy,64 
although there are variations.65 In moral philosophy (moral) autonomy is first of all associated 
with Kant in the meaning of the capacity to impose the moral law on oneself.66 On the other 
hand, there is an understanding of ‘personal autonomy’ not limited to moral obligations.67 
                                                 
54 The principle of autonomy was seemingly first proposed by Claude Bernard, known for his ambition in 
establishing the use of the scientific method in medicine: C. Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie 
communs aux animaux et aux végétaux, 2 vols. (Paris: Baillière, 1878). 
55 W. Heisenberg and P.C.W. Davies, Physics and philosophy: the revolution in modern science 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000). 
56 J.C. Tabary, "Hierarchy and Autonomy," International Journal of General Systems 18, no. 3 (1990); Niklas 
Luhmann, "The World Society as a Social System," ibid.8 (1982). 
57 J. Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
58 B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek, Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
59 "Autonomy (n.)," Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/autonomy. 
60 Aristotle and S. Everson, The politics; and, The constitution of Athens, 2nd ed., Cambridge texts in the 
history of political thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
61 Barents, The autonomy of Community law, 246-47. 
62 Ibid., 247. 
63 T. Gazzini, "The relationship between international legal personality and the autonomy of international 
organizations," in International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the 
International Legal Order (2011); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1 (5 February 1963), 196. 
64 Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy". 
65 J. Feinberg, "Autonomy," in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John Christman (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
66 Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy". 
67 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 34-47. 
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Thus, autonomy has many variations and applications, although they are strongly 
linked to its original etymology. As far as international organizations are concerned, autonomy 
could be understood as political independence in decision-making. 68  In the same vein, 
autonomy could be understood as institutional independence. 69  One can argue that any 
international organization possesses some degree of autonomy. After all, the idea behind 
international organizations is that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.70  As the 
International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ICJ’) put it: ‘. . . the constituent instrument of 
international organizations are also treaties of a particular type; their object is to create new 
subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of 
realizing common goals.’71 Therefore, it is possible to agree, that in this sense, autonomy is 
the ability ‘to act and decide without hindrance, to a greater or lesser degree.’72 However, this 
understanding is very narrow since it would confine the notion of autonomy to the possession 
of international legal personality.73 
Probably, an international organization without a certain degree of autonomy can 
hardly be called an international organization. In fact, for some scholars, the notion of 
autonomy is key to defining an international organization.74 However, it must be understood 
that there are degrees of autonomy and, by definition, they will be subject to different 
interpretations and disagreements. Therefore, autonomy should not be regarded as an either-
or notion. 
The legal order of international organizations is ‘limited to the exercise of the functions 
entrusted to the organization by its constituent treaty.’75 Hence, powers are essential to the 
organization’s autonomy: ‘the exercise of powers is one of the most visible ways in which 
such autonomy can be displayed.’76 It is precisely the acts of an organization that make it 
                                                 
68 N. White, "Separate but Connected: Inter-Governmental Organizations and International Law," International 
Organizations Law Review 5 (2008). 
69 Ibid., 63. 
70 Jan Klabbers, "Autonomy, constitutionalism and virtue in international institutional law," in International 
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy, ed. Richard Collins and Nigel D. White (Routledge, 2011), 121. 
71 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 226, 
para. 19 (1996). 
72 Klabbers, "Autonomy, constitutionalism and virtue in international institutional law," 122. 
73 Gazzini, "The relationship between international legal personality and the autonomy of international 
organizations," 199-200. On the importance of international legal personality for an autonomous legal order see 
further in the chapter. 
74 Jan Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity. 
75 International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, para. 1341. 
76 V. Engström, "Powers of organizations and the many faces of autonomy," in International Organizations and 
the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, ed. R. Collins and N.D. 
White (Routledge, 2011), 213-14. 
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possible to realize whether there is autonomy of any sort. Moreover, the autonomy of 
organizations ‘is emphasized by the fact that organizations will themselves determine the 
extent of their powers.’77 This has been established in international law long ago by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter ‘PCIJ’): ‘. . . as a general rule, any body 
possessing jurisdictional power has the right in the first place itself to determine the extent of 
its jurisdiction.’78 Therefore, the ability to interpret and reinterpret its own powers with a view 
to achieving the aims standing before an organization is significant. A notable indicator of 
such an ability is, for instance, finding and exercising implied powers. In doing so, however, 
organizations must take into account the nature of powers in order to remain legitimate. 
Powers of an international organization have a dual role. On the one hand, they embody the 
consent of member states, while on the other they express the autonomy of the organization 
itself.79 As Engström puts it, ‘the measure of success will always be whether members of the 
organization comply with [decisions].’80 
Moving further to the legal dimension of autonomy, it is interesting to observe, that in 
Kant’s philosophy, apart from moral autonomy, one can also distinguish legal autonomy and 
institutional autonomy. 81 Legal autonomy is understood as an omnilateral, general will of a 
certain community, and is contrasted with heteronomy in Kant’s moral philosophy. Legal 
autonomy is the idea that ‘law establishes the omnilateral or general will of a community . . . 
autonomous from the individuated subjective wills of those that comprise the community.’82 
Institutional autonomy, in its turn, realizes in practice the aforementioned will, it is the 
‘practical expression of legal autonomy’, since the institutions ‘exercise public power in a way 
that is distinct from the way in which members of the community governed by them can.’83 
This leads closer to the idea of a legal order, which forms part of the concept being 
analysed in this chapter. A legal order can be defined as a totality of legal rules regulating a 
certain community.84 However, such a totality only constitutes an order if the norms constitute 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 218. 
78 Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1, 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory 
Opinion, PCIJ Publications, Series B, no 16, p. 20 (1928). 
79 Engström, "Powers of organizations and the many faces of autonomy," 224. 
80 Ibid., 213. 
81 Patrick Capps, "Autonomy in Kant's philosophy of international law," in International Organizations and the 
Idea of Autonomy, ed. Richard Collins and Nigel D. White (Routledge, 2011), 48-50. 
82 Ibid., 49. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, para. 1140. 
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a unity.85 Moreover, a certain hierarchy between legal rules is ‘[i]nherent in the concept of the 
legal order.’86 In other words, a legal order is an organic and structural normative whole.87  
With regard to international organizations, which started appearing since the 19th 
century, it was not immediately clear that they could have their own legal order.88 Such 
recognition was developed only in the 20th century, and has only become definitively accepted 
since 1945.89 Such a legal order with a basis in the constituent instrument is both distinct from 
the legal orders of member states and from the international legal order.90 As far as the EU is 
concerned, the ECJ has recognized European law as a legal order in its very first preliminary 
ruling.91 
However, the recognition of a distinct legal order does not make it autonomous per se. 
General public international law is not very helpful in identifying what an autonomous legal 
order of an international organization could be, as the usage of the word ‘autonomy’ in this 
discipline is quite diverse and often unrelated to (legal orders of) international organizations.92 
Public international law also operates with the notion of a ‘self-contained regime’ (also 
‘special’ or ‘specialised’ regime). This notion in itself is not entirely clear, since its usage 
differs from a narrow understanding as a ‘special set of secondary rules under the law of State 
responsibility that claims primacy to the general rules concerning consequences of a violation’, 
to a broader sense of ‘interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules, sometimes also 
referred to as “systems” or “subsystems” of rules that cover some particular problem 
differently from the way it would be covered under general law’, to an even broader sense 
covering ‘whole fields of functional specialization, of diplomatic and academic expertise . . . 
in the sense that special rules and techniques of interpretation and administration are thought 
                                                 
85 H. Kelsen and S.L. Paulson, "The Concept of the Legal Order," The American Journal of Jurisprudence 27, 
no. 1 (1982): 64. 
86 Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, para. 1341. 
87 P.-M. Dupuy, "A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International Law," 
European Journal of Legal Studies 1, no. 1 (2007): 29. 
88 Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 1142. 
89 Ibid. 
90 However, even though the separateness of the legal order of international organizations from the legal order 
of states is generally accepted, there is more discussion regarding it being separate from the international legal 
order. See on both issues ibid., para. 1142 and relevant footnotes. 
91 Case 13/61, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Bosch, EU:C:1962:11 (6 April 1962), 49-50. The court stated that 
‘the municipal law of any Member State . . . and Community law constitute two separate and distinct legal 
orders.’ 
92 E.g. federal states, internationalized territories and territories of particular international concern, and 
associated states, and others were subject of research in H. Hannum and R.B. Lillich, "The Concept of 
Autonomy in International Law," The American Journal of International Law 74, no. 4 (1980): 858. 
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to apply.’93 It is in the latter sense EU law appears alongside the law of the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter ‘WTO’), human rights law, humanitarian law, space law, etc.94 
Here, it is claimed, ‘rules of general international law are assumed to be modified or even 
excluded in their administration.’ 95  Moreover, the Report of the International Law 
Commission, wherein these understandings were developed, calls the notion of a self-
contained regime a misnomer.96 The reason given is that ‘no legal regime is isolated from 
general international law’, doubting the very possibility for such isolation: ‘a regime can 
receive (or fail to receive) legally binding force (“validity”) only by reference to (valid and 
binding) rules or principles outside it’.97 Indeed, as we will see further, an autonomous legal 
order does not mean external or internal isolation thereof.  
Thus, there are various contested interpretations of the term ‘self-contained’. 98 
Moreover, it is even claimed that the very act of assigning a treaty to a particular regime is an 
arbitrary act devoid of legal significance, to the point that ‘no regime is self-contained.’99 
Therefore, autonomy is in any event a much more suitable term for this project. A 
reference point, or rather an ‘exemplar’, when the autonomy of a legal order of an international 
organization is discussed, is the EU and EU law. The legal order of the EU bears clear legal 
significance as years of EU practice and ECJ case law suggest. Therefore, in order to further 
explore the notion of an autonomous legal order of an international organization I will plunge 
into the autonomy narrative created within the EU. 
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1.3 The EU as an autonomous legal order 
1.3.1 The narrative of an autonomous legal order 
It could be argued along structuralist lines that our view of the world is constructed by 
language, which plays the role of a conceptual framework that creates our experience.100 The 
EU has developed a strong sense of identity,101 which is reflected in the vocabulary it uses to 
refer to itself (which includes such notions as e.g. primacy and direct effect), including the 
language of an autonomous legal order.102 This has to a large extent constructed the narrative 
of autonomy through a series of ECJ judgments and advisory opinions, which is being 
constantly reinforced through consequent case law, making it an essentially judge-made 
concept. Indeed, the founding treaties do not mention the term, while the ECJ held that ‘it is 
for the Court to ensure respect for the autonomy of the European Union legal order thus created 
by the Treaties.’103 
In fact, there are several identifiable narratives of European integration. Apart from the 
autonomy narrative, the most visible ones are the constitutional narrative, supranationality 
narrative, statist narrative, and international law narrative.104  There is not always a clear 
division between them, as they interrelate to a certain extent and sometimes have hierarchical 
structures. However, these narratives coexist, and the EU is in some way the product of the 
intersection of those narratives. 
On the legal side, one can find the push for a distinct narrative from within the 
institutions at the inception of the European integration. An illustrative example is the first 
international academic congress on the then European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter 
‘ECSC’), which gathered law professors from all member states in 1957.105 The professors 
that spoke on the legal nature of the ECSC said that despite its originality, the ECSC was still 
an international organization, which was to be analysed using international law and its tools.106 
According to the international law tradition, a treaty has to be interpreted in favour of member 
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states.107 Lawyers representing the legal departments of the ECSC institutions, including the 
ECSC Court, opposed this approach of the international law scholars. They believed that 
ECSC features place it outside the category of an international organization and make it a 
supranational one, meaning a new legal entity of a different type, whose functioning should 
escape the scope of international law.108 That was a strong statement, and one can see the 
narrative it transmits. 
The ECJ has to some extent recognized the claim, or at least, the approach, in its case 
law that followed. Initially, back in 1963, the special features of the European Economic 
Community (hereinafter ‘EEC’ or ‘Community’) enabled the ECJ to identify it as ‘a new legal 
order of international law’.109 This way the ECJ differentiated European law from positive 
(contemporary) public international law. Arguably, the process of this differentiation was 
completed with the next case, where the word ‘international’ was dropped from the description 
of the Community legal order.110 This and further developments led to speculations that the 
Community legal order was no longer part of international law.111 
It has been argued that the Community needed to stress the autonomy in relation to 
international law in order to effectuate the major principles of its own law (such as primacy 
and direct effect): so that member states could not apply ordinary legal techniques developed 
for the reception of international law when enforcing Community law in domestic legal 
orders.112 
This development shows that autonomy is relative113 or having a reflexive nature.114 
The concept of autonomy can only be understood by relating it to something, and therefore an 
autonomous legal order must be related to certain other orders, which might exist. The way an 
autonomous legal order relates to these other orders is its extrinsic characteristic, as it is 
ascribed to it in virtue of relations it has to other orders. However, this does not diminish its 
intrinsic characteristics, which, although, could be related to other orders, are qualities in their 
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own right.115 Apart from relating it to the international legal order, the ECJ made a similar 
claim regarding the issue of dependence on national legal orders for the validity of EU law 
and its application.116 Therefore, the case law showed the signs of a double claim for autonomy 
from the outset—with respect to the international legal order and the legal orders of member 
states.117 This conceptualisation is evident from the development of the case law as will be 
shown further in the chapter.118 These two extrinsic dimensions of autonomy—(1) internal 
dimension reflecting the relationship between the EU legal order and national legal orders of 
member states, and (2) external dimension reflecting the relationship between EU law and 
international law—will be explored next.  
1.3.2 Autonomy relative to member states’ legal orders 
The initial case law was primarily preoccupied with the autonomy vis-à-vis the 
member states, rather than the international legal order (the focus on the latter was more 
profoundly articulated by the ECJ later). The autonomy of the legal order vis-à-vis the national 
legal orders was clearly outlined by the ECJ in the Costa v ENEL judgment: 
‘. . . the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question.’119 
It is visible that the Court relied on an intrinsic characteristic of ‘special and original 
nature’. Further, even though the terminology differed in the English version, the original 
French version of the judgment had the word autonome instead of ‘independent’.120 The same 
difference in wording in the French and English versions took place in some other cases as 
well.121 
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For the purposes of finding the contents of indicia of legal order autonomy, it is 
important to follow the initial logic with which the ECJ approached the issue. This is especially 
true as it has never been reconsidered in the case law that followed, but quite the opposite, 
recalled and reaffirmed.122 The main points were spelled out in the Van Gend en Loos ruling.123 
Considering the spirit of the Treaty establishing the EEC, the ECJ found that the objective of 
the treaty was to establish a common market, the functioning of which was of direct concern 
to interested parties in the Community. This, in its turn, implied that the treaty was more than 
an agreement, which merely created mutual obligations between the contracting states. The 
ECJ continued with a number of useful observations to confirm the findings. First, the 
preamble of the treaty referred not only to governments but also to peoples. Second, the ECJ 
noted the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which 
affected both member states and citizens. Third, the Court underlined that the nationals of the 
states brought together in the Community were called upon to cooperate in the functioning of 
the Community through the intermediary of the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee. Regardless the fact that the European Parliament had very limited powers 
back then, its existence was enough for the ECJ to make the argument. Finally, the availability 
of the preliminary ruling procedure with an aim to ensure uniform interpretation of the treaty 
by national courts, confirmed that states acknowledged that Community law had an authority 
which could be invoked by their nationals before those courts. Additionally, in the Costa v 
ENEL case, the Court added such features as the unlimited duration of the organization, its 
own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane. 
This logic is far from perfect since it had a specific orientation, namely to justify the 
direct effect and primacy of Community law.124 After all, in the words of the ECJ, the main 
features of this legal order are, in particular, ‘its primacy over the law of the Member States 
and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and 
to the Member States themselves.’125 This has been reiterated on multiple occasions.126 
                                                 
122 E.g. in Opinion 1/09. 
123 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos. 
124 M. Rasmussen, "Revolutionizing European Law: A history of the Van Gend en Loos judgment," 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 1 (2014): 155. 
125 Opinion 1/91, para. 21. 
126 For the importance of direct effect see Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 12; Opinion 1/09, para. 65; For 
primacy see Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, 594; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para. 3; Opinion 
1/09, para. 65; Case C-399/11, Melloni   v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107 (26 February 2013), para. 59. 
 29 
This makes direct effect and primacy the crucial indicia of an autonomous character of 
a legal system with regard to member states. Therefore, this logic will be useful in our further 
exploration of the research question. 
It was not only the ECJ that was making the autonomy claim. Certain national 
constitutional authorities were confirming the narrative to a certain degree. Thus, the French 
Conseil constitutionnel recognized ‘l’existence d’un ordre juridique communautaire intégré à 
l’ordre juridique interne et distinct de l’ordre juridique international’.127 It basically stated that 
there were three legal orders that simultaneously operated on the territory of the country: the 
national French legal order, international legal order, and the (back then) European 
Community legal order, different from public international law. 
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht gave the following assessment to Community 
law: 
‘[It is] neither a component part of the national legal system nor international 
law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from an autonomous legal 
source, for the Community is not a State, especially not a federal State, but a 
sui generis community in the process of progressive integration, an ‘interstate 
institution’ within the meaning of Article 24(I) German Constitution.’128 
The EU legal order, undoubtedly, stands out from the legal orders of other international 
organizations, which have generally looser legal systems.129 But what, in essence, does the 
autonomy of the EU legal order imply? To put it simply, the EU legal order is autonomous 
vis-à-vis the legal orders of member states in a sense, that ‘it displays its legal effects in the 
national territory independently of national law.’130 This means that the aforementioned direct 
effect and primacy do not depend on any rules of national law, since EU law ‘stems from an 
independent source of law, the Treaties.’131 These features are based exclusively on EU law, 
which demonstrates the normative independence from national legal orders.132 
‘. . . according to settled case-law of the Court, the autonomy of EU law with 
respect both to the law of the Member States and to international law is justified 
by the essential characteristics of the EU and its law, relating in particular to 
the constitutional structure of the EU and the very nature of that law. EU law 
is characterised by the fact that it stems from an independent source of law, the 
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Treaties, by its primacy over the laws of the Member States, and by the direct 
effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals 
and to the Member States themselves. Those characteristics have given rise to 
a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal 
relations binding the EU and its Member States reciprocally and binding its 
Member States to each other . . .’133 
EU legal order can be described as self-referential. This is regardless of whether 
internal or external dimensions are concerned, since it is an intrinsic characteristic, a quality 
thereof in its own right, ‘built into’ it. It means that ‘the autonomy of Community law implies 
that its character as “law” follows exclusively from its source, the [Treaties],’134 and it refers 
exclusively to itself with regard to its normative character. As Tsagourias put it more 
comprehensively, it is an order that ‘both enjoys and exercises the capacity for self-rule’, and 
is ‘distinct from other orders, has its own foundational and validation points, and is self-
reproduced, self-organized and self-maintained.’135 To come to this conclusion, he draws on 
Kelsen. The claim is that, even though the EU has been created by states in the exercise of 
their international powers and is founded on international law instruments, the EU has 
‘appropriated the constitutive treaties which were transformed into the basic norm upon which 
the political and legal edifice that constitutes the Union was erected.’136 
However, it is not necessary to import all Kelsen’s ideas, and use the idea of a basic 
norm, or grundnorm, as a convenient expression. Grundnorm thus is a foundational rule on 
which all other rules, or legal propositions, in the system depend, but which does not itself 
depend for its validity on any other legal rule.137 
Not entering the debate on Kelsen’s grundnorm, however, it seems to be true that the 
practice of functioning of the EU legal order has been self-referential. The argument back in 
the Costa v ENEL judgment, the binding force and primacy were not dependent on recognition 
in national legal orders, but were derived from the founding treaties themselves.138 This, 
however, does not imply that other legal orders do not have legal effect within the autonomous 
legal order. Their norms can be applied, and they are being applied. The difference is that such 
norms do not have independent legal effect.139 Therefore, the autonomy of the EU legal order 
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implies that only its law is autonomous within its scope,140 and the primacy and other legal 
effects are exclusively determined by it (which, as we will see later, is also the case with regard 
to the international legal order).141 
The notion of scope of the law is important since the EU functions in accordance with 
the principle of conferral, which puts certain limits to the scope of EU law. However, 
autonomy implies that the contents and nature of powers, after being conferred, are governed 
by EU law.142 Some researchers claim that the EU principle of conferral limits the powers to 
those expressly attributed to the EU by the member states, which leads to a conclusion that the 
organization ‘is not in principle empowered either to act within new substantive areas not 
explicitly covered by the Treaties or to undertake new functions which could go beyond the 
powers originally conferred or surpass the objectives initially arranged.’143 This is hard to 
uphold as this wording is not maintained neither by the EU treaties, nor by practice, including 
the practice of other international organizations.144 
1.3.3 Autonomy relative to international legal order(s)145 
Turning to the international aspect of legal order autonomy, it must be said that the 
ECJ has been vehemently protective of the legal order autonomy against the encroachment of 
international legal order(s). In one of the recent prominent cases—Opinion 2/13—the ECJ 
effectively declared the Draft Agreement on Accession of the EU to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECHR’) incompatible with the EU legal order autonomy.146 
However, the trail of protection of the external dimension of autonomy goes further back. 
Already back in the 1970s, the ECJ invoked the ‘essential elements’ of the structure of 
the EU legal order to challenge compatibility of an international agreement with the treaties 
in Opinion 1/76, effectively ruling against it.147 However, one of the major concerns for the 
ECJ, through which it largely construed the external aspect of the legal order autonomy, has 
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always been the preservation of its exclusive power to interpret EU law entertaining exclusive 
jurisdiction. The case law in which this idea was developed concerns the establishment of 
various dispute settlement mechanisms.148 
In principle, the ECJ acknowledges that the EU, being an international legal person, is 
able to participate in setting up international dispute mechanisms, decisions of which become 
binding: 
‘. . . an international agreement providing for the creation of a court responsible 
for the interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the 
institutions, including the Court of Justice, is not, in principle, incompatible 
with EU law; that is particularly the case where, as in this instance, the 
conclusion of such an agreement is provided for by the Treaties themselves. 
The competence of the EU in the field of international relations and its capacity 
to conclude international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to 
the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as 
regards the interpretation and application of their provisions.’149 
The same case law maintains that the EU legal order cannot be bound by interpretations 
of any EU legal norms by external dispute settlement mechanisms (and, by analogy, any other 
authority), which can involve not only states but also private parties, as only the ECJ maintains 
exclusive jurisdiction over it to ensure uniform interpretation. Further, dispute settlement 
mechanisms other than the EU system of courts, are only allowed to resolve disputes between 
on the one hand the EU and/or its member states and on the other hand third countries.150 
The first case in this line-up of the external dimension of autonomy has been the 
Opinion 1/91 on the draft agreement between the then EEC, its member states, and the member 
states of the European Free Trade Area (hereinafter ‘EFTA’) on establishing the European 
Economic Area (hereinafter ‘EEA’).151 The idea behind the EEA was to extend internal market 
rules to non-members of the EEC, and ensure homogeneity in the interpretation and 
application thereof. The major concern was establishing an EEA Court with jurisdiction over 
disputes between the parties to the agreement, where the latter replicated many of EEC’s 
internal market rules. According to the ECJ, the eventual ability of the EEA Court to rule on 
the competences of the Community and member states, interpret provisions of EEA 
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Agreement without having regard to future case law of the ECJ, as well as effectively interpret 
Community law would have had adverse impact on the legal order autonomy. Eventually, the 
EEA Agreement had to be amended, and the ECJ confirmed in its Opinion 1/92 that the 
problematic points were removed not calling into question the autonomy of the legal order.152 
Further cases followed, of which only the draft agreement on a European Common Aviation 
Area was deemed by the court as not undermining legal order autonomy.153 
Using similar rationale, the ECJ extended autonomy concerns from primary law to 
secondary law in the Mox Plant case.154 This time the case concerned a dispute between two 
member states, who referred to a tribunal other than the ECJ—the Arbitral Tribunal under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’). The ECJ 
underlined its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law, both primary and 
secondary, and stated that since the matters covered by the UNCLOS provisions were also 
covered by EU law, the Arbitral Tribunal would apply them, which would ‘involve a manifest 
risk that the jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of 
the Community legal system may be adversely affected.’155 Similar risks were identified in 
Opinion 1/09 concerning the European and Community Patents Court, albeit in a different 
context.156  The threat to the autonomy of the Community legal system was through avoidance 
of the EU member states judiciary, while the latter are integrated in the EU legal system and 
are obliged together with the ECJ to ensure that ‘in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed’,157 and to ‘ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights 
under that law.’158 The ECJ underlined the special place of the preliminary ruling procedure 
in this system, which turned the EU judiciary into a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures. Eventually, a new agreement establishing the Unified Patents Court had to be 
drafted, to which only EU member states became parties.159 
Overall, the external dimension of autonomy of the EU legal order was summed up in 
Opinion 1/00: 
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‘Preservation of the autonomy of the [Union] legal order requires therefore, 
first, that the essential character of the powers of the [Union] and its institutions 
as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered . . . Second, it requires that the 
procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the . . . Agreement 
and for resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the [Union] and 
its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular 
interpretation of the rules of [Union] law referred to in that agreement . . .’160 
However, this is only the case where such an interpretation becomes binding on the 
EU. It therefore would have no effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order in a situation 
where an EU law issue arises before a national court outside the EU. 161  Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ is not confined just to exclusive jurisdiction provision in Article 344 
TFEU but other aspects of autonomy come to light. 
The external dimension of autonomy was also brought up in the Kadi judgments, which 
concerned the interrelations between the United Nations (hereinafter ‘UN’) and EU legal order 
(as well as fight against terrorism and protection of human rights).162 The issue concerned 
implementation of a UN Security Council Resolution on suspected terrorists, and whether the 
ECJ had jurisdiction over it. The ECJ outlined the autonomy of the EU legal order from the 
international legal order (or, rather, the UN legal order, as the reference was made to the UN 
Charter), where ‘an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by 
the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system’.163 And more 
generally, ‘an international agreement cannot affect the . . . autonomy of the Community legal 
system’.164 This is, however, beyond that, since following the Kadi judgment, international 
agreements cannot prejudice EU’s constitutional principles, including fundamental rights,165 
which returns us to the intrinsic characteristic of the legal order as self-referential. 
Like in the Kadi ruling, the ECJ often stresses the interpretation of allocation of 
competences as enshrined in the Treaties, therefore creating a competence dimension of 
autonomy. Thus, the ECJ has stated that the essential character of powers of the EU and its 
institutions ‘as conceived in the Treaty should remain unaltered.’166 This links directly to the 
autonomy: as the ECJ pronounced in the Mox Plant case, which essentially repeats Opinions 
1/91 and 1/00: ‘an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities 
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defined in the Treaties and, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system, 
compliance with which the Court ensures under article 220 EC.’167 This power dimension 
includes the binding nature of the ECJ decisions and the power distribution among the EU and 
its member states. 
The ECJ’s Opinion 2/13 ruling with which this section started, continues the story of 
the Opinion 2/94, which also dealt with EU accession to the ECHR.168 Back then the ECJ 
underlined that the European Community did not have competence to accede to the 
Convention. This time, although such competence had been enshrined into the Treaties as an 
obligation,169 the draft accession agreement was still rejected by the ECJ on ten grounds.170 
The core of the concerns the ECJ had were certain aspects of the EU judicial setup, which are 
protected by autonomy. It goes beyond the purpose of this chapter to analyse all the concerns 
the ECJ voiced.171 Suffice it to say, apart from certain aspects, such as the issue of Protocol 
16 of the ECHR and Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter ‘CFSP’) matters, the 
ECJ followed to a large extent its previous case law on autonomy.172 
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The current debate is rising around new international agreements that are being drafted 
or awaiting conclusion/ratification (or where it was so until recently in the case of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter ‘TTIP’) with the United States 
(hereinafter ‘US’)).173 One of the major issues is the dispute settlement institutions stipulated 
therein, which has been subject to multiple scholarly debates.174 Such agreements provide for 
inclusion of chapters with investor-state dispute settlement (hereinafter ‘ISDS’) mechanism 
or, in case of the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (hereinafter 
‘CETA’), Investment Court System (hereinafter ‘ICS’). One of many concerns with direct 
bearing on legal order autonomy is that such dispute settlement institutions could as a result 
review EU law. 
The ECJ refused to analyse the dispute settlement mechanism vis-à-vis EU law 
autonomy in its Opinion 2/15 regarding the EU – Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
(hereinafter ‘FTA’) as irrelevant for the questions put to the Court.175 However, it did so in the 
Achmea case,176  where the ECJ ruled that the ISDS provisions of the Netherlands – Slovakia 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter ‘BIT’) is incompatible with legal order autonomy 
essentially because the arbitral tribunal ‘may be called on to interpret or indeed to apply EU 
law’, while not being situated within the judicial system of the EU and effectively endangering 
the full effectiveness of EU law.177 Moreover, the ECJ stipulated that setting up such a tribunal 
called into question the principle of mutual trust between member states.178 Even though 
Achmea concerned intra-EU BITs, and CETA is external EU agreement, which also stipulates 
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a range of safeguards, the ruling may have repercussions for the CETA ICS, which currently 
is being reviewed by the ECJ.179 
Following this voluminous case law it can be argued that autonomy in many cases has 
been used by the ECJ to protect its own prerogatives, leading de Witte to describe it as a 
‘selfish court’.180 However, Odermatt argues that the concept of autonomy is ‘also for the 
benefit of the EU legal order.’181 Indeed, other objectives could be identified in the ECJ’s 
reasoning: in Opinion 1/76 the ECJ was also concerned with protecting the powers of other 
EU institutions; in the same opinion, as well as in Opinion 2/13 the interstate relations between 
EU members was of concern; Opinions 1/91 and 2/13 dealt with division of competences; and 
Opinion 1/09  was concerned with the role of the EU member states’ national judicial 
institutions.182 
In any event, the external dimension of legal order autonomy does not exclude that the 
effect of international law and the principle pacta sunt servanda extends to the EU. Even 
though the ECJ has never explicitly pronounced itself on whether EU law is part of 
international law, EU is deeply intertwined with it. It follows from Article 216(2) TFEU that 
agreements concluded by the EU are binding upon its institutions. Moreover, the ECJ has ruled 
that upon entry into force of an international agreement, norms thereof become part of the EU 
legal system,183 they can be given direct effect,184 and international agreements as well as other 
provisions of international law are considered in assessing legality of EU legal acts.185 In 
addition, this article also extends the obligation to the member states. Even though it does not 
mention other forms of international law, such as international customary law and general 
principles of international law, the ECJ has recognized them as obligatory as well and has 
deemed international law as such obligatory.186 Therefore, the ECJ can be in pricniple called 
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an ‘international law-friendly court’. At the same time, especially following the Kadi and 
Intertanko187 rulings, primarily public international law scholars vehemently criticized ECJ’s 
approach to international law.188 
Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty has confirmed favourable treatment of international 
law, as following Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU, the EU shall contribute to the strict observance 
and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the UN 
Charter. In addition, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to rule on matters of international law 
binding upon the member states, but outside of the EU legal framework. 
Advocate General Maduro has brought together the abovementioned aspects in a rather 
eloquent manner: the autonomy of EU legal order ‘does not mean, however, that the 
Community’s municipal legal order and international legal order pass by each other like ships 
in the night’ but ‘the relationship between international law and the Community legal order is 
governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal 
order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the community’.189 
1.4 Legal order autonomy and supranationality 
The concept of supranationality prima facie has some correspondence with autonomy, 
not the least because this term is also strongly associated with European integration. It has also 
been mentioned in this chapter as a feature that early on distinguished the late ECSC from 
other international organizations. Further it was mentioned as an identifiable narrative of 
European integration. However, legal order autonomy is also a narrative and can be described 
as a distinguishing feature. Therefore, the ways in which the two notions relate and what effect 
this relation has for indicia must be clarified. 
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Supranationality is an elusive concept. The term comes from Nietzsche and therefore 
is not a specific legal notion.190 However, it is discussed extensively in the legal scholarship. 
Such discussions have not produced a single approach or common understanding of the notion, 
though.191  Evidently, there is no commonly accepted definition of supranationality either. 
Some scholars even claim it is impossible to have ‘a fully-fledged definition’ of 
supranationality.192 
There seems, however, to be more common ground about the link of this idea to the 
development of European integration.193 The term was used widely in the 1950s at the time of 
the Schuman Plan, 194  and the purpose behind the plan was to establish a new form of 
organization restricting sovereignty. 195  Further, ‘supranationality’ was used in the ECSC 
Treaty referring only to the High Authority.196 The wording disappeared later on (e.g. from 
the EEC Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(hereinafter ‘EURATOM’)). Likely, it could have been a conscious decision due to the failure 
of the European Defence Community, the draft treaty on which was using the term broadly, 
as well as other events.197 Therefore, the absence of the wording cannot and should not mask 
the essence. 
However, even if one is to accept this, there are still no clear-cut criteria to distinguish 
‘traditional’ (or, otherwise, ‘intergovernmental’) and ‘supranational’ international 
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organizations. To start with, there is a problem to define a ‘traditional’ international 
organization, if there is such a thing at all.198 It becomes even more complicated, because they 
have many features in common, such as establishment on the basis of consent, legal 
personality different from member states, independent bodies, own resources, etc.199 
Structurally, however, one can distinguish the following differences. ‘Traditional’ 
organizations have an intergovernmental ‘horizontal’ structure, which includes a council of 
representatives of states as the main decision-making body, usually adopting decisions by 
unanimity, and such decisions are not necessarily binding and, in any event do not have legal 
effect in the domestic legal orders.200 Other bodies include an executive body to decide day-
to-day issues and a secretariat to assist all of the bodies. In contrast, a supranational 
organization would consist of various institutions vested with legislative, administrative and 
judicial powers with a ‘vertical structure, based on a division of powers between the 
institutions and member states’.201 This distinction is however a shaky ground, since some 
‘traditional’ organizations also have some sorts of ‘vertical’ arrangements. 
Martin Martinez indicates the following essential differences of ‘traditional’ 
international organizations. 202  First, unlike supranational organizations, they do not limit 
sovereignty of member states, but rather restrict their external freedom of action by compelling 
to certain acts and/or refraining from certain acts. Second, they do not have the capability of 
adopting binding decisions directly applicable to member states and individuals. Thirdly, they 
have concurrent instead of exclusive competences, which are enumerated in the constitutive 
documents. In my view, these observations, even though useful, are not entirely clear. For 
instance, even in the EU context, it is not usually understood that the organization limits 
sovereignty of member states. The idea is rather that certain sovereign rights (in the sense of 
competences) are transferred and carried out. Further, the third observation does not take 
proper account of the implied powers doctrine. Moreover, there are instances where implied 
powers are understood broader than in the EU.203 
However, further Martin Martinez makes a much more plausible attempt to identify 
characteristics of supranationality. In a concise manner she names four major criteria of 
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supranationality: 1) exclusive competences; 2) independent institutions; 3) ability to adopt 
binding decisions, which are directly applicable to member states and to citizens; 4) 
mechanisms to ensure member states obeying the decisions of the organization even in case 
they were adopted against their will.204 In addition to these ‘most representative’ features, she 
mentions financial autonomy, common values, and some others.205 This classification seems 
to have been recognized in scholarship and is used in other classifications of supranationality 
features discussed below. I tend to agree that these are indeed central manifestations of 
supranationality, but there are more. 
Many scholars understandably take the EU as an example for analysis. Thus, Klabbers 
uses the EU example to identify features of supranationality. In his view supranationality 
manifests itself in majority voting, supremacy of EU law and direct effect.206 These features 
are hard to argue with, however, the list does not seem to be complete. Tolstukhin identified 
the following (making a caveat that the list is not necessarily complete):207 1) supranational 
authority is hierarchically higher compared to state authority (which follows from supremacy 
of EU law over domestic law); 2) such authority must be independent from member states, 
which means that officials must not represent the states, but peoples of these states; 3) the will 
of supranational organization must have normative force and direct effect on the territory of 
member states; 4) to achieve the aims of founding treaties, the institutions of a supranational 
organization must have an opportunity to independently widen the boundaries of its 
competence. Even though this approach is of interest, it is not easy to agree with all of the 
points. For instance, it is not clear, how an authority can represent the peoples of the states, 
since not all of them are elected, and those elected, represent citizens (the European 
Parliament). 208  The idea regarding the ability to independently widen the boundaries of 
competences is also questionable, since even the implied powers doctrine is more nuanced 
than that. 
The judge of the EAEU Court Neshataeva has outlined the differences between a 
supranational and intergovernmental organization based on two criteria: transfer of certain 
competences regarding individuals and companies, and transfer of competence on conducting 
international relations.209 These are important features indeed, however, it is not clear, why 
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other features are not included, i.e. a relevant decision-making system, independence of 
institutions and the judicial system. 
Weiler identifies two aspects of supranationality: normative and decisional. Under the 
normative supranationality he understands ‘the relationships and hierarchy which exists 
between Community policies and legal measures on the one hand and competing policies and 
legal measures of the Member States on the other’. 210  The criteria for normative 
supranationality are the principles of self-execution (direct effect), the principle of supremacy 
and the principle of pre-emption.211 Decisional supranationality relates to the institutional 
framework and decision-making process.212 
Kembayev suggests the following four criteria of supranationality of the EU.213 First, 
the transfer of sovereign powers and hence the ability to take decisions binding on member 
states. Second, the adoption of such decisions is not entirely dependent on member state 
cooperation. Thus, decision-making is based on weighted majority vote and by independent 
individuals within institutions. Third, supremacy and direct effect of EU law and ability to 
enforce it. Fourth, financial autonomy. 
The list of classifications goes one, and, probably, new ones could be developed. 
However, that is not necessary for the purposes of this research, and it would be enough to 
take as a basis the most complete list of fundamental characteristics of a supranational 
organization. It seems that this list has been developed by Schermers and Blokker:214 1) the 
organization must have powers to adopt decisions binding the member states; 2) the 
institutions taking the decisions should not be entirely dependent on the cooperation of all the 
member states; 3) the organization should be empowered to make rules which directly bind 
the individuals of the member states (direct effect); 4) the organization should have the power 
to enforce its decisions; 5) the organization should have some financial autonomy; 5) unilateral 
withdrawal should not be possible (without the collaboration of the supranational institutions). 
The latter point is particularly vividly brought to attention with the Brexit negotiations. 
Biriukov has made a similar list of characteristics of a supranational organization, only adding 
specifically for the EU the direct elections to the European Parliament.215 
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It is worth mentioning that any international organization possesses certain 
supranational characteristics. However, in order to be ‘fully’ supranational, as argued by 
Schermers and Blokker, an organization has to conform to all of these criteria216. There is 
hardly such a supranational organization to date, since even the EU depends significantly on 
member state cooperation, most notably in relation to the CFSP. However, it seems plausible, 
that by outlining certain features and depending on the number of those and the way they 
manifest themselves it is possible to identify whether an organization leans more to an 
intergovernmental or supranational mode. Thus, Weiler claims the importance of determining 
indicia for supranationality and to give a ‘soft definition’, which could become a ‘significant 
comparative tool for evaluating the similarities and differences’ between the, back then, 
Community and other organizations.217 These could eventually lead to a proper definition.218 
This task is made more complicated by the absence of a common scholarly position on 
which of the features are more important. Thus, some believe that the main criterion of 
supranationality is the ‘autonomous character of an international organization’, which 
manifests itself, as it is argued, in the independence of the European Commission in the EU.219 
Others believe that the decisive element is the decision-making procedure within the 
institutions, where, correspondingly, the system of majority voting points at a supranational 
character of an international institution.220 
This overview makes it clear that certain features of supranationality broadly coincide 
with certain features of an autonomous legal order. First, it is the effect of decisions within 
national legal orders of member states: binding character through direct effect and primacy 
over national legal acts. Second, an independent judicial body able to ensure the legal order. 
Therefore, in this sense, supranationality forms part of or is being absorbed by the notion of 
an autonomous legal order as explored in the previous section. Some of these correlations are 
visible in Table 1. 
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Supranationality Autonomy 
Powers to adopt decisions binding member 
states 
Primacy 
Rules which directly bind individuals of 
member states 
Direct effect 
Power to enforce decisions Mechanism ensuring uniform application of 
law 
Table 1 Comparison of supranationality and autonomy features 
This does not ensue in a one-to-one comparison, and certain features are missing. 
Nevertheless, these autonomy features can be conceptualized into supranational effect of legal 
norms and supranational judicial mechanisms. 
However, there is another side to supranationality—the functioning of the institutions. 
The decision-making system manifested in a majority voting system and absence of veto 
powers indicates the supranational character of the institutional structure. This feature 
paradoxically relates to the way institutions are formed: unanimity in an institution which 
consists of independent persons should not, in principle, be perceived as limiting 
supranationality, as such persons are supposed to represent the interest of an organization (or 
people) and not the member states. At the same time, majority voting in an institution 
consisting of state representatives brings about some supranationality to the institution. Further, 
financial autonomy of the institutions and the organization as such has a major effect on the 
functioning of such institutions. These features could be indicative of the ability of an 
autonomous legal order to self-reproduce and self-organize. 
1.5 Indicia of autonomy of a legal order 
The paradoxical situation of the EU autonomous legal order has been described in 
various terms and literary allegories. One example is comparing it with the Frankenstein’s 
monster: 
‘Thus the [ECJ] affirms [in Costa v ENEL] that Community law is like 
Frankenstein’s monster: independent from its creator, imbued with a life of its 
own, supreme throughout the States’ territories, and immune from attack by 
their laws and Constitutions.’221 
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Another one is comparing the legal order with Baron von Munchausen, who claimed 
that he had lifted himself from the quicksand by pulling on his bootstraps.222 
I would like to use another allegory. As any allegory it has its limitations in portraying 
the reality. To make a mental image of the essence and some of the various features of an 
autonomous legal order, consider the literary analogy of Homer’s Odyssey.223 On his trip 
home, Odysseus is warned by the goddess Circe about the Sirens. The Sirens enchant everyone 
who comes near them with their singing. They sing so sweetly that they lure to death everyone 
who listens. They sit beside the ocean and sing inviting songs, but what is hidden is a great 
number of dead men’s bones in the meadow behind them. Sailors are drawn to their island, 
but their ship smashes upon rocks. Circe suggested filling his men’s ears with wax so that they 
are not tricked by the beautiful voices and songs. But Odysseus can have the pleasure of 
listening if he made his men bind him to the mast.  
He was curious as to what the Sirens sang to him. He followed the advice of the 
goddess Circe gave him and, using beeswax given as a gift by Circe, he had all of his sailors 
plug their ears with it. In order to withstand the Sirens himself, he ordered his crew to tie him 
to the mast of the ship and not to untie no matter how hard he might plead under the influence 
of Sirens’ singing. Eventually the vessel approached the Sirens, he heard their golden-sweet 
voices and a seductive, beguiling song entreating him by his name to abide and rest, and 
promising to deliver the desires of one’s heart, in case of Odysseus gifts of wisdom and 
knowledge. Unable to resist, Odysseus ordered in every possible way the unhearing sailors to 
untie him and let him free. But they, not hearing the song and therefore not succumbing to the 
spell, only bound him tighter and rowed harder and harder, eventually bypassing the danger. 
The idea represented in this story if applied to this research is of limiting the 
independence of action through transferring the control to another entity for one’s own benefit. 
Thus, Odysseus can be viewed as representing member states, while the vessel and its crew is 
the international organization. The Sirens are the temptations member states have to withstand 
but are unable on their own for various reasons. As it has been put by Klabbers, member states 
can create autonomous organizations because ‘they do not trust themselves or each other, or 
both.’ 224  The sailors were given an objective, which they had to pursue and they were 
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autonomous in achieving it by not succumbing to Odysseus’s wishes to be untied upon his 
hearing the beautiful but deadly song of the Sirens. 
However, this is much broader than that. The sea can be viewed as the international 
legal order, with other vessels as other legal orders, whether autonomous or not. The sea can 
be full of surges and contrary winds. Remember, as the myth goes, Odysseus and his crew no 
longer possess the leather bag, given by the keeper of the winds Aeolus, with all the contrary 
winds securely tied up. Therefore, this external environment has to be thoroughly taken into 
account. 
Of course, this literary analogy is a simplified and purely functionalist illustration, 
while autonomy is more complex than that. Odysseus’s instructions are simple and 
straightforward, while in the world of international organizations they are often complex and 
obscure. They must be interpreted and reinterpreted with changing times and circumstances.  
However, it broadly represents some fundamentals of an autonomous legal order, 
which were outlined in this chapter, such as the self-referential character, primacy, and the 
limited scope of powers. Importantly, the portrayal reflects the relative character of autonomy, 
where it must be related to something internal and external to it. The legal order autonomy of 
international organizations has two dimensions to relate to: the legal orders of member states 
and the international legal order(s). However, it must be observed that an autonomous legal 
order should not be understood as complete independence, or, worse, isolation from law 
external to it, be it the legal orders of the constituent member states or the broader international 
legal order(s). The development of the EU case law also shows that the ECJ was quite careful 
in not making such a claim. 
Before proceeding to outlining the indicia, there are two features that an organization 
must have in order to be able to possess an autonomous legal order. These are not indicia per 
se, but rather necessary preconditions, prerequisites, or otherwise conditiones sine qua nons, 
in order to start the search for legal order autonomy.  First, it should demonstrate that it actually 
has a legal order, as a unity of legal norms organized in a certain hierarchically relevant 
structure. Second, it should possess a legal personality (in order to be able to possess autonomy 
vis-à-vis member states) and an international legal personality (in order to be able to possess 
autonomy vis-à-vis international legal order(s)). As it has been uncovered in Section 1.2, a 
narrow understanding of autonomy confines this notion to international legal personality. The 
complexity of legal order autonomy studied in Section 1.3 does not allow for such a narrow 
understanding and leaves it as an essential precondition for an autonomous legal order. 
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Even though, intuitively, these preconditions are not hard to meet, especially with 
regard to a legal order, it was not always true in the history of international organizations. The 
main controversy, though, surrounds international legal personality. This is especially 
important because an international organization can exist without one.225 In this case, ‘the 
organization constitutes nothing more than an extension of the States concerned and thus when 
the organization acts it is nothing more than the States themselves acting.’226 
Following the overview made in the previous sections and the caveats made above, a 
number of indicia of an autonomous legal order can be singled out. 
Self-referential character of law 
The grand feature of an autonomous legal order is its intrinsic characteristic derived 
from the very etymology of the word autonomy and implies referral exclusively to itself with 
regard to its normative character. Although being intrinsic, this feature can still be related to 
other orders, since it does not exist in a vacuum. The relative nature of autonomy, which 
manifests in its duality, i.e. ability to claim autonomy with regard to the legal orders of member 
states and international legal order(s). Since autonomy is ‘normative independence from any 
other system of law,’ 227  the relationship with any other legal order, whether national or 
international, must be determined within and by an autonomous legal order. Indeed, the 
relations between EU law and law of member states, as well as EU law and international public 
law are governed by EU law.228 In this manner the EU preserves its autonomy. It manages 
how and to which extent, for instance, UN law penetrates the EU and by asserting the 
separateness of its order,229 while maintaining international law’s governance of the relations 
of EU law and third countries/organizations. 
This does not mean, however, that an international organization has to claim both 
‘autonomies’. Its legal order can be autonomous with regard to only one of the counterparts, 
or have different degrees of autonomy internally and externally. 
Supranational judicial mechanisms 
Supranational judiciary indicates the capacity of an autonomous legal order to self-
maintenance. If follows that this function is ensured in two main ways, which correspond to 
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the dual nature of an autonomous legal order. First, the internal dimension is represented 
through the mechanism ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all member states. An 
autonomous legal order has to have such a character, which makes it a common internal law: 
it must remain the same on the territory of all member states in all circumstances.230 The tool 
the EU has been using to ensure this is the preliminary ruling procedure, which became one 
of the most crucial elements of its autonomous legal order. As the ECJ has stated, the 
institution of preliminary rulings is ‘essential for the preservation of the community character 
of the law established by the treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this 
law is the same in all States of the Community.’231 This procedure has proven to be crucial in 
achieving this purpose. 
Second, the external dimension, is represented through a mechanism ensuring 
exclusive jurisdiction over the legal order. An autonomous legal order requires an independent 
system of courts having mandatory exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply the rules in a 
manner which corresponds to their contents and objectives. It is not possible to guarantee 
autonomous interpretation and application without such a system.232 Such a court system must 
hold the position of the final interpreter for the validity of a measure, including the 
jurisdictional limits, as has been the logic of the ECJ with regard to the EU’s legal order.233 
The jurisdiction of the court system is what essentially guarantees the autonomy of the legal 
order. Any effective challenge to such jurisdiction from an external entity makes the 
organization devoid of the autonomous character of the legal order.234 
This is however not to deny reimagining institutional structures and introducing 
institutional innovations that could play the roles described above. Indeed, it is conceivable to 
have other mechanisms with a similar effect. For instance, this role could be taken by an 
institution similar to a Constitutional Council proposed by Weiler, Haltern and Mayer, which 
would have jurisdiction over the relevant issues and could be seized by any institution or 
member state.235 The crucial point would be to put such a mechanism in place and make it 
work. 
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Supranational effect of legal norms 
As it has been observed in this chapter, the ability to bind both states and individuals—
direct effect,—and primacy play a crucial role in ensuring legal order autonomy with regard 
to member states. In the tradition of international law, the effect of decisions of international 
organizations is usually subject to the rules of a national legal order, while direct effect 
eliminates this obstacle. The directly effective legal norms are regarded as the law of the land 
in the member states within the scope of the autonomous legal order. An important part of this 
feature is that individuals can directly apply such norms in national courts. The courts, in their 
turn, are obliged to apply such norms as if they were adopted by state legislative bodies, 
regardless whether the state embraced a monist or dualist approach.236 However, direct effect 
only becomes fully operational in conjunction with primacy. The reason is that the legal rule 
lex posterior derogat lex anterior ceases to exist in favour of the legal rules of the organization. 
The symbiosis of direct effect and primacy is to a large extent responsible for the development 
of a coherent legal order. 
Interpretation of distribution of powers 
The scope of a legal order depends on the competences the entity in charge of it 
possesses. The ECJ in its initial case law referred to the institutions endowed with sovereign 
rights, the exercise of which affected both member states and citizens. The sovereign rights 
must be understood as the competences of the organization, or ‘real powers, stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers’ from the states. 237  First and foremost, 
exclusive competence are meant, where the states lose the power to adopt binding decisions 
in certain fields. Therefore, the scope of autonomy can expand, as the more powers an entity 
possesses leads to wider autonomy. The development of EU has seen the ever expanding scope 
of legal autonomy.238 
Further, it follows from the ECJ case law that it is the court’s soul right and 
responsibility to interpret powers as they are allocated by constituent instruments, which in 
effect protects the autonomy of the legal order. There are many possible manifestations, which 
follow therefrom. However, one of the most vivid is the ability to find implied powers. In fact, 
one of the most prominent implied powers rulings of the ECJ in the case ERTA,239 has been 
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called by McNaughton as ‘the third foundation stone’ of the EU legal order along with the 
cases Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL.240 
Institutional supranationality 
The ability of an autonomous legal order to self-reproduce and self-organize is 
manifested in the institutional supranationality, which uncovers itself in the way regulatory 
bodies of organizations are formed and the way decisions are arrived at. Thus, two main 
features would suggest that such bodies are supranational. First, independence of individuals 
(or officials) from member states. This means that they must be required not to receive 
instructions of their respective states, whose nationality they hold, and must pursue only the 
interest of the organization as such. Second, the predominant decision-making mechanism 
must involve a certain variation of the majority voting system instead of the traditional 
unanimity or consensus principle. An additional element to these two is financial 
independence of an institution and the organization as such. It means that institutions or the 
organization must be able to form and manage its own budget and even have its own sources 
of income. The institutions structured in that way indicate that secondary norms of the legal 
order can be arrived at without the consent and dictate of individual member states. 
1.6 Preliminary conclusions 
The autonomy of a legal order is a complex and multifaceted concept. It is hardly 
possible to identify definite criteria thereof since such criteria will always be subject to 
contestation. On the other hand, it is possible to identify indicia, which would indicate whether 
such a legal order is in place. These indicia can be visualized in the following manner (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Indicia of an autonomous legal order 
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It can be claimed that an autonomous legal order can be of different degrees of 
‘strongness’. For instance, if we apply a spectrum to various legal orders, at one end of such a 
spectrum there will be entities without legal order autonomy and on the other—possessing full 
legal order autonomy. The former would theoretically fail to possess any identifiable indicia 
outlined above. The latter would have to possess all of them in their strictest forms. These two 
extremes are hardly possible, and the positions in between are of primary concern. The locus 
of particular degrees of autonomy on this spectrum depends on a degree to which this or that 
indicium is identifiable in an organization. Many gradients of autonomy are imaginable, but 
certain landmarks must be identified. One such landmark could be the possession of certain 
autonomy without the ability to maintain it. This would be a legal order without a strong 
supranational judiciary and/or institutional structures incapable of self-maintenance, self-
reproduction and self-organization. Another landmark could be the inability to interpret its 
own powers. More importantly, there are prerequisites, which play the role of conditio sine 
qua non. Given that and given the relative nature of legal order autonomy (internal and external 
dimensions), the indicia of legal order autonomy can be represented in the following manner: 
 Internal External 
conditiones 
sine qua nons 
legal order international legal personality 
indicia per se 
self-referential character of law 
mechanism ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law in all member 
states 
mechanism ensuring exclusive 
jurisdiction over the legal order 
supranational effect of legal norms - 
interpretation of distributions of powers 
institutional supranationality 
Table 2 Indicia of an autonomous legal order 
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2 The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union 
‘Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, 
world-historical facts and personages occur, 
as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the 
first time as tragedy, the second as farce.’ 
Karl Marx241 
2.1 Defining Eurasian integration 
The EAEU is the most recent result of the process of Eurasian integration. However, 
what is understood by ‘Eurasia’ is not immediately clear, since there are different views in the 
social sciences. 242  Three major different understandings thereof can be distinguished: 1) 
Eurasia as the post-Soviet space; 2) Eurasia as the basis of Eurasian ideology; and 3) Eurasia 
as Europe and Asia.243 In this research I am primarily interested in Eurasia in the former sense, 
as a post-Soviet space, as the EAEU was developed within the integration processes therein. 
Moreover, this understanding distances us from some of the far-fetched ideological beliefs 
inherent in the second understanding,244 and it is not as wide as the third understanding, which 
geographically covers the whole continent. 
The notion of ‘integration’ in a general theoretic sense is usually understood as a 
unifying process resulting from social development.245 Integration in the sense applicable to 
this research does not have a common definition.246  However, a criterion of transferring 
competences to adopt legal rules, which directly regulate relations in member states and are 
applied by national courts is sometimes identified as the major criterion of integration entities 
as compared to other forms of interstate economic or other cooperation.247 Being a complex 
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phenomenon it can give rise to complex definitions, such as the following: (regional) 
integration is the ‘process, which is ensured by international, national and supranational legal 
mechanisms and tools, which occurs within a specific region at the level of states and 
individuals, and aimed at well-being improvement through gradual interpenetration and 
merging of national economic systems, which guarantees freedom of movement of all or some 
factors of production (goods, services, workers, capital), and entails deepening and widening 
of socioeconomic, sociocultural, military-political and other ties.’248 
There are a number of theories that help to explain processes of regional integration 
(often based on or applied to European integration), among which one can name functionalism 
and neofunctionalism, federalism, transactionalism, liberal integovernmentalism, integration 
through law, etc.249 However, as the processes of integration can be of various types, they can 
be classified into various frameworks. Multiple authors provided for their own classifications. 
Thus, according to Kashirkina and Rafaliuk, one of the typologies of integration can be based 
on two main criteria: 1) the scope of integration processes; and 2) belonging to one of the 
spheres of social life.250 Correspondingly, the first criterion encompasses international and 
regional integration; the second—political, legal, cultural, economic and other types of 
integration. Ravenhill additionally distinguishes the concept of ‘regionalism’, which he 
understands as a ‘formal process of intergovernmental collaboration between two or more 
states’, from ‘regionalization’ as a ‘growth of economic interdependence within a given 
geographical area’.251 Regionalism can also be divided into types, such as micro-regional 
economic integration, meso-regional political integration and macro-transcontinental security 
regionalism.252 
Stoiakin distinguishes integration based on 1) the field of interstate cooperation where 
integration takes place: economic, political, scientific and technological, social, monetary, 
military, etc.; 2) social subsystem: political, economic, spiritual; 3) geographical criteria: 
                                                 
248 Mikhaliova, Pravovoe regulirovanie regional'noi ekonomicheskoi integratsii: vyzovy i perspektivy, 48. 
249 For an overview see D.N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European integration (London: SAGE, 2001), 37-63; 
More generally see A. Wiener and T. Diez, European integration theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); S. Saurugger, Théories et concepts de l'intégration européenne, Références 
gouvernances (Paris: Sciences Po les Presses, 2010); For theories of new regionalism see F. Söderbaum and 
T.M. Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
250 V.Y. Lukianova, ed. Pravovye problemy formirovaniia mezhgosudarstvennykh ob"edinenii (na primere 
Zony svobodnoi torgovli i Tamozhennogo soiuza EvrAzES) (Moscow: Ankil, 2012), 29-30. 
251 J. Ravenhill, "Regionalism," in Global Political Economy, ed. J. Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 174. 
252 For that see R. Sakwa, "Challenges of Eurasian integration," in Eurasian Integration - the View from Within, 
ed. P. Dutkiewicz and R. Sakwa, Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), 12-13; More broadly see L. L'Estrange Fawcett and A. Hurrell, Regionalism in world 
politics: regional organization and international order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
  
55 
subregional, regional, interregional, and global; 4) creation of legal rules or elimination of 
national barriers: positive and negative. 253  Veliaminov adds the notion of ‘intensity’ of 
integration processes, where he distinguishes declaratory, constructive and real integration.254 
These and other classifications are not of immediate importance to this research. First, 
although it is possible to situate Eurasian integration in this or that manner following the 
relevant criteria, the corresponding analysis would go beyond the purpose of the study, while 
hardly providing us with the necessary explanatory power in the legal context. However, given 
the above, Eurasian integration even as a post-Soviet integration could be understood widely, 
embracing all the integration attempts in the region; or narrowly, concentrating only on certain 
ones. As the main focus of the research is the Eurasian Economic Union, Eurasian integration 
is understood in a narrow sense, i.e. integration that leads to the successive establishment and 
functioning of the EAEU. Therefore, geographically, this integration process is regional in 
nature. According to the sphere of interstate cooperation, it is essentially economic integration. 
This process has elements of positive integration as it includes creation of legal norms on 
interstate (and supranational) level; and negative integration due to elimination of national 
barriers. Different stages of Eurasian integration could be characterised as having elements of 
declaratory, constructive and real integration.  
Second, the lines are often blurred. For instance, although the EAEU is claimed to be 
a ‘regional’ organization, as will be explored more in Section 2.4, nevertheless, in theory, its 
membership is open to any country in the world irrespective of geographical location. Indeed, 
the provisions on accession to the organization do not mention Eurasia as a region to which a 
member state should belong: it is provided that the EAEU is open for accession to any state 
sharing its objectives and principles.255 
What is relevant, however, is the assessments of integration as multispeed, where states 
integrate to a different extent (higher or lower).256 This is the path that was eventually followed 
leading to the EAEU, which bears direct relevance since it led to a peculiar and rather 
innovative legal framework that has eventually involved into the EAEU. This integration was 
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disintegration : the trajectory of differentiation in EU law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017). 
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multispeed due to different levels of readiness of states for ‘intensity’ of integration processes, 
which is highlighted by the example of initial establishment of the EAEU consisting of only 
three states. 
2.2 Stages of Eurasian integration 
Prerequisites for an autonomous legal order, such as the existence of the legal order 
itself and of the legal personality as explored in the previous chapter, follow from the legal 
nature of the EAEU. In order to understand the legal nature of the EAEU it is necessary to 
explore the roots of the EAEU since it draws upon a number of previous integration projects. 
As there is no common understanding of Eurasian integration even in the sense of the 
post-Soviet space, there is no common view on how this integration developed. Therefore, 
scholars propose various versions of stages of Eurasian integration with different temporal 
scope. The widest scope starts with the fall of the Soviet Union and substantively covers all 
the integration processes that took place on the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, very 
narrow approaches exist as well. Thus, Chufrin begins Eurasian integration with the creation 
of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2006 and explains the choice of 
such a narrow scope by asserting the low effectiveness of the prior integration attempts.257 
There are scholars that distinguish Eurasian integration on the basis of various 
trajectories. Malinovskaya identifies three directions with a view to creation of the common 
economic area on the post-Soviet area.258 The first trajectory—economic integration within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter ‘CIS’) and the ensuing formation of a 
free trade area. The second trajectory—economic integration in the framework of the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia as a confederative union of two states, which also foresees the 
creation of a single customs area with single regulatory framework. Finally, the third 
trajectory—economic integration within the EURASEC. 
Others, e.g. Glazyev and Mansurov take European integration as a comparator and 
identify the stages of Eurasian integration on this basis. However, this approach necessarily 
limits the periodization to economic integration to the EURASEC.259 
                                                 
257 G.I. Chufrin, Ocherki evraziiskoi integratsii (Moscow: Ves' mir, 2013), 15-16. 
258 V.M. Malinovskaia, "Pravovye i institutsional'nye osnovy funktsionirovaniia Evraziiskogo soiuza," Vestnik 
MGIMO-Universiteta, no. 4 (2012): 198. 
259 S.Y. Glazev, V.I. Chushkin, and S.P. Tkachuk, Evropeiskii Soiuz i Evraziiskoe ekonomicheskoe 
soobshchestvo: skhodstvo i razlichie protsessov integratsionnogo stroitelstva (Moscow: Viktor media, 2013), 
184; Lukianova, Pravovye problemy formirovaniia mezhgosudarstvennykh ob"edinenii (na primere Zony 
svobodnoi torgovli i Tamozhennogo soiuza EvrAzES), 116; Mansurov, "Metodologicheskie i institutsionalnye 
osnovy integratsii stran EvrAzES," 112. 
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Chetverikov proposes periodization, which is the closest for the purposes of this 
research, as it is determined by the formation of the EAEU: 1) preliminary stage (1991 – 
2007)—dissolution of the USSR, establishment of the CIS, and conclusion of a number of 
agreements of ‘integration’ character between its members; 2) establishment of the Customs 
Union and the Single Economic Space (6 October 2007 – 2011)—drafting, adoption, and 
implementation of the documents directed at formation of, initially, the Customs Union, and 
later the Single Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia; 3) preparation for the 
establishment of the EAEU (2012 – 2014)—launch of the Eurasian Economic Commission, a 
number of measures are taken with a view to implementation of the agreements forming the 
Single Economic Space, drafting of the codification treaty establishing the EAEU; 4) signing 
and implementation of the EAEU Treaty (2015 and following years).260 
Any periodization attempt is artificial to a certain extent as it is dictated by the aims 
pursued by an author. In case of this research, the aim is to establish the pattern which has led 
to the creation of the EAEU’s legal order. The proposed periodization is a good foundation for 
this research, which, however, requires certain modifications to achieve this aim. In my view, 
it is justified to agree with the integration trajectories distinguished by Malinovskaya and, in 
order to avoid the distraction away from the EAEU, which is the underlying object of this 
research, one must not include other integration projects in the periodization. However related, 
such other projects either go in parallel or are envisaged to achieve other aims (e.g. the CIS 
and the Union State of Belarus and Russia261). Taking these circumstance into account, I 
propose the following periodization of Eurasian integration. 
2.2.1 First stage (1992 – 1999) 
The first stage of Eurasian integration, which should have become the initial 
foundation of the current EAEU, must be traced back to the first attempts to create a customs 
union, which, after a number of attempts, finally became the foundational basis of the EAEU. 
In certain sources, especially in the official discourse, e.g. official EAEU reference 
materials,262 the reference point for the current integration project in a legal dimension is the 
                                                 
260 Kashkin, Osnovy pravovogo regulirovaniia integratsionnykh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve, 18. 
261 The interrelations of the Union State and the EAEU somewhat resemble that of the Benelux Union and the 
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Agreement on the Customs Union of 20 January 1995.263 However, it is not entirely correct 
for the following reasons. First, this agreement has been concluded between Belarus and 
Russia on the one side and Kazakhstan on the other. This means that there was a prior customs 
union agreement between Belarus and Russia. Indeed, earlier the same month, on 6 January 
1995 an Agreement on Customs Union was concluded between the two countries,264 which 
entered into force the same year, while the agreement with Kazakhstan entered into force only 
in 1997. Moreover, the agreement of 20 January is to a large extent a renvoi to the agreement 
of 6 January, which essentially means Kazakhstan becoming part of the latter.265 However, to 
begin with the agreement from 6 January 1995, as it is done by Malinovskaya 266  and 
Neshataeva,267 is also not entirely correct. Both agreements are based on, and directly refer to 
another agreement—on the establishment of the Economic Union, which was concluded in 
1993.268 This agreement envisaged a phased creation of a common economic space,269 and the 
customs union was to become one of the stages.270 At the same time it is important to note that 
this agreement did not become part of the legal basis of the Customs Union created in 2007,271 
which could be the reason why the agreement is not usually mentioned by scholars. However, 
it is rarely mentioned that earlier on 13 March 1992 an agreement on the principles of customs 
policy was concluded, which envisaged the creation of a customs union. 272  Hence, this 
agreement must be considered as the first attempt to establish a customs union within Eurasian 
integration and therefore 1992 must be the reference point. 
Agreements further adopted at this stage were the Treaty on deepening of Integration 
in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields of 29 March 1996 with the participation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia;273 Treaty on the Customs Union and Single Economic 
Space of 26 February 1999 to which Tajikistan also became a party.274 The five countries 
which signed the agreement were referred to as the ‘Customs Union’, even though neither 
                                                 
263 Soglashenie o Tamozhennom soiuze. 20 January 1995. 
264 Soglashenie o Tamozhennom soiuze mezhdu Respublikoi Belarus' i Rossiiskoi Federatsiei. 6 January 1995. 
265 On 29 March 1996 Kyrgyzstan also joined the agreement. 
266 Malinovskaia, "Pravovye i institutsional'nye osnovy funktsionirovaniia Evraziiskogo soiuza," 199. 
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from the legal point of view nor from the trade and economic points of view these countries 
could hardly be considered as such.275 
It seems plausible that the main feature of these agreements is that they were limited 
to introducing certain objectives, programmatic provisions the implementation of which 
required adoption of a body of specific measures by the parties.276 Such measures had seen 
only limited implementation, which became the premise for the following stage of integration. 
2.2.2 Second stage (2000 – 2006) 
The second stage came about with the establishment of the new international 
organization—the Eurasian Economic Community on the basis of the Treaty establishing the 
EURASEC of 10 October 2000 with the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan.277 The EURASEC was created, primarily, with a view to ensure a more 
efficient process of developing a customs union and single economic space. This has led to 
the conclusion of another document: Agreement on the formation of the Single Economic 
Space of 19 September 2003 with the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine.278 Apart from these, a number of other documents were adopted, which, however, to 
a large extent retained the main feature of the first stage: introduction of objectives with limited 
implementation in practice.279 
2.2.3 Third stage (2007 – 2014) 
The third stage is distinguishable due to the practical implementation of the concepts 
of multilevel and multispeed integration of states,280 reinforcement of integration efforts of the 
three states, which were, for various reasons, ready for deeper integration (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia). It has been plausibly suggested that 2007 was ground-breaking in 
terms of moving from declarative integration towards real integration.281 Moreover, this stage 
was marked by the announcement to establish a supranational institution. 
On 6 October 2007 a number of international legal documents were adopted, which 
became a distinguishing point of this integration stage. Among them, two agreements (Treaty 
                                                 
275 A.V. Barkov, "Pravovoi status Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobschestva" (MGIMO, 2003), 41. 
276 Kashkin, Osnovy pravovogo regulirovaniia integratsionnykh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve, 14. 
277 Dogovor ob uchrezhdenii Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva. 10 October 2000. 
278 Soglashenie o formirovanii Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva. 19 September 2003. 
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EURASEC see further in the chapter. 
280 A.N. Spartak, "Evraziiskaia ekonomicheskaia integratsiia - sostoiavshiisia i otrkytyi dlia shirokogo 
mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva integratsionnyi proekt," Mezhdunarodnaia ekonomika, no. 1 (2013): 55. 
281 Kashkin, Osnovy pravovogo regulirovaniia integratsionnykh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve, 14. 
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on the establishment of the Single Customs Territory and formation of the Customs Union;282 
Treaty on the Commission of the Customs Union283), two protocols (Protocol establishing the 
procedure of entry into force of international agreements aimed at the formation of the 
contractual legal basis of the Customs Union, secession from and accession to it;284 and 
Protocol amending the Treaty establishing the EURASEC of 10 October 2000),285 index of 
international agreements forming the contractual legal basis of the Customs Union,286 and the 
action plan on the formation of the Customs Union within the EURASEC.287 
The aforementioned action plan envisaged the conclusion of more than 50 agreements 
of special character, which were signed in 2008 – 2009. In addition to them, around 30 
agreements forming the legal basis of the Customs Union were adopted in 2010 – 2011. 
According to the protocol establishing the procedure of entry into force of international 
agreements, the contractual legal basis of the Customs Union consisted of two groups of 
agreements, which were later supplemented with a third one: 1) international agreements 
within the EURASEC (the EURASEC Treaty itself, certain agreements on particular aspects 
of integration within the EURASEC, and some other agreements adopted prior to the 
establishment of the EURASEC); 2) international agreements aimed at completion of the 
formation of contractual legal basis of the Customs Union (signed in 2007 – 2009 to establish 
the Customs Union); 3) other international agreements (additional agreements of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia signed at the end of 2009 and later on). 
The Customs Union formally started functioning as of 1 January 2010 after the entry 
into force of the Single Customs Tariff.288 However, in practice, the Customs Union was fully 
operational as of 1 July 2011 when the customs territories of the three countries were merged 
into a single customs territory.289 
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Otvetstvennogo sekretaria Komissii Tamozhennogo soiuza "O vypolnenii planov formirovaniia Tamozhennogo 
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The three states started forming a common market—the Single Economic Space. The 
contractual legal basis of the Single Economic Space encompassed the agreements 
establishing the legal framework of free movement of persons between Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia, in addition to the goods, services and capital, as well as the procedure to develop 
and implement a common (coordinated) economic policy. 
To facilitate the transition to the new level of integration, on 19 December 2009 the 
three states adopted an Action Plan for the formation of the Single Economic Space for 2010 
– 2011,290 which was amended on 9 December 2010.291 The plan envisaged drafting of twenty 
international agreements ensuring the establishment of the Single Economic Space by 1 
January 2012. According to the 2010 – 2011 calendar plan to form the legal basis of the Single 
Economic Space, it was envisaged to draft, adopt and implement the first package of 14 
agreements by 1 July 2011, and the second package of 6 documents on the Single Economic 
Space by 1 January 2012292 (eventually 17 were signed, which entered into force on 1 January 
2012). These agreements were classified into five groups: 1) economic policy; 2) free 
movement of capital, currency policy; 3) energy, transport, communications; 4) free 
movement of workers; 5) technical regulation. The calendar plan also envisaged conclusion 
of a number of other documents as well.293 
Therefore, the Single Economic Space formally started functioning as of 1 January 
2012 with the entry into force of these agreements.294 However, the full-fledged functioning 
of the Single Economic Space required further implementation of these agreements. To this 
end a new plan of action was drafted envisaging measures up to 2020.295 These measures 
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included drafting and adoption of 13 international agreements and 42 other documents 
(protocols, plans of action, etc.) until the end of 2015.296 Apart from that, the governments 
were supposed to ensure implementation of more than 70 obligatory actions on 17 base 
agreements, which form the Single Economic Space with precise deadlines. The full-fledged 
functioning of the Single Economic Space was planned for 1 January 2016.297 
This overview clearly shows that Glazyev was incorrect in claiming that the formation 
of the Single  Economic Space was to end with the establishment of the EAEU (1 January 
2015).298 Its establishment should not be regarded as the following stage after the formation 
of the Single Economic Space, but rather as a stage which encompasses the process of 
completing the Single Economic Space, which became part of the EAEU. 
In order to ensure a common and more effective organizational and legal basis for the 
functioning of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, the declaration of Eurasian 
economic integration was signed on 18 November 2011.299 The declaration stated the intention 
to finalize the codification process by 1 January 2015 and to establish the EAEU on this basis. 
Concurrently with the adoption of the declaration, the states concluded the documents on the 
establishment of the single regulatory body of the Customs Union and the Single Economic 
Space—the Eurasian Economic Commission, which assumed the powers of the Customs 
Union Commission as of 2012. 
Therefore, the third stage was characterized by a considerable leap forward in the 
integration process. After many years of struggle to establish a functioning customs union, the 
process was finally complete at this stage. However, the Single Economic Space remained in 
the process of being formed. 
2.2.4 Fourth stage (2015 and beyond) 
The fourth integration stage takes place within the newly established international 
organization—the Eurasian Economic Union. The EAEU Treaty is a product of a codification 
exercise, which has united the most important rules of the agreements concluded between 
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Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia with a view to the creation of the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space. 
The work on codification envisaged in 2011 by the decision of the EURASEC 
Interstate Council (the Supreme Body of the Customs Union) at the level of heads of 
governments.300 The final aim of the codification was the draft international treaty.301 A third 
party—Russian Foreign Trade Academy of the Ministry of Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation—was assigned to do the work on codification,302 which delivered the first 
draft of TEAEU. The coordination and control over the work was done by a working group 
under the direction of the Member of the Commission Board, Minister in charge of Integration 
and Macroeconomics Valovaya.303 However, the draft treaty eventually was not used, and the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council of the Customs Union adopted the decision “On 
realization of the main directions of integration” on 19 December 2012304 with an objective to 
draw-up issues of integration by 1 May 2013 and a shortened deadline for the draft TEAEU 
by 1 May 2014. 
On 20 May 2013 the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council adopted the decision “On 
the direction of further development of integration processes”,305 based on which the work on 
the draft TEAEU was continued, and the revised Treaty was signed on 29 May 2014 and 
entered into force on 1 January 2015. 
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Therefore, the fourth stage is signified by the establishment and development of the 
new international entity, which is described in Article 1(2) TEAEU as an international 
organization of regional economic integration possessing international legal personality. 
2.3 The legal nature of the integration entities within Eurasian 
integration prior to the establishment of the EAEU 
The periodization clearly singles out three main integration structures, which have a 
direct relation to the formation of the EAEU: the EURASEC, the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space. While the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space became 
part or, rather, fundamental basis for the EAEU, the EURASEC has ceased to exist with the 
entry into force of the TEAEU.306 
2.3.1 EURASEC 
The EURASEC was established in order to effectively advance the process of 
formation of a customs union and a single economic space, as well as to achieve the other 
objectives and purposes laid down in a number of previous agreements, making it first and 
foremost an economic organization. Making it different from prior economic integration 
attempts, the EURASEC Treaty endowed the new entity with a new legal status of an 
international organization with conferred powers.307 
There are different opinions about the legal nature of this organization. There is a view, 
which has been voiced by Morozov and Kashirkina, that the EURASEC differed from 
‘classical’ international organizations, among others due to its aims and objectives, system 
and structure of institutions, types of decisions, manner of their implementation, etc.308 Even 
more radically, Kalachyan argues that EURASEC had very much in common with the 
supranational features of the EU.309 Alternatively, it is argued in literature that this Community 
possessed features of a classical international intergovernmental organization.310 There are 
also controversial views. For instance, Moiseev believes that the EURASEC is simply a 
renamed Customs Union.311 A radical view has been expressed by Vishniakov, who claims 
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that the EURASEC was developing in the direction of a specific state entity, wherein sovereign 
rights of the Community members intertwine with characteristics of a common state 
structure.312 In this respect, he discerns such attributes of a state as common territory, common 
borders, common laws, single currency, etc. In the other extreme, there is an opinion that the 
EURASEC ‘can hardly be qualified as an international organization’ at all.313 
As it is rightly pointed out by Kembayev, there is no basis for such extreme claims and 
the EURASEC must be considered an international organization with an international legal 
personality.314 The main differentiating feature of this organization is that it played a role of a 
suitable framework to develop a customs union and a single economic space in a multi-speed 
and multi-level fashion. 
2.3.2 Customs Union 
The Customs Union is defined in the TEAEU as a ‘form of trade and economic 
integration of the Member States envisaging a common customs territory, within which no 
customs duties (other duties, taxes and fees having equivalent effect), non-tariff regulatory 
measures, safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing measures shall be applied to the mutual 
trade”.315 In so doing, member states apply common customs tariff and common measures 
regulating foreign trade. 
Kashirkina and Morozov claim that the customs union announced in 2007, which has 
become the foundation of the EAEU, is the fourth one within the Eurasian integration 
process.316 However, if we consider the Agreement on the Principles of Customs Policy of 13 
March 1992, which was mentioned above, and which envisaged the establishment of a customs 
union, this makes the latest customs union a fifth iteration. Regardless the involvement of 
different actors within different legal frameworks, the various attempts to create a viable 
customs union within the Eurasian integration process could be viewed as a single process. 
Therefore, the various agreements on customs unions could be viewed as supplementary and 
clarifying in nature.317  
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The 2007 Treaty establishing the Customs Union does not explicitly define it as an 
international organization, but as a form of trade and economic integration of member states, 
which envisages a single customs territory.318 This however did not preclude the speculations 
about its legal nature. It is interesting to note that the 1992 Agreement on the principles of 
customs policy, which was the first attempt to establish a customs union, even then declared 
the Customs Union an independent subject of international law within its functions. 319 
Nevertheless, only a classical description of a customs unions was given, i.e. that in mutual 
trade in goods coming from one customs territory, as well as from third countries and released 
into free circulation on that customs territory, customs duties and restrictions of economic 
character are not to be applied except for special safety, antidumping, and compensation 
measures. Member states were to apply a single customs tariff and other common regulatory 
measures regarding trade in goods with third countries. 
Imprecision of the status of the Customs Union does not bear immediate importance 
for the EAEU. However, prior to the establishment of the EAEU it could have had direct 
practical legal consequences. Thus, in international practice there were instances of non-
recognition of immunities of an organization in national courts precisely because of the 
indeterminacy of its status.320 
Today, the issue of the exact status of the Customs Union is rather a theoretical 
exercise. However, since it can shed some light on the development of the legal order of the 
EAEU, it is worth mentioning. The views of researchers differ considerably, often being 
diametrically opposite. Sliusar, the then director of the legal department of the late Customs 
Union Commission Secretariat, pointed out that the Customs Union had all the features of an 
international intergovernmental organization, but it was an entity that existed within the 
EURASEC. 321  Diatlov and Zverev also maintained that the Customs Union was not an 
independent international organization and did not possess international legal personality, and 
that it was ‘created “within” EURASEC, but was not a Customs Union of EURASEC.’322 
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Some see the Customs Union as a ‘space with a special international legal regime’,323 which 
essentially means a sui generis entity. Others express the opinion that the Customs Union 
Commission, established in 2009, and not the Customs Union itself, possessed the status of an 
international organization.324 Malinovskaia proposes her own terminology and claims that as 
of 1 January 2012 the Customs Union is in fact the ‘Eurasian Union’, and the single customs 
territory of the Customs Union is the Single Economic Space.325 Some of these views can be 
justified at least to some extent. However, the last one is clearly incorrect since all the 
international agreements and other legal acts indicate to the contrary. 
There are those who believe that the Customs Union was an international organization. 
Thus, Mansurov calls the 1996 Customs Union a regional organization.326 This opinion has a 
right to exist, however, it must be clarified since it avoids other (previous and the following) 
customs unions, which were established by other agreements within the Eurasian integration 
process and does not give them a legal assessment. 
Kashirkina and Morozov see the last Customs Union as an international 
intergovernmental organization,327 however, they clarify that it is more appropriate to call it 
an ‘interstate integration association on a regional level’ and distinguish it from ‘classical’ 
international organizations. They also recognize its international legal personality by 
underlying that it is founded upon a system of interrelated international agreements, which 
provide for the aims, objectives, foundations of its functioning, system of institutions, which 
possess wide competences, including supranational competences.328 Also the Customs Union 
had a developed regulatory system, which included decisions of the Customs Union 
Commission (later—Eurasian Economic Commission). 329  Therefore, according to these 
authors, the Customs Union in a wide sense was an international intergovernmental 
organization, while in a narrow sense—an interstate integration association. In this respect 
they share the view of Tikhomirov that the latter is a higher level of interstate and legal 
integration.330 
                                                 
323 S.V. Komendantov, "Mezhdunarodno-pravovye posledstviia sozdaniia Tamozhennogo soiuza v ramkakh 
EvrAzES," Rossiiskii vneshneekonomicheskii vestnik, no. 1 (2010): 38. 
324 Glazev, Chushkin, and Tkachuk, Evropeiskii Soiuz i Evraziiskoe ekonomicheskoe soobshchestvo: skhodstvo 
i razlichie protsessov integratsionnogo stroitelstva, 125. 
325 Malinovskaia, "Pravovye i institutsional'nye osnovy funktsionirovaniia Evraziiskogo soiuza," 199. 
326 Mansurov, "Metodologicheskie i institutsionalnye osnovy integratsii stran EvrAzES," 101. 
327 Kashirkina and Morozov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovye modeli Evropeiskogo soiuza i Tamozhennogo soiuza: 
sravnitelnyi analiz, 86. 
328 Ibid., 85-86. 
329 Ibid., 86. 
330 Y.A. Tikhomirov, "Tseli i formy gosudarstvenno-pravovoi integratsii," in Pravovoe obespechenie 
mezhgosudarstvennoi integratsii, ed. Y.A. Tikhomirov and V.I. Lafitskii (Moscow: Olita, 2005). 
  
68 
As Crawford observes, since there is a large number of international organizations, it 
is very difficult to find one single definition of an international organization.331 Indeed, there 
are numerous definitions of international organizations and different authors include different 
sets of characteristics in their definitions.332 Crawford proposes to turn to Article 2 of the Draft 
articles on the responsibility of international organizations, which defines an international 
organization as an ‘organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing its own international legal personality.’ 333  However, 
Crawford immediately comments that regardless the usefulness of the definition, it was drafted 
in the context of international responsibility, which presupposes legal personality, while an 
international organization can exist without legal personality.334 
In any event, the strong view of Kashirkina and Morozov is not completely clear, since, 
among others, it does not address the issue of the Single Economic Space, which, according 
to the classical theory of integration of Balassa, is only a stage of economic integration.335 I 
will now turn exactly to that. 
2.3.3 Single Economic Space 
The Single Economic Space is defined in the TEAEU as a ‘space consisting of the 
territories of the Member States implementing similar (comparable) and uniform mechanisms 
regulating economy based on market principles and the application of harmonised or unified 
legal norms, and having a common infrastructure.’336 Separately, the TEAEU identifies a 
‘single (common) market’ as a ‘set of economic relations within the Union ensuring the 
freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labour.’337 
The terminology is somewhat obscure, which, notably, has also been the case in the 
EU until the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the initial founding Treaty of Rome used the term ‘common 
market’, which was eventually supplemented with the term ‘internal market’ in the Single 
European Act in 1986. However, beyond the Treaties, the preferred term of art was ‘single 
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market’.338 While the ECJ often used the three concepts interchangeably,339 scholars drew 
distinctions.340 The current TEU and TFEU operate only with the notion of internal market. 
If the Customs Union in the framework of the EURASEC was an international 
organization of its own, its relations with the Single Economic Space were not clear, especially 
given the fact that they co-existed. Even more problematic is that both Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space were subsumed by the EAEU and no legal basis is available to regulate 
the issue of the changing status. 
Following the indeterminate nature of this issue it is safer to assume that, as Dragneva 
argues, the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space were a treaty regime within the 
EURASEC framework using the tools and mechanisms of that established international 
organization, which allowed a group of EURASEC member states to move forward in their 
integration efforts establishing new institutions and practices. 341  This treaty regime was 
completely subsumed by the EAEU following the disseverment of this framework. Therefore, 
the issue of the legal nature must be addressed on another level. Indeed, for the purposes of 
this research I am interested first and foremost in the status and legal nature of the EAEU. 
2.4 The prima facie legal nature of the EAEU 
Each international organization is unique,342 and the EAEU is hardly different. The 
Treaty gives the following description of the EAEU: 
‘The Union shall be an international organisation of regional economic 
integration and shall have international legal personality.’343 
This definition has several characteristics, the first of which declares the EAEU as an 
international organization. However, as it has been mentioned above, the EAEU is established 
on the basis of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, which predetermines the 
specifics of its objectives. One of the main objectives of the EAEU as stipulated in the Treaty 
is to create a common market of goods, services, capital, and labour. This objective resonates 
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with the EU’s aim to establish an internal market,344 the functioning of which, according to 
the ECJ’s interpretation as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2, is of direct concern to 
interested parties. 
However, following Baildinov’s reading of the TEAEU’s objectives, the common 
interests of the states are narrowly directed only at securing the economic development of the 
respective countries, making it different from the wider aims of the EU treaties, which, 
according to him, include people, nations, their rights and interests of sustainable 
development, and where the economy and politics are regarded only as means to realization 
of these rights and interests.345 
At the same time, the aims of a treaty should be analysed alongside the provisions of 
the preamble, which also the ECJ did in the Van Gend en Loos case, where it noted, that the 
preamble referred not only to governments but also to peoples. Indeed, the preamble of the 
1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter ‘TEEC’), analysed 
by the ECJ at the time, went as follows: ‘[determined] to lay the foundations of an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’,346 and ‘[affirming] as the essential objective of their 
efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples.’347 
The preamble to the TEAEU has the following provision: ‘seeking to strengthen the solidarity 
and cooperation between their peoples while respecting their history, culture and traditions.’348 
This is almost an exact reproduction of the current preamble to the TEU, which goes as 
follows: ‘[desiring] to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their 
history, their culture and their traditions.’349 
Therefore, the TEAEU shies away from a semantically stronger wording of the ‘ever 
closer union of nations’. However, it is important to underline that in both cases the reference 
is made to the nations and not exclusively to the states. It must also be noted that the wording 
of the TEAEU preamble is one of the strongest among all the agreements concluded within 
the Eurasian integration process, most of which mention the population at best in the context 
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of improving the living conditions (similar to paragraph 3 of the preamble to the TEEC). Thus, 
the preamble of the 1993 Treaty establishing the Economic Union provided for increasing 
living standards of the population: ‘seeking to ensure favourable conditions for a dynamic 
development of economies and conducting economic reforms in the interest of improving the 
living standards of the population of their countries.’ 350  Similarly, the first aim of the 
Economic Union mentioned the interests of the population: ‘creation of conditions of stable 
development of economies of the parties in the interests of improving the living standards of 
their population.’351 However, for instance, the following two 1995 agreements regarding the 
establishment of the Customs Union do not mention the population in any form. 352  An 
important exception in the row of agreements concluded within the Eurasian integration was 
the 1996 Treaty the deepening of integration in economic and humanitarian fields, which 
widened the spheres of cooperation and envisaged the creation of a Community of Integrated 
States. The preamble referred to the historical links of the peoples and their aspiration to 
further integration: ‘based on the historically established ties of the peoples, their aspirations 
for further integration and comprehensive rapprochement.’353 This is the strongest wording 
available among the international agreements concluded within the framework of Eurasian 
integration. 
Turning back to the Treaty-established definition of the EAEU, the second feature is 
the geographic scope of the EAEU as a regional international organization. The distinctive 
characteristics of universal and regional integration are the geographic and quantitative 
parameters, i.e. the location and number of states. 354  This limits the possibility for the 
organization to expand within specific geographical boundaries. Even though the TEAEU 
does not specify its boundaries, one can deduce that the EAEU is limited to the region of 
Eurasia. As it has been noted above, the understanding of Eurasia as a post-Soviet territory 
has been chosen for the purposes of this research. At the same time, it is not entirely clear if 
the architects of the EAEU had (only) this understanding in mind. Thus, in theory, Eurasia 
could be understood in the widest sense and could lead to an interregional integration of the 
whole Eurasian continent. In addition, as has been mentioned in Section 2.1, the provisions on 
accession to the organization do not mention Eurasia as a region where a potential member 
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state should belong, and the EAEU is open to any country provided that EAEU’s objectives 
and principles are shared. This is different from the EU, where there is a clear geographical 
criterion of accession, and only European states can become EU members.355 Therefore, in 
theory, the TEAEU allows any state to become a potential member of the organization, 
regardless the region upon the condition of complying with all requirements. 
Third, it is an organization of integration, as it envisages (economic) integration. The 
use of the notion of ‘integration’ is often related to the process of EU’s coming into being. 
However, as it has been noted by Pescatore, it was the UN Security Council who used it.356 
Chetverikov defines an organization of integration as an entity, which has the main or sole 
objective to develop integration between member states. 357  He also distinguishes such 
organizations from ‘classical’ international intergovernmental organizations by singling out 
one main feature—supranationality.358 
The TEAEU shows that Treaty drafters also distinguish ‘organizations of integration’. 
The preamble contrasts ‘international integration associations’ and ‘other international 
organizations’.359 In my view, other international organizations must be distinguished as those 
that do not have integration as one of their main objectives. However, the main objectives of 
the EAEU are not explicit about integration. They are to create proper conditions for 
sustainable economic development of member states in order to improve the living standards 
of the population; to seek the creation of a common market for goods, services, capital, and 
labour within the EAEU; to ensure comprehensive modernisation, cooperation, and 
competitiveness of national economies within the global economy. 360  Therefore, the 
integration elements are only indirectly mentioned, and mainly within the second objective in 
a very cautious manner. 
Fourth, the integration envisaged is economic in nature. This means that non-economic 
integration (e.g. political, cultural, social, etc.), normally, falls outside the EAEU, and, 
possibly, will be achieved through other agreements, other organizations or through 
amendments to the TEAEU in the future. The economic focus of integration is underlined by 
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the absence of the parliamentary institution in the EAEU, which is by its nature a political 
body.361 However, this institution was present in the draft version of the TEAEU. Thus, the 27 
December 2012 draft TEAEU envisaged a Eurasian Interparliamentary Assembly.362 At the 
same time, as practice indicates, economic integration can gradually develop into other fields 
of public life. Eventually, such organizations can transform into organizations of wider 
competence. 
Finally, and importantly for this research, the TEAEU stipulates that the EAEU 
possesses international legal personality. The explicit reference to the EAEU’s international 
legal personality has likely been inserted to preclude speculations, which, for example, took 
place regarding legal personality of the European Communities and the EU in their initial 
stages of development. 363  It was also an issue for the UN, which was resolved by the 
International Court of Justice in the Reparation for injuries advisory opinion.364 There is no 
convincing theory of international legal personality of international organizations.365 Shaw 
suggests that legal personality of an organization depends on its constitutional status, actual 
powers and practice, with significant factors including ‘the capacity to enter into relations with 
states and other organizations and conclude treaties with them, and the status it has been given 
under municipal law.’ 366  Moreover, international legal personality can be explicit or 
implicit.367 More specifically, according to Brownlie, the indicia of legal personality include 
1) a capacity to make treaties; 2) a capacity to present international claims by diplomatic 
procedures or in other available forms; 3) a liability for the consequences of breaches of 
international law; 4) privileges and immunities in relation to the national jurisdictions of states. 
However, he suggests, that it is not necessary for an entity to bear all the indicia.368 In any 
case, the TEAEU provides for the right of the Union to engage in international cooperation 
with states, international organizations, etc., and independently or jointly with the Member 
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States to conclude international agreements therewith on any matters within its jurisdiction.369 
The TEAEU also provides for the immunities of the EAEU institutions and members of the 
Commission Board, judges, officials, and employees from national jurisdiction.370 
2.5 Intermediate conclusions 
The process that has led to the EAEU has been a thorny one. In my view, the epigraph 
to this chapter, when applied to the realities of the Eurasian integration, aptly describes the 
spiral of integration attempts that took place. The question remains whether the EAEU is to 
make the same turns or not. Although this complex issues is not part of the research question 
and falls beyond legal research, this study will nevertheless illuminate some of the aspects 
which will help to throw light on it. 
A narrow understanding of ‘Eurasian integration’ is proposed here, meaning such 
integration which leads to the creation and functioning of the EAEU. Based on this narrow 
understanding I propose another look at the stages of Eurasian integration, different from what 
is available in scholarship. Thus, this understanding of Eurasian integration is characterized 
by such features as focus on economic development, certain regional isolation and different 
abilities of regional actors to accept obligations stemming from it. To put in perspective, 
although within European integration the multispeed integration took the form of opt outs, 
within Eurasian integration it led to the creation of a new international organization leaving 
out (or ‘opting-out’) non-willing and non-ready states. 
Thus, Eurasian integration in narrow sense used in this research is a multi-speed 
regional economic integration process on the post-Soviet space, which leads to a successive 
establishment and functioning of the EAEU. 
The legal nature of the EAEU is complex and versatile. Description of the organization 
in the TEAEU as an international organization of regional economic integration with legal 
personality is not enough to understand the legal nature of the EAEU. The following chapters 
will contribute to understanding of the substance of the EAEU in order to try and single out 
the indicia of legal order autonomy. 
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3 Supranational and intergovernmental functioning of 
the EAEU 
‘The strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must.’ 
Thucydides371 
3.1 The institutional design 
The EAEU institutional system is based on the institutional structure of the Customs 
Union and Single Economic Space and is not profoundly different. The EAEU Treaty 
establishes four institutions: the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (hereinafter ‘Supreme 
Council’), the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (hereinafter ‘Intergovernmental Council’), 
the Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter ‘Commission’), and the Court (Figure 2). 
The Treaty also provides for a structured list of general powers of each of the institutions.  
 
Figure 2 EAEU institutional structure 
In terms of succession, starting from the effective date of the TEAEU, all functions 
and powers of the preceding Supreme Eurasian Economic Council at the level of heads of 
states and at the level of heads of governments are carried out by the Supreme Council and the 
Intergovernmental Council, respectively. Thus, the highest EAEU institution is the Supreme 
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Council, which consists of the heads of states.372 It considers the principal issues regarding the 
functioning of the EAEU, determines the strategy, directions, and perspectives of integration 
development, and makes legally binding decisions to implement EAEU objectives.373 The 
TEAEU provides for a non-exhaustive list of twenty-three basic powers.374 One of the main 
responsibilities of the Supreme Council lies in its control of all budgetary issues: it approves 
the EAEU budget, drafted by the Commission,375 and determines the amount of contributions 
of the member states.376 
The Supreme Council also possesses the main competences in the area of the EAEU 
external action. It approves the procedure for international cooperation, for admission of new 
member states and termination of membership, decides on granting or revocation of an 
observer status or the status of a candidate country for accession.377 The Supreme Council 
decides on negotiations with a third party, including on the conclusion of international 
agreements, termination, suspension of or withdrawal from an international treaty.378 
Overall, based on its function, the Supreme Council is comparable to the European 
Council in the EU. However, the latter does not have such a wide range of powers. In essence, 
the Supreme Councils decides on any issues within the EAEU functioning, including the issues 
of empowering the Commission and the Court. The availability of broad powers tells about 
the reluctance of the Member States’ leaders to confer the powers to the Commission and the 
Court for more effective management of integration processes at this stage. The higher status 
of the Supreme Council as compared to the EU’s European Council is determined by the 
ability not only adopt but also implement any of its decisions. 
The next institution is the Intergovernmental Council, which initially was only a 
subsection of the Supreme Council that consisted of the heads of Member States’ 
governments. Essentially, it remains unchanged, even though it is established as a separate 
body. The TEAEU provides for a non-exhaustive list of powers of the Intergovernmental 
Council.379 Among its competences, the Intergovernmental Council ensures implementation 
and control over compliance with the TEAEU, international agreements within the EAEU and 
decisions of the Supreme Council. As it will be shown later, the Intergovernmental Council 
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shares this function with the Commission Board.  The difference here is that the control is 
ensured on the intergovernmental level. 
Although these institutions have predominantly intergovernmental features, some 
scholars believe in supranationality of, e.g., the Supreme Council.380 In my view, the EAEU 
Supreme Council, according to the two main criteria of institutional supranationality can be 
characterized only as an intergovernmental body: it is comprised of heads of Member States,381 
and decisions are adopted by consensus. 382  The Intergovernmental Council shares these 
features, as it consists of heads of governments of Member States, and decisions are also 
adopted by consensus. This body was extracted from the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 
where it was a formation on the level of heads of governments of the Customs Union and 
Single Economic Space. Hence, only the Eurasian Economic Commission can be regarded as 
a candidate for supranationality within the EAEU, which will be the subject of the next section 
of this chapter. It must be said that indeed, when supranationality is mentioned within the 
Eurasian integration process, the Eurasian Economic Commission is typically invoked and 
moreover compared to the European Commission. 383  However, there are no exact 
explanations in literature, what exactly is understood by the Commission’s supranationality 
and based on which criteria such qualification is deduced, and whether it is enough to qualify 
as a supranational body. 
It is generally provided that the Commission acts in a broad range of areas.384 The 
Commission Council has a non-exhaustive list of competences, albeit not in the TEAEU, but 
in its annex.385 The Commission Council organizes the work to improve EAEU regulatory 
activities, examines the results of monitoring and control of implementation of international 
agreements, submits for the approval of the Supreme Council main integration directions, 
instructs the Commission Board, and exercises other functions and powers.386 One of the most 
important powers of the Commission Council is the ability to consider the annulment of the 
Commission Board decisions.387 
                                                 
380 Malinovskaia, "Pravovye i institutsional'nye osnovy funktsionirovaniia Evraziiskogo soiuza," 200. 
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The only EAEU institution that has an exhaustive list of powers and functions is the 
Commission Board. 388  One of the important powers is monitoring and controlling the 
implementation of international agreements that form the Union law and decisions of the 
Commission as well as notifying the member states of the requirement for their 
implementation. 
3.2 Eurasian Economic Commission: a supranational body?389 
3.2.1 Development of the institution 
The Commission starts its history from executive bodies of the preceding Eurasian 
integration entities. The classical concept of a customs union does not necessarily presuppose 
the creation of supranational bodies.390 However, within the first stage of integration, in the 
1992 Customs Union, there was a provision that the employees of the working apparatus 
(Secretariat) when performing their duties where obliged to follow exclusively the interests of 
the common market and did not have a right to adhere to positions of the member state, 
department or organization. 391  However, the first branched institutional structure was 
envisaged in the Treaty on Deepening of Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Fields of 
29 March 1996392 (which proclaimed a ‘prospective’ creation of the Community of Integrated 
States), in the framework of which there was an Integration Committee as a permanent 
executive body. Within the second stage of integration, which starts with the establishment of 
the EURASEC with the treaty of 10 October 2000, an even more elaborated system of 
institutions was envisaged within which the new Integration Commission overtook the 
functions of its predecessor and became the second most important institution in the 
integration system. However, the Integration Committee remained an intergovernmental body 
and did not adopt any decisions binding upon member states. 
The Agreement on the Formation of the Single Economic Space of 2003 envisaged the 
creation of institutions based on a combination of intergovernmental elements and the 
principle of conferral of part of member states’ competences to the single regulatory body with 
                                                 
388 Para.43 Regulation on the Commission. 
389 Parts of this section are based on my previously published work: M. Karliuk, "The Eurasian Economic 
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a gradual increase in the importance of the latter. Moreover, the decisions, adopted by a 
qualified majority voting, were binding upon member states.393 
At the third stage the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space were created, 
within which the Customs Union Commission (hereinafter ‘CUC’) functioned up to 2 
February 2012.394 The CUC was announced as the first supranational body within Eurasian 
integration. The CUC was created with the Treaty on the Customs Union Commission, and its 
main aim was to ensure the conditions for the functioning and development of the Customs 
Union.395 However, supranationality of this institution was under question since it consisted 
of one representative of each state, which were vice prime ministers or members of 
government, vested with relevant competences.396 These officials evidently represented the 
interests of respective governments. However, elements of supranationality were established 
as well as binding decisions were adopted by a two-thirds qualified majority voting, and in 
case of disagreement, there was no obligation to refer the issue to a higher institution,397 as it 
was in the EURASEC Integration Committee. 
The CUC was terminated on 2 February 2012 with the entry into force of the Treaty 
on the Eurasian Economic Commission.398 The Commission became the single regulatory 
body of the Customs Union and Single Economic Space,399 acquired much wider competences 
and completely took over the CUC. The main task of the Commission, as well as the preceding 
CUC, albeit with the addition of the Single Economic Space, was ensuring the conditions for 
the functioning and development of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. The 
Commission had a more complex configuration as compared to the CUC with the inception 
of the two-tire system: the Council and the Board. The Council carried out overall regulation 
of the integration process and the overall leadership in the Commission activities;400 and the 
Board was the executive body of the Commission.401 Thus, in my view, the institutional 
supranationality has first appeared within this system, which eventually transferred to the 
EAEU Commission. 
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3.2.2 (Partial) supranationality of the institution 
Officially, the Commission is described as a permanent supranational regulatory body 
of the Union.402 However, the TEAEU does not use this terminology with regard to the 
Commission. The notion of supranationality is used only twice in the Treaty, both times not 
explicitly referring to the Commission. First, in Art.38 on the absence of supranational 
competence of the Union in the sphere of foreign trade in services. Second, in Art.103 on 
supranational authority to regulate financial markets to be established in 2025. This, however, 
seems to be an unfortunate drafting of the Treaty, since ‘supranationality’ is not defined, while 
by denying supranational competence in one field it clearly presupposes supranational 
competence in another/others. 
At the same time, regardless the fact that the EAEU Commission is officially deemed 
a supranational institution, it is more appropriate to speak of its partial supranationality. In fact, 
the very first principle under which the Commission operates reveals the intergovernmental 
elements of this institution: it shall ensure mutual benefit, equality and respect for the national 
interests of the member states,403 rather than interests of the Union. 
It is telling that the officials of the Commission departments cannot be citizens of the 
same country. The selection is conducted on the basis of the principle of equal representation 
of member states, and the candidates are proposed by a member of the Commission Council 
of a respective country. Selection of candidates for other positions in the Commission 
departments is conducted taking into account the share of financial contributions towards the 
Commission. These provisions can indicate the necessity of ensuring additional influence of 
member states on the activities of the Commission departments and/or fear of excessive 
influence on the part of certain member states. 
Further, it is not entirely correct to analyse the Commission as one institution. Instead, 
it is an organization within an organization that has an institutional and decision-making 
structure of its own. 404  Therefore, it is difficult to refer to the body as a whole as a 
supranational one, at least in terms of its composition. The Commission has retained the 
structure of its predecessor and consists of the Council and the Board.405 The Council is an 
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exclusively intergovernmental entity. It consists of one representative from each member state 
who are deputy heads of government endowed with necessary competences based on the 
national legislation. This means that they hold the position due to the fact of their official 
position in their respective country. Therefore, this Commission position is a political one. 
Moreover, the decisions are only made when there is unanimity. 
The other intergovernmental feature of the Commission Council is the provision that 
it has authority to sit and adopt decisions only when members are present. The voting takes 
place by consensus.406 In case no consensus is reached, the issue is transferred to the Supreme 
Council or the Intergovernmental Council at the request of any member of the Commission 
Council, where decisions are also adopted by consensus only. Thus, any member of the 
Commission Council ensures national interests of a respective member state in this body 
following the instruction of respective government, which is additionally ensured by the 
consensus rule. This is a purely intergovernmental feature and not a supranational one. 
The Commission Board has an entirely different structure, which allows it, when 
certain conditions are met, to become a representative of the common interest of the Union, 
and not of the Member States. The Board is the executive body of the Commission and consists 
of three representatives per member state, which shall be independent of all public authorities 
and officials and may not request or receive instructions from them.407 The Supreme Council 
approves the composition of the Board and the duties of its members. The Board is the only 
body in the whole Union that has an exhaustive list of responsibilities identified.408 One of the 
important competences of the Board is the monitoring and control of compliance with the 
international agreements in the EAEU framework. Member states do not have a right to recall 
a member of the Board, except in cases of unfair performance of duties and a number of other 
improper actions.409 In addition, only the Board can adopt decisions by qualified majority.410 
It must be noted that supranationality of the Board also has its limits. Thus, the Board 
consists of representatives of member states based on the principle of equal representation of 
states. The composition of the Board is approved by the Supreme Council. Responsibilities 
among the members are distributed and powers are terminated by the Supreme Council as 
well.411 The Supreme Council also appoints the Chairperson of the Board and it decides on 
                                                 
406 Art.18(2)(2) TEAEU; Para.29(2) Regulation on the Commission. 
407 Para.32(1) and 34 Regulation on the Commission. 
408 Para.43 Regulation on the Commission. 
409 Para.41(1) Regulation on the Commission. 
410 Art.18(2)(3) TEAEU. 
411 Art.12(2)(2) TEAEU; Para.31(4) Regulation on the Commission. 
  
82 
early termination of his/her powers. 412  It also approves the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission413  and approves the procedure for remuneration of Board members. 414  This 
means that the Supreme Council can basically control the work of Board members. 
Another peculiarity about the functioning of the Board concerns its meetings. The  
rules of procedure provide that Commission meetings are valid when two-thirds of Board 
members are present, albeit under the condition of at least one per member state.415 If this 
condition is not met, the Board does not have a right to meet and adopt decisions. Obligatory 
conditions of having at least one representative of each member state can mean the dependence 
of Board members on the instructions from respective member states, since in this mode of 
decision-making, as well as approval and termination of responsibilities of members, each 
member state has leverage not only indirectly, but also directly influence the positions of its 
Board members. 
Regardless the fact that the Board adopts decisions by qualified majority voting, the 
Supreme Council can compile a list of sensitive issues to be decided by the Board by 
consensus.416 
The aforementioned confirms the argument of retaining intergovernmental elements 
not only of the whole Commission, but also of the most supranational part thereof—the Board. 
In any event, the Board, and not the whole Commission, can be compared to the European 
Commission, which consists of independent members. Consequently, the Commission 
Council can be seen as a separate body broadly comparable to the Council of the EU, which 
represents the interests of individual governments. However, even in this case, voting in the 
Council of the EU currently takes place by a qualified majority in various fields, which 
introduces a supranational element into this intergovernmental institution. This is not the case 
in the Commission Council, where all the decisions are taken by unanimity.417 
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3.3 EAEU decision-making418 
Even though it is possible to identify certain similarities between EAEU and EU 
institutions, the EAEU decision-making process is decisively different from that in the EU. In 
the EAEU, essentially, each institution adopts its own acts separately. There has been an 
improvement upon previous post-Soviet systems, where the decisions adopted at the lowest 
levels of the institutional structure needed the approval of the highest institution. Change is 
plausible, although there is still a system in place that can undermine independence and 
supranationality. 
The EAEU system of decision-making is based on a tacit principle, informally called 
‘the Belarusian elevator’.419 In this system, any decision adopted at a lower level of the 
institutional structure can potentially be challenged at a higher level of the institutional ladder, 
up to the highest level of the Supreme Council. This means that, in principle, any decision can 
potentially repealed by the Supreme Council. 
The EAEU formal procedure of decision-making does not require participation of 
several institutions. According to the Treaty, any institution can independently, within the 
limits of its competences, adopt final legal acts, even in the forms of binding decisions. This 
is fundamentally different from the EU decision-making, which is primarily based on a 
legislative process involving several institutions, where the European Commission has 
executive functions and virtually exclusive right of initiative.420 As the case law shows, this 
role has far going consequences. 421  The European Commission adopts regulatory acts 
independently only in narrowly determined cases, when such competences are delegated by 
the EU Council and the European Parliament.422 It can also adopt measures to implement 
decisions adopted in accordance with the legislative procedure. However, its main role in the 
decision-making is initiation of their adoption, drafting of yearly common legislative plan and 
drafting of common political strategies.423 
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In the EAEU, at the lowest level of the institutional structure, when the Commission 
Board adopts a decision, there is no obligation to transfer it for approval of the higher 
institution. However, the Commission Council can review and cancel or introduce 
amendments thereto.424 The procedure is as follows:425 Member States or the Commission 
Council member is entitled to, within 15 calendar days from the date of publication of a 
decision of the Board, submit to the Board a proposal for its cancellation or amendment; on 
the day of receipt of such a proposal, the Chairman of the Board sends to Council member the 
appropriate materials regarding the decisions and the Council adopts a decision within 10 
calendar days. In case of disagreement with the decision adopted by the Council (but no longer 
than 30 calendar days from the date of the official publication of the decision of the Council), 
or upon expiry of the specified period, can submit to the Commission a letter signed by the 
head of its government with a proposal for the introduction of the issues for consideration to 
the Intergovernmental Council and/or the Supreme Council. 
The Intergovernmental Council has powers to suspend Commission Council and Board 
decisions.426 It considers, on the proposal of the Council of the Commission, any issues for 
which no consensus was reached during decision-making in the Council of the Commission.427 
Also any member state can refer to the Intergovernmental Council to consider cancelling or 
amending decisions adopted by the Commission, and, in the case of absence of agreement, 
refer it directly to the level of the Supreme Council. The Intergovernmental Council (or the 
Commission), can refer any issues on which no consensus was reached in decision-making.428 
However, if none of the aforementioned procedures work for member states, any 
member state can individually transfer to the Supreme Council issues relating to the 
cancellation or amendment of decisions adopted by the Intergovernmental Council or the 
Commission.429 As it has been mentioned, all the decisions and disposition of the Supreme 
Council are adopted by consensus (with the exception of decisions related to the termination 
of membership of a member state in the EAEU).430 
Therefore, this system provides member states with a number of tools to control any 
decision adopted within the EAEU. In essence, any Commission Board decision that can 
contradict national interest of a member state can be blocked on this or that institutional level. 
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This essentially reduces the role of the Commission Board to primarily preparation of 
proposals for the Commission Council and the Supreme Council.431 
3.4 The Court 
As has been explored in Chapter 1, courts play a crucial role in the autonomy of a legal 
order: a supranational judiciary indicates the capacity of an autonomous legal order for self-
maintenance. Thus, an autonomous legal order requires an independent system of courts with 
appropriate powers. The latter—the issue of judicial powers—within the EAEU will be 
explored in Chapter 6, while this part will focus on the former—the institutional set up and 
functioning in view of the concepts of supranationality and independence. 
3.4.1 Establishment of the EAEU Court 
When the TEAEU came into force in 2015, a new permanent judicial body was 
created.432 The new Court replaces the judicial body of the now defunct EURASEC, and the 
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. 433  However, the issue of succession is 
somewhat blurred. Initially, the idea was to ensure legal succession between the two courts, 
which would include the legal procedure and the judges: the EAEU Court would be a successor 
to the EURASEC Court regarding the competences in dispute resolution within the Customs 
Union and Single Economic Space; the judges would continue performing their functions in 
the new Court until the end of their term.434 This was logical given the fact that, although it 
was envisaged that the EURASEC would cease to exist, the Customs Union and Single 
Economic Space would not, but would become part of the EAEU. The proposal developed 
into limiting succession to the competences on dispute resolution within the Customs Union 
and the Single Economic Space without mentioning the succession of judges.435 Eventually, 
this path was not followed, and the succession was reduced to a provision that the case law of 
the EURASEC Court remained in force.436 In one of its judgments, the EAEU Court has 
mentioned that the legal positions formulated in the judgments of the EURASEC Court may 
be used as stare decisis.437 However, even in this case, it has been argued, that the new Court 
can still distance itself from the case law of the EURASEC Court, since there is only one 
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instance where such case law was quoted even though the EAEU Court often reproduces the 
same legal positions.438  
More importantly, however, is that there is finally a judicial body dedicated exclusively 
to one legal order. The EURASEC Court was responsible for two legal orders during the short 
period of its functioning from 1 January 2012 through 31 December 2014: EURASEC on one 
hand, and the Customs Union and Single Economic Space on the other. Prior to that, the 
situation was even more complicated because the CIS Economic Court in addition to its 
functions as the judicial body of the CIS, performed the functions of the EURASEC Court.439 
According to the former president of the CIS Economic Court, Abdulloev, this situation was 
logical and well-grounded for the purposes of optimizing the judiciary in the post-Soviet 
space.440 Indeed, the CIS Economic Court has a peculiar status and is not exclusively tied to 
the CIS. As Shinkaretskaya notes, the CIS Statute does not define it as a CIS body, there is no 
definite link with (other) CIS institutions, and it acts “on its own”.441 However, in my view, 
vesting such additional authority in a court that operates under different legal acts is logical 
and well-founded only for reasons of resource optimization, not from the point of view of the 
integration and proper administration of justice. The judges were forced to resolve disputes 
and give consultative opinions in different legal orders: CIS, EURASEC, and the Customs 
Union and Single Economic Space. The international agreements establishing these legal 
orders have different aims and contexts, which creates difficulties. The judges, when 
interpreting international agreements, effectively had to apply legal rules, often similar or 
equally formulated, but following different approaches, methods and concepts, in order to take 
into account the nature of each of the agreements and their specific aims. A similar issue was 
dealt with by the ECJ in the case Opinion 1/91 (EEA I), where the possibility for judges to sit 
concurrently in different courts and to apply similar or equally formulated legal norms was 
examined. The ECJ decided that such a situation would not allow them to decide cases in a 
proper manner.442 
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The problematic nature of the situation was recognized in a report on the formation of 
the EURASEC Court as it underlined that the status quo did not correspond to the realities of 
the intensified integration process within the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, and 
that the creation of a separate and independent judicial body was needed.443 The EAEU legal 
order has a dedicated court now, and the question is whether it can ensure the functioning of 
that order. 
The effective Statute of the EAEU Court is an annex to the TEAEU and was drafted 
based on the 2012 and 2013 Draft Statutes.444 In terms of judicial procedure, it provides for a 
system somewhat close to that of the CJEU, which consists of the ECJ and the General 
Court.445 In the CJEU the General Court is the court of first instance, and the ECJ is the only 
instance for certain cases, while an appeal chamber for others. The ECJ sits as a full Court, 
Grand Chamber, consisting of 13 judges, and in chambers of 3 and 5 judges.446 The General 
Court sits in Grand Chamber, chambers of three or five judges, and in certain cases as a full 
court or be constituted by a single judge.447 
The EAEU Court consists of the Grand Panel, the Panel and the Appeals Chamber,448 
which is the same structure as in the EURASEC Court.449 Thus, the EAEU’s Grand Chamber 
is analogous to the ECJ’s full court. Unlike the CJEU, though, where the appeal functions 
regarding the General Court are carried out by the ECJ, which at the same time possesses its 
own competence, the EAEU Court has an independent Appellate Panel, the competence of 
which is the second instance for the Panel of the Court. The way the Appellate Panel is formed 
is left the same as in the EURASEC Court: one judge per member state, which did not take 
part in the first instance proceedings. Thus, there is a constant rotation of judges—same judges, 
but on different cases, can be members of the Panel of the Court and the Appellate Panel. This 
is also a difference between the appellate instance of the Eurasian judiciary from the European 
judiciary, where the ECJ judges (when acting as the appellate instance) remain permanent. An 
ECJ judge does not deliver justice as the judge of the General Court. 
                                                 
443  Reshenie Mezhgosudarstvennogo Soveta Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva No.75. O 
formirovanii i organizatsii deiatelnosti Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva. 15 March 2011. 
444 Draft Statutes, on file with author. 
445 Art.251 and 256 TFEU. 
446 Art.251 TFEU, Art.16 Statute of CJEU. 
447 Art.50 Statute of CJEU. 
448 Pt.70 Statute of EAEU Court. 
449 Art.24 Statute of EURASEC Court, Art.24 Dogovor ob obrashchenii v Sud Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo 
soobshchestva khoziaistvuiushchikh sub"ektov po sporam v ramkakh Tamozhennogo soiuza i osobennostiakh 
sudoproizvodstva po nim. 9 December 2010. Art.6-9 Reglament Suda po rassmotreniiu obraschenii 
khoziaistvuiuschikh sub’ektov. 
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The 2012 Draft Statute proposed an additional Civil Service Panel, reminiscent of the 
EU’s Civil Service Tribunal that existed between 2004 and 2016,450 which was not retained. 
The Civil Service Panel, consisting of three judges, would have had competence to decide on 
disputes between the Union and its employees, including disputes between any institution and 
its personnel. The 2013 Draft Statute removed the Civil Service Panel, but introduced the 
possibility to form specialized compositions, arbitration chambers and ad hoc chambers. The 
adopted Statute provides for an ability to establish specialised groups, which is similar to the 
mentioned ad hoc groups, since specialised groups can be created when examining particular 
disputes.451 Such groups consist of three experts, one from each list submitted by each member 
state for the respective type of disputes. The aim of specialised groups is to submit a report 
containing an unbiased assessment of the facts of the case to the Court. Such opinions are not 
binding except in certain cases.452 
3.4.2 The issue of independence 
The independence of international courts and judges is a matter of doctrinal dispute.453 
However, independence and impartiality are essential legal requirements of virtually all courts 
and tribunals.454 In the EAEU, it has been argued, the decision not to reform the EURASEC 
Court, but to create a new institution was prompted, among others, by the desire of some 
member states to get more control over the appointment and dismissal of judges.455 
When envisaging a new court within the Eurasian integration process, the 2012 Draft 
Statute of the institution provided independence as the very first principle under which the 
Court would operate.456 This was underpinned by the guarantees of judicial independence. It 
stipulated that the host member state would guarantee non-intervention into the activities of 
the Court and that internal rules and activities of the Court would be regulated by the rules 
adopted by the Court. Both are relevant for independence from the laws of the host member 
state. The first one is a foundation for the agreement between the Court and the host member 
state. Although the adopted Statute of the EAEU Court does not explicitly provide for a 
                                                 
450 "The Institution," Official Website of the CJEU, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5230/en/. 
451 Pt.82 Statute of EAEU Court. The topics of disputes are listed as provision of industrial subsidies, 
agricultural state support measures, the application of safeguard, anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 
452 Paras.90 and 92 Statute of EAEU Court. 
453 N.A. Engstad, A.L. Frøseth, and B. Tønder, The independence of judges (The Hague, The Netherlands: 
Eleven International Publishing, 2014), 188-89. 
454 A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, "On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking," 
German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1356. 
455 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 54. 
456 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 132. 
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conclusion of such an agreement with a host state, such an agreement was concluded.457 The 
second one limits the reach of legislation and jurisdiction of the host state in a number of 
issues. Although the provision was not retained in the final Statute, such rules were adopted.458 
However, the Court has lost the right to approve its own rules of procedure, which is now done 
by the EAEU Supreme Council.459 
Further, the independence was underpinned by the rule that the Court was to be 
financed by its own budget formed from the resources of the EAEU budget in an amount 
necessary for the full and independent delivery of justice. However, the ‘own budget’ norm 
was not included in the next, 2013 Draft Statute. This was reversed in the Statute that was 
eventually adopted, which provides that the Court drafts its own budgetary proposals and 
disposes of financial means allocated to ensure its activities.460 
The adopted Statute no longer provides for principles under which the Court operates. 
Instead, the principles governing its proceedings were introduced. Among those it is important 
that the principle of independence of judges was retained.461 Judicial independence is also 
reiterated regarding clarification proceedings.462  
An important provision, which was introduced in the 2012 Draft Statute, was the 
disciplinary liability of judges. This could take place on one of the following grounds: 
nonexecution of entrusted responsibilities, undermining the authority of the judicial power, 
involvement in activities not compatible with the position of a judge, and serious misconduct 
incompatible with the high status of a judge. The measures of responsibility available were a 
warning and sending a decision with a proposal of an early relief of duties to the Supreme 
Council. This was changed in the 2013 Draft Statute, where the latter measure was eliminated. 
The grounds of bringing a judge to account were noncompliance with the restrictions 
established by the Statute, international agreements within the Union and other norms of 
international law, as well as conflict of interests when carrying out judicial responsibilities and 
out-of-office relations, belittling the authority of the judicial power, dignity of the judge or 
other actions which could raise doubt in his or her objectivity, justice and impartiality.463 
                                                 
457 Soglashenie mezhdu Evraziiskim ekonomicheskim soiuzom i Respublikoi Belarus' ob usloviiakh 
prebyvaniia Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza na territorii Respubliki Belarus'. 29 April 2016. 
458 Pravila organizatsii I deiatelnosti Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza. Utverzhdeny prikazom 
Predsedatelia Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza ot 14 aprelia 2015 goda No. 8 
459 Para.13, Statute of EAEU Court. 
460 Para.5 Statute of EAEU Court; Reshenie Vysshego Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soveta No.78. O 
Polozhenii o biudzhete Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza. 10 October 2014. 
461 Para.53 Statute of EAEU Court. 
462 Para.69 Statute of EAEU Court. 
463 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 144. 
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The adopted Statute does not explicitly provide for a possibility to bring a judge to 
disciplinary account. However, among the grounds for termination of powers of a judge, apart 
from objective factors, there are a number of provisions such as participation in activities 
incompatible with the office of a judge and serious misconduct incompatible with the high 
status of a judge. This means only one type of penalty, which is termination of office, which 
is more severe than the ones in the both drafts. Moreover, a very important change was 
introduced regarding who could bring judges to account. Where the 2012 and 2013 Draft 
Statutes envisaged possibility for bringing judges to account only on the initiative of judges 
themselves, the Statute in force provides that the initiative to terminate the powers of a judge 
may be put forward by a member state represented by the judge, the Court or the judge 
concerned.464 This may interfere with the autonomy of the judges and, therefore, undermine 
the supranationality of the EAEU Court. Such actions are not possible in the CJEU as its judges 
can only be removed by a unanimous vote of the judges themselves (excluding the judge under 
consideration) and Advocates General.465 
Further, the 2012 Draft Statute provides for privileges and immunities of judges. These 
provisions were widened as compared to the scope of privileges and immunities available 
previously in the EAURASEC.466 These provisions generally agreed with the rules of the 
Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the EU.467 The 2013 Draft Statute did not include 
rules on privileges and immunities of judges anymore, but established that upon termination 
of responsibilities they gained guarantees provided for chairpersons of highest courts of 
member states by national legislation. This repeats the provision of the Statute of the 
EURASEC Court.468 Although the norms on privileges and immunities did not become part 
of the final Statute, they are included in a separate act governing privileges and immunities in 
the EAEU.469 
In terms of appointment of judges, the 2012 Draft Statute provided that the judges were 
to be appointed and removed by the Parliamentary Assembly on proposal of the Supreme 
Council (at the level of heads of state). However, the EAEU does not have a parliamentary 
body and the judges are proposed by member states and appointed by the Supreme Council.470 
                                                 
464 Para.13 Statute of EAEU Court. 
465 Art.6 Statute of CJEU. 
466 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 135. 
467 Art.11 Protocol (No 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union. 
468 Art.7 Statute of EURASEC Court. 
469 Polozhenie o sotsial’nykh garantiiakh, privilegiiakh i immunitetakh v Evraziiskom ekonoicheskom soiuze. 
470 Para.9, Statute of EAEU Court. The Caribbean Court of Justice is the first international court where the judges 
are appointed by the international Regional Judicial and Legal Service Commission. See D. Byron and C. 
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The term of office of judges has been increased from 6 to 9 years as compared to previous 
drafts and to the Statute of the EURASEC Court,471 which is in line with some scholarly 
proposals regarding international judiciary to introduce longer terms and exclude the 
possibility of re-election in order to decrease dependence on respective governments, whose 
support they would need to be re-elected.472  As for the chairperson, the adopted Statute 
provides for an election procedure by the judges subject to approval by the Supreme 
Council.473 The 2012 and 2013 Draft Statutes as well as the Statute of the EURASEC Court 
provided only the election by judges.474 The term of office was increased from two to three 
years.475 
There have been changes in the way the Secretariat of the Court is formed. The drafts 
provided for recruitment based on an open competition. However, the Statute provides that 
the Secretariat of the Court is formed not only on a competitive basis from among nationals 
of member states, but with account of share participation of the member states in the EAEU 
budget.476 Moreover, the candidates for the positions of the head of the Secretariat and his or 
her deputies are to be selected on a competitive basis with account of the principle of equal 
representation of member states.477 Candidates are nominated by member states. Further, the 
head of the Secretariat and his/her deputies may not be nationals of the same member state.478 
Some can consider this as an improvement in terms of supranationality since it balances 
technocratic and quota elements.479 On the other hand, such state involvement and concern 
about nationality can be used in an opposite direction. 
It must be said that the Statute of the EAEU Court has seen certain departure from best 
international practices of international judiciaries closer to the practices of the EURASEC 
Court and national judiciaries. The changes from the very first draft statute to the final version 
reflect the changes in the composition of working group experts. 480 While the 2012 Draft 
                                                 
Malcolm, "Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ),"  The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Intenrational Law 
(2009). 
471 Para.8 Statute of EAEU Court; Art.3 Statute of EURSEC Court. 
472 R. Mackenzie and P. Sands, "Judicial Selection for International Courts: towards common principles and 
practices," in Appointing judges in an age of judicial power: critical perspectives from around the world, ed. K. 
Malleson and P. Russell (Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 228. 
473 Para.15 Statute of EAEU Court. 
474 Art.8(2) Statute of EURASEC Court. 
475 Para.16 Statute of EAEU Court; Art.8(2) Statute of EURASEC Court 
476 Para.35 Statute of EAEU Court. 
477 Para.34 Statute of EAEU Court. 
478 Para.27 Statute of EAEU Court. 
479 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 153. 
480 Reshenie Kollegii Evraziiskoi ekonomicheskoi komissii No.27. O vnesenii izmenenii v sostav Rabochei 
gruppy po kodifikatsii mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov, sostavliaiushchikh dogovorno-pravovuiu bazu 
Tamozhennogo soiuza i Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva. 5 March 2013. 
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Statute was drafted by international law experts, the 2013 Draft Statute reveals participation 
of representatives of the Commission, and the consequent drafting was done mainly by the 
representatives of national governments up until the point of its adoption in 2014.481 
3.4.3 The issue of dissenting opinions 
The Statute of the EAEU Court provides judges with a right to publish dissenting 
opinions. Given the problematic nature of the judicial system explored above, this could 
become an issue for the independence of the judges and the Court as such. 
The right of a judge to provide a dissenting opinion is not universally recognised: many 
countries and international institutions, including the CJEU, do not recognise it. Usually, in 
the countries of common law tradition judges can draft dissenting opinions, while the 
continental states have opposing views: some countries are against this practice (Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France, Italy), while others are in favour of it (Germany, Greece, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland).482 
There is certain concern regarding dissenting opinions as they are inextricably linked 
to individual judges and their subjective evaluations which could undermine the legitimacy of 
courts. It becomes more dangerous in the absence of rules of conduct, which Bentham was 
concerned about when criticizing the judiciary in common law countries, where, in his 
opinion, it turned into a non-transparent and unaccountable elite. Therefore, these courts had 
to fight for legitimacy through irreproachable legal argumentation. 
In the international legal order, many judicial institutions allow for dissenting opinions. 
These include the ICJ, European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’), International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, International Criminal Court. Thus, it is argued that dissenting 
opinions in the ECtHR often became the source for development of law, improving the quality 
of legal argumentation.483 Moreover they helped in establishing the dialogue within the court 
on sensitive issues. 
Early in the history of establishment of international judicial institutions, dissenting 
opinions were an issue for the PCIJ.484 However, the issue was decided in favour of dissenting 
opinions, in part, probably, because such opinions play a special role in international law 
                                                 
481 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 149-50. 
482 J. Alder, "Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20, no. 2 
(2000): 237. 
483 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda, 216. 
484 Gleider I. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the judicial function (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 110. 
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where international custom is a major source of law. Often, dissenting opinions became a 
method of revealing a custom or the beginning of its formation. According to the PCIJ judge 
Politis, dissenting opinions are a big advantage for international law in a sense that they 
promote the development of judicial practice, which cannot appear without opinions of 
judges.485 
The CJEU went the other way and does not allow for dissenting opinions. There could 
be several reasons for that. First, some believe that the reason is the availability of opinions of 
Advocates General, who, acting with complete impartiality and independence, make, in open 
court, non-binding legal opinions.486 The history of the institutions dates back to the XIX 
century and the French Conseil d’État. Thanks to France and its unwillingness to allow 
dissenting opinions, the position of Advocate General was introduced into the ECJ.487 
Second, it is considered that dissenting opinions destroy one of the main guarantees of 
judicial independence—secret deliberations.488 Third, the CJEU has a specific function to 
ensure uniform application of EU law. Dissenting opinions can undermine uniform application 
of law and distract national law enforcement, to which CJEU’s decisions are addressed to, 
from a single possible interpretation given by the CJEU with an aim of achieving legal 
integration, support of the newly established legal order, as well as avoiding conflict within 
the court.489 
The EAEU Court allows for dissenting opinions, and makes public who the dissenters 
are. Given that the independence of the judges and the Court as such is under question, this 
can put additional pressure on the judges and compromise their independence. 
3.5 Intermediate conclusions 
Based on this short overview, the broad correspondence between the EAEU and EU 
institutions is shown in the table below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
485 PCIJ Revision Report (1929). N 105. 
486 Art.252 TFEU. 
487 Neshataeva, Evraziiskaia integratsiia: rol' suda. 
488 Art.35 Statute of CJEU. 
489 E. Sharpston, "Transparency and Clear Legal Language in the European Union: Ambiguous Legislative 
Texts, Laconic Pronouncements and the Credibility of the Judicial System," Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 12 (2010): 416-17. 
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EU EAEU 
European Council Supreme Council 
Intergovernmental Council490 
Council of the EU Commission Council 
European Commission Commission Board 
European Parliament - 
CJEU EAEU Court 
Table 3 Correspondence of EU and EAEU institutions 
It can be concluded that no EAEU institution, even the Commission, possesses 
institutional supranationality. The latter does not fall under the criteria of institutional 
supranationality developed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, primarily the independence of 
individuals (or officials) from the Member States and the majority voting system. The reason 
is that the Commission has a hybrid structure consisting of the Commission Council and 
Board, which have completely different formation principles and decision-making system. 
Thus, the Commission Council does not consist of independent officials, but of Member 
States’ representatives pursuing the interests of respective member states, making it an 
exclusively intergovernmental entity. The only decision-making mode available within the 
Commission Council is unanimity. 
However, if one analyses the Commission not as one institution, but as an organization 
within an organization that has an institutional and decision-making structures of its own, the 
other part of the Commission—the Commission Board—can claim to be supranational based 
on its institutional structure, albeit to a limited degree. This is manifested in the requirement 
for the Commission members to be independent from their respective Member States and are 
required not to receive any instructions from them. Therefore, the institutional supranationality 
criterion of independence is prima facie fulfilled. Further, the criterion of majority voting 
system as a predominant decision-making mechanism is also fulfilled since Commission 
Board decisions are adopted by qualified majority. 
The additional criterion of institutional supranationality regarding the financial 
independence is not fulfilled since the institutions and the organization itself are fully 
dependent on the contributions of the Member States. Although the budget is drafted by the 
Commission, it is approved by the Supreme Council and consists only of contributions of the 
Member States, which are determined by the Supreme Council as well. There is no separate 
independent source of income available. 
                                                 
490 The Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council were grouped into one slot as they had previously 
been two parts of one institution, and the Intergovernmental Council also takes the role of the Supreme Council 
when it is not in session. However, this is still only a rough comparison. 
  
95 
This chapter has identified the move away from exclusively vertical decision-making 
arrangement within Eurasian integration. Important changes in this direction are that there is 
no more obligation to transfer Commission decisions to a higher level for approval. 
Simultaneously, the mechanisms to invalidate such decisions have remained. Therefore, 
although the institutional balance has been ensured better than in the EURASEC, it remains 
under intergovernmental control. Therefore, effective functioning of the Commission Board 
is rather relative and is defined by how much national interests regarding development of 
integration concur. 
Finally, the independence of the judges is under question. To be fair, the EAEU Court 
has gained the right to draft its own budgetary proposals and to dispose of financial means, 
which somewhat boosts its independence. However, the Court has lost the right to approve its 
own rules of procedure, which is now done by the EAEU Supreme Council. The judges are 
no longer elected by the Parliamentary Assembly (the institution does not exist anymore), but 
are proposed by Member States and appointed by the Supreme Council. Member States can 
also terminate the duties of a judge upon certain conditions. This may interfere with the 
autonomy of the judges and, therefore, undermine the supranationality of the EAEU Court. 
Such actions are not possible in the CJEU as its judges can only be removed by a unanimous 
vote of the judges themselves (excluding the judge under consideration) and Advocates 
General. The institution of dissenting opinion, albeit not prejudicial in itself, combined with 
the problematic nature of independence of judges in the EAEU Court, can be used as leverage 
against them. 
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4 The powers of the EAEU 
‘[Although] individual oppression may now 
and then proceed from the courts of justice, 
the general liberty of the people can never be 
endangered from that quarter.’ 
Alexander Hamilton491 
 
4.1 Introduction 
International agreements can be drafted in different manners, sometimes very precise, 
other times very broad. Therefore, a disagreement can appear on the ambit of certain 
provisions. The same is true with regard to powers of international organizations. Since the 
scope of a legal order depends on competences, the ability to interpret the distribution of 
powers can be indicative not only of legal order autonomy, but also of the scope of such 
autonomy. This scope can expand, as the more powers an entity possesses leads to a wider 
autonomy. Thus, the development of the EU has seen the ever-expanding scope of legal 
autonomy. 
A special place in this chapter is reserved for the doctrine of implied powers. The 
reason for that is twofold. The first reason is the importance of the ability of a supranational 
court to interpret powers for an autonomous legal order. Arguably, an epitome thereof is the 
implied powers doctrine. In the EU legal order, it was developed by the ECJ492 and made all 
the way into the TFEU.493 The second reason is that the EAEU Court has encountered three 
major attacks on its powers, which are closely interrelated and have direct bearing on the legal 
order autonomy. The first two are the elimination of the preliminary ruling procedure and a 
direct ban on “creating new norms”, which are addressed in Chapter 6. The third attack is a 
direct prohibition for the Court to establish implied powers of the Union. It can be deduced 
from the following provision: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall not include extension of the competence of 
Bodies of the Union in excess of that expressly provided for by the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union.’494 
                                                 
491 A. Hamilton, "The Federalist, 78. A view on the constitution of the judicial department in relation to the 
tenure of good behaviour," in The Federalist Papers, ed. A. Hamilton, et al. (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 380. 
492 Most prominently starting as of the Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA). 
493 Art.216(1) and 3(2) TFEU. 
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This particular encroachment on the Court’s powers is therefore addressed in this 
chapter. However, it must be noted that the issue addressed is related to the existence of powers 
and not their nature. Thus, the EU doctrine of implied powers has moved strongly towards 
establishing exclusivity of such competence, i.e. its nature.495 Since in the EAEU an attempt 
has been made to preclude even the existence of implied powers, this will be the focus instead. 
In order to interpret this provision, it is necessary to clearly understand the concept of 
implied powers. Even though there is plenty of research on implied powers, it is rather 
fragmented, often inconclusive and conflicting. The genesis and development of the implied 
powers doctrine has not yet been traced in a comprehensive legal and diachronic manner: from 
its inception in one legal order to its adoption and spreading to other distinct legal orders. 
Given the necessity to interpret the TEAEU provisions pertinent to the implied powers, and 
lack of an authoritative account of implied powers to build upon in this process, I find it 
necessary to provide a thorough account and introduce a classification of implied powers 
doctrines. 
4.2 The nature of powers of international organizations 
International organizations function on the basis of a conferral of powers by member 
states. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) played an important role in 
formulating the principle, which will be later called attributed (conferred) powers. In its 
opinion of 1926 on the European Commission of the Danube, the PCIJ has formulated a 
general rule for international organizations: 
‘As the European Commission is not a State, but an international institution 
with a special purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the 
Definitive Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power 
to exercise these functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not 
impose restrictions upon it.’496 
This idea was reinforced in another judgment which followed in 1927—the Case of 
the SS Lotus. The Permanent Court stated that rules of international law emanate from the free 
will of sovereign states.497 It may be understood that if rules cannot be thrust upon states 
against their will, then organizations must function in accordance with the will of the member 
                                                 
495 See M. Chamon, "Implied Exclusive Powers in the ECJ's Post-Lisbon Jurisprudence: The Continued 
Development of the ERTA Doctrine," Common Market Law Review 55, no. 4 (2018). 
496 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Series B, No. 14, 64 
(1926). 
497 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v Turkey), PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 18 (1927). 
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states.498 Such an understanding would be similar to the way the Soviet doctrine interpreted 
international organizations as not being able to circumvent states and their sovereign rights.499 
However, this is a one-sided view of the issue, since there are various ways in which powers 
can be conferred onto international organizations depending on the degree to which states give 
away their powers: agency relationships, delegations of powers, and transfers of powers.500 
The different extent to which powers have been conferred can be characterized by their 
revocability, degree to which member states retain control over the exercise of powers by the 
organization, and whether the organization possesses the sole right to exercise powers or 
concurrently with member states.501 In this respect, for an autonomous legal order it will be 
important to possess powers which are generally irrevocable, a limited degree of member 
states retaining control over the exercise of powers, and the availability of powers exclusively 
to the organization.  
An agency relationship exists in international law as relations between a principal and 
agent who are separate legal entities both consenting to conferral of powers.502 It is generally 
presumed that agency relationship between international organizations and member states do 
not exist.503 Essentially, when exercising its powers, an international organization with an 
international legal personality does not act on behalf of its member states but acts on its own 
behalf.504 
In the case of delegation of powers, member states can revoke the powers and can 
exercise the powers concurrently with and independently of the organization.505 This is also 
known as shared competence, which involves the ability of both the organization and member 
states to adopt legally binding acts. In the EU, most of the regulatory areas are shared.506 
However, the feature of the shared competence in the EU is that member states can exercise 
their competence only to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence, or decided 
to cease exercising it.507 This provision codified by the Lisbon Treaty has become the result 
of the pre-emption doctrine, developed by the ECJ.508 Following this doctrine, if the EU 
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exercises its powers within the EU or externally, the area becomes ‘occupied’ and member 
states are precluded from acting therein. The resulting effect is that the scope of shared 
competence shrinks with time and moves towards exclusive competence of the EU (upon 
complying with certain conditions) and becomes generally irrevocable. 
In the case of transfer of powers, the organization will possess exclusive competence 
to exercise powers.509 The exclusive competence is understood as a certain regulatory area 
where only the organization can adopt binding legal acts. In the EU such competences were 
implemented in a way that in such areas member states could also adopt binding legal acts, 
but only in two cases: 1) when the EU empowers them to do so; and 2) for the implementation 
of EU acts.510 
The transfer of powers means that the conferrals will generally be irrevocable.511 The 
irrevocability is, however, relative, since virtually any member state can withdraw from an 
international organization, albeit upon completion of different requirements and within 
different notice periods. Therefore, it is not an ideal way to estimate the extent to which 
member states have conferred their powers. 512  However, the other important features of 
transfers of powers are that member states cannot exercise direct control over the organization 
and consent to be bound by the decisions of an organization.513 In this respect the transfers can 
be divided into ‘partial’ and ‘complete’. In the former case, a member state agrees to be bound 
by the organization’s exercise of powers on the international plane, while in the latter—on the 
domestic level via direct effect.514 
In the EU the principle of conferral is a fundamental constitutional principle. It has 
been at the core of the European integration process, including through the ECJ case law, and 
was reinforced with the introduction of Article 5 TEU along with the principles of subsidiary 
and proportionality.515 Regardless the wider coverage of the shared competence in the EU, a 
strong case could be made in favour of the ever increasing area of transfers via the pre-emption 
principle and the principle of direct effect, as well as member states’ consent to be bound by 
EU external action. 
                                                 
509 Sarooshi, International organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers, 54. 
510 Art.2(1) TFEU. 
511 Sarooshi, International organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers, 54. 
512 Ibid., 68. 
513 Ibid., 65. 
514 Ibid., 70. 
515 For analysis of the principle of conferral post-Lisbon see I. Govaere, "To Give or to Grab: The Principle of 
Full, Crippled and Split Conferral of Powers Post-Lisbon," College of Europe Research Papers in Law, no. 4 
(2016). 
  
100 
Many EU member states have national provisions concerning transfer of powers. Thus, 
Article 24 of the German Constitution provides that ‘[t]he Federation may by legislation 
transfer sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions.’ Article 92 of the Constitution of 
the Netherlands provides that: 
‘Legislative, executive and judicial powers may be conferred on international 
institutions by or pursuant to a treaty, subject, where necessary, to the 
provisions of Article 91, paragraph 3 [the requirement that treaties which 
conflict with the Constitution must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote 
in the Parliament].’516 
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution stipulates that sovereign powers can be transferred 
to international organizations. The Italian Constitutional Court found that such transfer to the 
EU was constitutional (i.e. consistent with Article 11), as the founding treaty guaranteed the 
due process to a sufficient extent and Italy participated in the decision-making.517 
However, member states can still exert control over the organization’s exercise of 
powers directly and indirectly via implementation within domestic legal orders. The essential 
point is well put by Sarooshi: 
‘[T]he greater the degree or extent of conferrals by States of powers on an 
international organization, the less is the degree of direct control that States are 
allowed to exert over the organization’s exercise of powers outside the confines 
of the organization’s decision-making processes; and yet, as a State confers 
powers to a greater degree on an organization there will often be more pressure 
exerted by the State . . . to try and control the organization’s decisions.’518 
This point has been abundantly illustrated in practice, most notably by the German 
Constitutional Court in the Lisbon case,519 but also in a number of cases in the French, Italian, 
British and other judiciaries.520 
4.3 The powers of the EAEU 
The EAEU has adopted the idea of attributed powers since it has jurisdiction ‘within 
the scope and limits determined under [the EAEU] Treaty and international agreements within 
the Union.’521  Even though the EAEU Treaty does not articulate conferral as a separate 
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principle, it is reinforced in Article 3, which lists the basic principles of functioning of the 
Union, but starts with the provision that the principles listed form the basis of the Union 
activities, which, in their turn, shall be carried out within the jurisdiction granted by member 
states in accordance with the EAEU Treaty.522 The principle of conferral is additionally fixed 
in the provisions devoted to the EAEU institutions, which is essentially a reformulation of the 
aforementioned provisions: 
‘Bodies of the Union shall act within the powers accorded to them by this 
Treaty and international agreements within the Union.’523 
The main difference is that previously this principle was devoted to the activities of 
the EAEU, while here it separately regulates the activities of the EAEU institutions. All of it 
indicates that the EAEU is based on the principle of powers conferred by member states. 
At the same time, the parties to the treaty decided to renounce a strict classification of 
the EAEU competences, which was proposed in the draft treaty, creating more space for 
interpretation.524 Thus, it was proposed to divide the competences into exclusive, shared, and 
competence coordinating and supporting the activities of member states with precise lists of 
such competences.525 It was similar to the division of competences to which the EU came to 
after fifty years of its existence and which was introduced with the Lisbon treaty in Articles 2 
– 6 TFEU, distinguishing exclusive, shared and supporting competences as three main types 
of EU powers.526  Nevertheless, as Govaere argues in the case of the EU, resorting to a 
catalogue of competence is helpful in terms of clarity and transparency, but “it also creates a 
false sense of legal certainty as it leaves crucial issues regarding the principle of conferral 
untouched and unresolved.”527 
Thus the adopted version of the TEAEU only identifies separate policies: common 
policy, coordinated policy and agreed policy. According to the Treaty, a common policy is 
‘the policy implemented by the Member States in certain spheres as specified 
in this Treaty and envisaging the application of unified legal regulations by the 
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Member States, including on the basis of decisions issued by Bodies of the 
Union within their powers.’528 
Each area covered by the Treaty belongs to a certain policy, which, in its turn 
determines the division of competences. In its Vertical Agreements advisory opinion, the 
EAEU Court has clarified the issue. 529 Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Belarus requested 
an advisory opinion from the Court to interpret several provisions of the TEAEU regarding 
general principles and rules of competition, with a particular focus on vertical agreements. The 
background of the case was that EAEU law allows Member States to introduce additional 
prohibitions, as well as additional requirements and restrictions in national legislation with 
regard to the prohibitions of anticompetitive behaviour available in EAEU law. 530  The 
question was whether Member States can introduce other criteria of admissibility of vertical 
agreements. The outcome of the ruling was that admissibility criteria cannot be modified by 
Member States. Importantly, in its reasoning, the Court developed conditions for a certain area 
to be attributed to the common policy. According to the Court, in order to ascribe a certain 
sphere to the common policy, two conditions must be met: 
1. A unified legal framework must be present; 
2. Member States must have conferred competences in this area to the bodies of the Union 
within their supranational powers.531 
In this particular case, protection of competition on cross border markets falls within 
the common policy as both criteria are satisfied. However, other competition rules fall under 
the two other types of policies depending on the nature of the market (national or cross border) 
and the nationality of the economic entity (market participant of a Member State or of a third 
country). 
Thus, the notion of common policy corresponds broadly to that of exclusive 
competence in the EU as it requires unified legal regime and transfer of competence from 
Member States to the Union.532 The EAEU Court has also already ruled that general rules 
regulating the functioning of the Customs Union as well as general rules regulating the 
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functioning of the international market of goods fall under common policy.533 Importantly, the 
Court has equated the notions “common policy” and “supranational regulation”.534 
The second type of policy is agreed policy. The Treaty defines it as 
‘policy implemented by the Member States in various areas suggesting the 
harmonisation of legal regulations, including on the basis of decisions of the 
Bodies of the Union, to the extent required to achieve the objectives of the 
Union under this Treaty.’535 
Although it can be seen as similar to the EU shared competences, it is not so. The 
reason is that the areas that fall under agreed policy still remain in the competence of Member 
States, while the Union can adopt measures to bring national legislation in certain areas closer 
together. The pre-emption principle does not exist either. 
In the Vertical Agreements advisory opinion, the Court summarized criteria for areas 
to fall under the agreed policy: 
1. The area must involve harmonization of legislation; 
2. It must be directed at attainment of Union aims. 
According to the Treaty, the areas that fall under agreed policy are sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, consumer protection, macroeconomic policy, monetary policy, 
financial markets, electronic communication development, information technologies, 
uniformity of measurements and others. When interpreting Article 74(4) of the Treaty, the 
Court ruled that competition policy can also fall under agreed policy. This is applicable only 
with regard to activities of market participants from third countries if their actions have 
adverse effect on competition on commodity markets in Member States.536 
Finally, coordinated policy is defined as 
‘policy implying the cooperation between the Member States on the basis of 
common approaches approved within Bodies of the Union and required to 
achieve the objectives of the Union under this Treaty.’537 
Thus, coordinated policy only establishes common approaches towards achieving the 
aims of the Union, including approaches approved by the EAEU institutions. In the Vertical 
Agreements advisory opinion, the Court ruled that, while safeguarding competition on the 
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cross border markets falls under common policy (and therefore is exclusive competence of the 
Union), competition on the national markets falls under coordinated policy.538 Therefore, 
various Union competition rules can fall under all three types of Union policies, triggering 
different powers, and having different legal consequences. 
It can be concluded that the type of policy gives answers on the level of decision-
making (supranational or national) and regulatory method (unification, harmonization or 
coordination). The precise competences are defined in various parts of the TEAEU and other 
international agreements within the EAEU, which has been subject of criticism.539 Absence of 
a clear typology of the EAEU powers makes it hard to assess them as either transfers or 
delegations. Regardless possible difficulties in delimiting areas and corresponding 
competences,540 it still allows for a clearer object of interpretation. Otherwise, as Sarooshi 
explains: 
‘[T]he conferral of powers on an organization does not ipso facto mean that a 
State has limited its own competence to exercise the conferred powers. To the 
contrary, if a State has not limited its competence to exercise conferred powers, 
then, applying the Lotus case principle, the State can exercise powers on a 
unilateral basis even while the conferral to the organization remains in 
force.’541 
It will be essentially the EAEU Court’s task to interpret the types of powers and their 
scope. The Court’s ability to do that will be analysed in the following chapters. Now I shall 
consider another issue of direct bearing on the autonomy of the legal order, which is the place 
of the implied powers in the EAEU. 
4.4 Express and implied powers 
As observed before, the principle of attributed powers means that international 
organizations and their bodies can carry out their activities only within the competences 
conferred upon them by member states. Many international organizations have a certain 
version of wording limiting competences of an organization via this principle. As the ICJ 
observed in one of its advisory opinions, the ‘powers conferred on international organizations 
are normally the subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments.’542 Member 
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states usually spell out fields of activities and competences in the founding documents of an 
international organization. In other words, founding documents determine the limits of 
substance and functions of such an international organization. 
However, international organizations are living entities which have their own 
independent institutions and organs, have their own will different from that of the member 
states. International organizations tend to vary and grow with the passage of time. Also, the 
necessity of self-adaptation to the changes in international life and the obligation to achieve 
certain aims and objectives influence the evolvement in understanding of the principle of 
attributed powers.543  
Some researchers claim that the EU principle of attributed powers limits the powers to 
those expressly attributed to the EU by member states, which therefore leads to a conclusion 
that the organization 
‘is not in principle empowered either to act within new substantive areas not 
explicitly covered by the Treaties or to undertake new functions which could 
go beyond the powers originally conferred or surpass the objectives initially 
arranged.’544 
This is however hard to uphold as this wording is not maintained by the EU treaties 
and the practice; both national and international practice shows acceptance of certain variation 
of implied powers, which will be discussed later. 
The TEAEU does not discuss implied powers. An arguably relevant provision is only 
found in the Statute of the Court limiting its jurisdiction: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall not include extension of the competence of 
Bodies of the Union in excess of that expressly provided for by the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union.’545 
Since the implied powers were essentially developed by the judiciary, as it will be 
shown later in this chapter, an argument can be made that this provision was included in order 
to avoid the possibility of identifying implied powers by the EAEU Court. However, in order 
to interpret this provision, it is necessary to clearly understand the concept of implied powers. 
Given the importance of the implied powers as an indicium of a legal order autonomy, the 
necessity to interpret the TEAEU provisions pertinent to the implied powers, and lack of an 
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authoritative account of implied powers to build upon in this process, I find it necessary to 
provide a thorough account of our own. 
The implied powers doctrine originates in the US, where nowadays it is the basic 
principle of the US government that the Congress can act both when there is express or implied 
authority to act in the Constitution.546 The doctrine eventually finds its way into the law of 
international organizations. Therefore, in order to uncover the doctrine of implied powers it is 
necessary to look into the relevant legal orders—national (the US) and international (primarily 
the UN)—and, eventually, into the EU. 
4.5 Genesis of the implied powers doctrine—the US 
The first notion of implied powers appeared on the way to the creation of the federation 
of the United States of America under the new constitution. The idea first appeared in the 
Federalist (later – Federalist Papers)—a series of essays published in 1787-1788 and initiated 
by Alexander Hamilton, one of the Founding Fathers of the US, who was also the author of 
the majority of essays.547 Alexander Hamilton in his federalist paper no. 33 tackled the issue 
of what will be known as the necessary and proper clause. 548  It is a provision of the 
Constitution in Article 1, Section 8 describing the powers of Congress: 
‘To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.’ 
Hamilton argued that the necessary and proper clause is “only declaratory of a truth 
which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of 
constituting a federal government and vesting it with certain specified powers”.549 Madison in 
his federalist paper no. 44 stated that without the substance of the power of the necessary and 
proper clause, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter.550 
Bearing in mind the EAEU wording of “competence … expressly provided”, 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the document that preceded the Constitution of 
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the US, the Articles of Confederation, had a provision according to which the exercise of any 
power not expressly delegated was prohibited (Article 2).551 Madison believed that if one was 
to adopt the term “expressly” in the Constitutions, this would mean that “the new Congress 
would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing 
the term ‘expressly’ with so much rigour as to disarm the government of all real authority 
whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction.”552 He 
believed it was easy to show that no important power delegated could be executed by Congress 
without recurring to the doctrine of construction or implication. According to him, “particular 
powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always 
necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the 
same.”553 
The issue of implied powers arose when Alexander Hamilton proposed to the Congress 
to chart the first central bank in the US.554 When the bill passed in the Congress, George 
Washington, before signing it, decided to ask opinions of the members of his cabinet, one of 
which, the Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson’s, is particularly revealing. Thomas Jefferson 
based his arguments on the provision of the tenth amendment to the Constitution which he 
called “the foundation of the Constitution”. The amendment reads as follows: 
‘The powers not delegated to the United Stated, by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.’ 
Therefore, according to Jefferson, to go beyond that would mean “boundless field of 
power, no longer susceptible of any definition”.555 He analysed the enumerated powers and 
the general phrases of the Constitution to see if they could be used to incorporate a bank. 
According to Jefferson, none of the three of the most relevant enumerated powers in the 
Constitution—to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; and to regulate commerce—is 
                                                 
551 The wording is as follows: “Each State Retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in 
Congress assembled.” However, James Wilson, probably the most prominent lawyer of the time of founding of 
the United States, who also was a major force in drafting the US Constitution, interpreted this provision of the 
Articles of Confederation, regardless the word “express”, as still allowing for implied powers, mainly due to 
the fact that some powers, were not possessed by any individual state in the first place and, therefore, the states 
could not delegate them to the US, and such power could only derive from the union of the states, and therefore 
the US could possess it. See Mikhail, "The Necessary and Proper Clauses," 1074-78. 
552 Hamilton et al., The Federalist papers, 225. (emphasis added) 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 344. 
555 "Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank: 1791," The Avalon Project: Documents in 
Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp. Here and further, Jefferson’s 
quotations are given from this text. 
  
108 
executed in the incorporation of a bank. As for the general phrases, the power “to lay taxes for 
the purpose of providing for the general welfare”, Jefferson argued that to lay taxes and to 
provide for general welfare are related to each other as the power and the purpose, meaning 
that the taxes are to be laid only to provide for general welfare, and, vice versa, general welfare 
can be provided only by laying taxes. Otherwise, Jefferson argued, constructing this provision 
broadly would make the enumeration of powers in the Constitution useless and even “would 
reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do 
whatever would be for the good of the United States”. The other general phrase analysed was 
the necessary and proper clause. Jefferson observed that all the enumerated powers could be 
executed without a bank, which made it therefore not necessary and not authorized by the 
clause. He contrasted the notion of necessary to that of convenient, which, he argued, reduces 
the whole to one power. 
After having received Jefferson’s concise opinion, Washington turned to Hamilton, 
who believed that it is axiomatic to government ‘to employ all the means requisite and fairly 
applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by 
restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the 
essential ends of political society [emphasis added].’ He agreed with the notion of delegated 
powers; however, he claimed that the amount delegated in each case “is a question of fact, to 
be made out by fair reasoning and construction, upon the particular provisions of the 
Constitution, taking as guides the general principles and general ends of governments”. As 
Jefferson did not rule out the existence of implied powers, Hamilton argued that a power of 
erecting a corporation, which was a means to an end, may as well be implied, and it may be 
employed as a means of carrying into execution any of the specific powers. The question was 
whether such means had a relation to any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the 
government. 
Hamilton dismissed Jefferson’s restrictive interpretation of necessary and proper 
clause, and turned to popular sense of the word ‘necessary’, which according to him means 
“needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to”, and it is used “when nothing more is 
intended or understood, than that the interests require, or will be promoted by, the doing of 
this or that thing”. Every government has only a right to pass such laws that are necessary and 
proper to accomplish the objects intrusted to it, they cannot do whatever they please. The 
degree of necessity of a measure cannot be a test of the legal right to adopt it, as it is a matter 
of opinion and can only be a test of expediency, he argued. The criterion of constitutionality, 
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according to him, should be “[t]he relation between the measure and the end; between the 
nature of the mean employed toward the execution of a power, and the object with that power”. 
Hamilton further stated that he did not contend that the necessary and proper clause 
gave new or independent powers, but an explicit sanction to implied powers and only to the 
extent of the objects of government’s specified powers. This could be a criterion of what is 
constitutional: ‘if the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if 
the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular 
provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the 
national authority’. A further assisting criterion is whether it encroached upon a pre-existing 
right of a State or individual. If it does not, there is a strong presumption in favour of its 
constitutionality. 
George Washington was persuaded by Hamilton’s arguments and signed the bill into 
law. Thomas Jefferson, during his own presidency, eventually abandoned the strict 
constructionist view of the constitution, at least temporarily, when there was an opportunity to 
purchase Louisiana.556 James Madison, during his presidency, renewed the charter of the bank 
after it expired.557 
The 1819 case McCulloh v. Maryland was the first and major case decided by the 
Supreme Court of the US on implied powers and is considered one of the canons of American 
constitutional law.558 It concerned the Second Bank of the United States, renewed by Madison. 
Certain states were unhappy about the activities of the federal bank, which were economically 
disadvantageous to them, and tried to limit or prohibit its activities on their territory. Maryland 
introduced a tax on all banks incorporated outside the state. However, the Second Bank was 
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the only non-state bank, which meant that the tax was directed precisely at it. The bank refused 
to pay the tax and it was sued by the state, and both courts of first and appellate instances 
decided in favour of Maryland. The case went to the Supreme Court. 
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court was delivered by the Chief Justice John 
Marshall, who, before answering on the constitutionality of the tax gave an extensive 
elaboration on the Congress’s ability to incorporate a bank, where he developed the implied 
powers doctrine. Justice Marshall noted that even though there is no enumerated power to 
establish a bank or creating a corporation in the Constitution, there is no phrase, which 
excludes incidental or implied powers, as the articles of confederation did. That includes the 
Tenth Amendment, where the powers ‘not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the 
States, are reserved to the States or to the people’, does not include the word ‘expressly’. He 
famously said: ‘In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution 
we are expounding.’559 This means that the Constitution differs from a regular legislative act, 
it would be impossible to enumerate in all details all means to carry into execution the powers 
provided. The Constitution therefore should be interpreted differently. Therefore, the Court 
believed that the Congress was not limited to the acts expressly stipulated in the Constitution. 
As for the necessary and proper clause, the Congress could chose the means not prohibited by 
the Constitution in order to carry out the enumerated powers: ‘Let the end be legitimate, let it 
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.’560 Marshall did not accept the understanding of necessary as 
indispensable, which was proposed by the representative of Maryland in the case (and by 
Jefferson as shown above). Also, like Hamilton, Marshall analysed the meaning of the word 
necessary, and relied to its usage in the ‘common affairs of the world, or in approved authors’, 
and denied its understanding as ‘indispensable’ in favour of ‘convenient, or useful, or essential 
to another’. On the one hand, it is related to the nature of the constitution, which is meant to 
be there for the years ahead and should be adapted to possible crises.561 On the other hand, the 
clause is part of Article I, §8, which expands the competence, but not part of Article I, §9, 
which limits it. However, this does not create unlimited competence and the Court underlined 
the judicial review of the constitutionality of the federal legislation.562 
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What is also important is that it follows from Marshall’s reasoning, similar to 
Hamilton, that the necessary and proper clause is only to facilitate the finding of implied 
powers, which could otherwise be deduced by ‘general reasoning’.563 
On this basis and based on several other arguments, the Supreme Court deemed the tax 
unconstitutional. These arguments legally established the doctrine of implied powers. 
4.6 Implied powers in the international legal order(s) 
The implied powers doctrine in the international legal order was developed within the 
international judicial bodies, specifically in the case law of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). 564  However, the first steps towards the fully-fledged doctrine were made by its 
predecessor, the PCIJ. 
There are several cases were the PCIJ introduces the elements of implied powers 
thinking. The first one is the 1922 opinion Competence of the ILO to Regulate the Conditions 
of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture.565 The question to the Court was, whether the 
ILO had powers to regulate the conditions of labour in the agricultural sector. The Court 
argued that the term “industry” and derivations thereof could also, “in their primary and 
general sense” embrace agricultural production, while acknowledging that they have also a 
more limited meaning.566 However, in the opinion delivered the same day and also on the 
ILO’s powers with regard to agricultural sector, the Court used the same interpretative logic, 
but this time showed the limits of scope by denying the ILO to discuss specifically the methods 
of agricultural production, when such methods did not relate to the specific points regarding 
which the ILO had been given powers.567 This means that the implied powers, as it would be 
called later on, derive from the explicit powers. 
In 1926 another issue appeared before the Court with regard to ILO’s competence. 
This time it was about the competence to draw up labour legislation protecting workers, which 
incidentally affected the position of employers who performed the same jobs. The Court 
confirmed that there was an implied power to do so, which, even though not expressly stated, 
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could be derived from explicit provisions because the fundamental purpose of the organization 
“to assure humane conditions of labour and the protection of workers” could be seriously 
hampered otherwise.568 
As it has been stated before, the PCIJ developed an attributed powers principle in its 
1926 opinion. However, it did not preclude the implied powers as the Court ended its passage 
“. . . but it has power to exercise these functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute 
does not impose restrictions upon it.” 569 
This provides plenty of space for implied powers doctrine, as described later on. 
Moreover, the PCIJ itself eventually extended the jurisdiction of the Danube Commission in 
an implied manner, in order to ensure the effectiveness in achieving the main task of the 
Danube Commission.570 This notion of “effectiveness”, later also to be known as the effet utile 
principle, is further developed in the 1928 opinion on the Greco-Turkish Agreement. The 
agreement had established the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Populations and stipulated that in case when Commission does not agree, the case could be 
transferred to arbitration. However, the agreement did not clarify who could make such a 
transfer. The PCIJ, on the basis of this gap, principle of effectiveness and the ‘spirit’ of the 
institution, came to the conclusion that it is the Mixed Commission has the powers to do so.571 
The effet utile principle states that when two interpretations of the same article are possible, 
the right interpretation would be that which better ensures the fulfilment of the purposes of an 
organization, and to enable the organization with the powers to perform the functions 
conferred upon it to its full extent.572 The principle of effectiveness is better viewed as the 
reason for the emergence of the doctrine of implied powers and describing its substance. 
These PCIJ opinions created the ground for the development of the implied powers 
doctrine within the case law of the ICJ as international organizations developed into actors in 
their own right and became to be perceived as dynamic entities.573 
There are three main cases where the doctrine of implied powers saw its main 
development by the ICJ. The first one is the advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries of 
                                                 
568 Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of the Employer, Advisory Opinion, 
PCIJ, Series B, No. 13 (1926); See also Engström, Constructing the powers of international institutions, 29-30; 
Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 80-81. 
569 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 64. 
570 Ibid., 65-66. 
571 Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol‚ Article IV), Advisory 
Opinion, PCIJ, Series B, No. 16, 20 (1928). 
572 Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 78. 
573 Engström, Constructing the powers of international institutions, 41. 
  
113 
1949.574 In its opinion, the Court has innovatively interpreted the competences of the UN. Two 
important issues where dealt with: whether the UN had legal personality and whether it had 
competence to bring claims with regard to damage caused to itself and its agents in the absence 
of express provisions on that. Both issues were decided through the doctrine of implied 
powers. The Court has found that the UN has legal personality as 
‘the Organization was intended to exercise, and is in fact exercising and 
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the 
possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of 
international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of the 
founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must be acknowledged 
that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties 
and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable 
those functions to be effectively discharged.’575 
As for the competence to bring claims, the Court used this logic: 
‘Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties 
recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the 
Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or 
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.’576 
Therefore, it is a wide understanding of implied powers, where not (only) the means 
can be implied, but even broader functions. According to the ICJ, the UN should have such 
powers, which, even though not explicitly stated in the Statute, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as essential to the performance of its duties.577 The ICJ also referred to 
the PCIJ opinion of 1926. The ICJ first found that the UN could bring claims for damages to 
it, and then found that it could bring such claims for the damages caused to its agents. The ICJ 
mentioned several reasons to apply this logic to the case in hand, but it specifically stressed 
the independence of the organization and its agents from member states, effective functioning 
of the organization, effectiveness of the work of its agents, etc. 
This reference to the PCIJ as well as the broad understanding of implied powers, as 
those the UN could need to attain general objectives, rather than just to effectuate the 
functions, are criticized in legal doctrine.578 There were also dissenting opinions within the 
ICJ. The dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth, who was the first US judge to sit in the ICJ, 
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is of particular importance. Even though he agreed on that the UN could bring claims with 
regard to the damage to it (through implied powers reasoning as well, however a narrower 
one), but he did not agree that the same was true with regard to its agents. In his view, 
‘Powers not expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied powers flow from a 
grant of express powers, and are limited to those that are “necessary” to the 
exercise of powers expressly granted.’579 
In his view the majority of judges in the case expanded the implied powers. He did not 
see any necessity to use of implied powers in order to ensure the independence and 
effectiveness of the organization and of its agents. 
The next case was the Effect of Awards of 1954.580 One of the issues the ICJ dealt with 
was the powers of the UN General Assembly to establish an administrative tribunal capable 
of adopting binding decisions. The ICJ, referring to its Reparation for Injuries decision, stated 
that such powers arose “by necessary intendment” out of the UN Charter. The reason behind 
it was that staff members may be precluded from bringing claims against the UN in domestic 
courts due to immunities; therefore such a tribunal was needed for “efficiency, competence 
and integrity”.581 The main critique was about the powers of the General Assembly to delegate 
judicial functions, which it did not possess itself.582 However, the majority ruled that the 
tribunal was not an organ of the General Assembly, but a tribunal of the UN and therefore 
there was no delegation of powers at all. 
In the Certain Expenses opinion of 1962 the ICJ confronted the issue of peacekeeping 
and related expenditures as whether they can qualify as “expenses of the Organization”. It 
formulated the following rule: 
‘when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the 
Organization.’583 
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It was probably the widest interpretation of implied powers,584 which could be deemed 
available if they could be related to the purposes of the UN. This wide interpretation became 
the centre of F. Seyersted’s work, who proposed a theory of inherent powers, meaning that 
organizations possess all the powers necessary to achieve the purposes without a direct link to 
the source of such competence, but on the basis of the fact that such powers are inherent in the 
organization as such.585 This view, however respected, did not however find much support; 
moreover, the argument of the ICJ in the opinion was widely criticized, both by several judges 
and in doctrine.586 
The Certain Expenses opinion could be considered as the culmination of the 
development of the implied powers doctrine in the international legal order—signs of more 
restrictive interpretation appeared from then on. In the 1990s the ICJ clearly changed its views. 
In the 1996 Legality of use of Nuclear Weapons opinion, it found that the World Health 
Organization (hereinafter ‘WHO’) had no powers to address issues concerning the legality of 
weapons systems. According to the Court, the organization would have vast powers in relation 
to the health effects of the use of nuclear weapons, regardless the legality of the use of such 
weapons. By that the Court meant that the health competence of the organization does not 
depend on the legality of actions that resulted in the health consequences.587 
This opinion is considered to be a return to the principle of attributed competences.588 
In our opinion, however, it is not correct, as the principle was not abandoned at any point and 
the implied powers are referred to: 
‘Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need for 
organizations, in order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers 
which are not expressly provided for in the basic instruments which govern 
their activities. It is generally accepted that international organizations can 
exercise such powers, known as ‘implied’ powers.’589 
Therefore, regardless the fact that the Court denied the competence to the WHO, it 
confirmed the existence of the doctrine of implied powers, which could be invoked under 
different circumstances. 
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This analysis shows that traditional international organisations take advantage of the 
concept of the implied powers extensively. The United Nations has seized the opportunity 
early. The most prominent example of the UN’s implied powers implementation is the 
adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution 377 allowing it to act in case of failure of the 
Security Council.590 This resolution has enlarged the originally assigned functions without 
introducing changes to the relationships between the organisation and its member states. 
Expansion has also permitted important progress in fields such as the content of the principle 
of self-determination, decisive advances which probably could not have been reached if the 
UN’s members have insisted upon rigid interpretation of the principle of attribution at any 
price.591 
4.7 Implied powers in the EU 
4.7.1 Implied powers per se 
The doctrine of implied powers in the EU developed firmly and, somewhat, 
unexpectedly, since the ECJ even developed a possibility for the implied powers to become 
exclusive. As Tizzano put it: ‘until the Court delivered its judgments, even though the doctrine 
was kept in mind, it was almost unanimously considered that the Treaty did not authorize the 
exercise of such [implied] power outside the cases expressly provided for.’592 Moreover, the 
EU, unlike the UN, saw both a functional and substantial expansion of powers.593 
This unexpectedness derives from a perceived rigidity of attributed powers. The idea 
of attributed powers is commonly invoked in order to emphasize a limited character of the 
organization and to underline the basis of the activities of the organization in the consent of 
its members (as expressed in the constituent instrument). The driving force in claiming implied 
powers is to increase the functional effectiveness of the organization beyond those express 
means.594 The ECJ seized the opportunity in the absence of wording that limits the powers to 
those “expressly” provided in the treaties, which is similar to the US and the UN, as discussed 
above. 
The implied powers doctrine in the EU was developed by the ECJ and it is primarily 
associated with the external competence of the EU. However, the first instances of the 
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application of the doctrine, even though not named so per se, concerned the internal issues of 
the EU and appeared as early as 1956. In the case Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v 
High Authority (Fédéchar), the Court reasoned that “rules laid down by an international treaty 
or a law presuppose the rules without which that treaty or law would have no meaning or could 
not be reasonably and usefully applied”.595 This is an effet utile logic, which is used by the 
ECJ when interpreting EU law trying to give a meaning of full effect to the express provisions 
of the Treaty in light of the objectives of the Treaty.596 The Court did not consider it to be a 
wide interpretation of a rule, but rather a “rule of interpretation generally accepted in both 
international and national law”.597 The Court continued that it followed from the duty of the 
High Authority to ensure that the objectives set out in the ECSC Treaty were attained in 
accordance with the provisions thereof as stipulated in Article 8 of ECSC Treaty, that the High 
Authority ‘enjoys a certain independence in determining the implementing measures 
necessary for the attainment of the objectives referred to in the Treaty.’598 By virtue of this 
judgment the Court “created” a power to fix prices on the part of the High Authority which 
was not expressly stipulated in the Treaty. The Court however limited it to a particular aim to 
achieve and with the limits laid down in the corresponding provisions.599 
There were a number of other cases were the Court resorted to the implied powers 
logic with regard to the internal functioning of the Communities in the early stages as well as 
later on.600 However, this doctrine has seen most of its development within the case law on 
external relations. The most prominent case is the 1971 ERTA decision.601 The case concerned 
the conclusion of the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) and whether the authority 
conferred to the European Community on the implementation of a common transport policy 
within the Community, included the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements 
with third countries. Therefore, the Community had the express power to act internally in the 
field of transport; however, there was nothing on external action. To answer this question, 
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Advocate General Lamothe decided to rely on the intentions of the founders, and argued 
against a possibility to invoke implied powers. He referred to the US Supreme Court implied 
powers doctrine and seemingly hinted that the notion of conferred powers of the EU differed 
from that in the US: 
‘No matter what legal basis the Court finds for it, recognition of the 
Community’s authority in external matters for negotiating and concluding the 
[ERTA] concedes by implication that the Community authorities exercise, in 
addition to the powers expressly conferred upon them by the Treaty, those 
implied powers whereby the Supreme Court of the United States supplements 
the power of the federal bodies in relation to those of the confederate States. . . 
. I for my part consider that Community powers should be regarded as those 
termed in European Law “conferred powers”. Such conferred powers may 
indeed be very widely construed when they are only the direct and necessary 
extension of powers relating to intracommunity questions . . . but . . . [i]t 
appears clear from the general scheme of the Treaty of Rome that its authors 
intended strictly to limit the Community’s authority in external matters to the 
cases which they expressly laid down.’602 
Therefore, in this particular case at hand on the authority to conclude agreements with 
third countries Advocate General Lamothe did not see the necessity in implied powers and 
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty had to be used. However, he was not in fact against the US-
style implied powers as such, but rather it is noticeable that he was against the implied powers 
in the external field, not necessarily in the internal one. 
The ECJ, however, went further than that, and looked into the ‘whole scheme of the 
Treaty no less than to its substantive provisions’.603 It explained: 
‘Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty 
[meaning the provisions on tariff and trade agreements and association 
agreements] ... but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and 
from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the 
Community institutions.’604 
Therefore, the ECJ invoked an implied powers doctrine and enabled the Community 
to also conclude international agreements. The logic of the ECJ is somewhat similar to that of 
the ICJ in the Effect of Awards and the Reparation for Injuries.605 
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The ECJ used to a certain extent similar reasoning in the cases that followed: Kramer, 
and Opinion 1/76 (Laying-up Fund). Kramer concerned the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention, and international agreement aimed at ensuring the conservation of fish stocks in 
the North-East Atlantic Ocean.606 Opinion 1/76 concerned a draft Agreement establishing a 
European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels: 
‘. . . authority to enter into international commitments may not only arise from 
an express attribution by the Treaty, but equally may flow implicitly from its 
provision . . . whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the 
Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a 
specific objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international 
commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence 
of an express provision in that connexion. 
This is particularly so in all cases in which internal power has already been 
used in order to adopt measures which come within the attainment of common 
policies. It is, however, not limited to that eventuality . . . the power . . . flows 
by implication from the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power 
and in so far as the participation of the Community in the international 
agreement is, as here, necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of 
the Community.’607 
It became clear after this opinion that there is no need for a prior internal Community 
legislation for the exercise of external competence, as it was understood initially from the 
ECJ’s decisions. This opinion is also described in doctrine as the establishment of the 
‘parallelism principle’—parallelism of internal and external powers.608 This idea was further 
enhanced in the ILO opinion, where the ECJ made a clear link between an internal and external 
competence.609 
All this time it seemed that the ECJ was gradually expanding the implied powers logic. 
However, the change came with the establishment of the WTO. In the Opinion 1/94610 the ECJ 
looked at the competence of the Community to conclude the WTO Agreement. The European 
Commission argued about the implied powers in all the rest of the fields covered by the WTO 
agreements. The ECJ mainly deals with the nature of EU external competence (exclusivity), 
although the distinction between existence and nature of competence is not very clear in the 
reasoning. However, the opinion is an important milestone in the implied powers case law, 
since the ECJ rejected the existence of exclusive implied powers e.g. in certain services, unless 
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they resembled trade in goods.611  In legal doctrine Opinion 1/94 is usually regarded as a stop 
to the ECJ’s wide interpretation of implied powers.612 Notably, a parallel could be made with 
the UN judiciary, as the ECJ chose in favour of a more restricted implied powers doctrine in 
the same timeframe as the ICJ did. However, Eeckhout believes that it is not necessarily so as 
the ECJ widely invoked the ERTA and Opinion 1/76 rulings and applied them in much the 
same way, regardless of a certain confusion of the argument in this particular case. 613 
According to him, in this opinion the ECJ was not concerned with the conclusion of an 
international agreement, but with a substantive external dimension of the right of 
establishment and freedom to provide services.614 
The next ‘limiting’ Opinion 2/94 was about the competence of the Community to join 
the ECHR.615 The ECJ, however, did not find any implied powers possibility to join the ECHR 
due to lack of treaty provisions conferring on the Community “any general power to enact 
rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in this field” and therefore there 
was nothing to derive implied powers from.616 It has been noticed that the ECJ failed to 
provide any analysis on account of implied powers in this case, limiting itself only to stating 
the absence thereof.617 The ECJ also ruled out the use of the ‘flexibility clause’—the ability to 
carry out functions for the attainment of a Treaty objective, whereby the EU has been given 
an express or implied power to act.618 
Regardless of this restrictive trend,619 the ECJ eventually codified a more generous 
version of the ERTA doctrine in Opinion 1/03 (Lugano Convention). The Court clarified the 
circumstances in which the powers can be implied and consolidated its implied powers case 
law. The Court repeated its ERTA ruling on implied powers establishing that Community 
competence to conclude international agreements: 
‘may arise not only from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally 
flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, 
within the framework of those provisions, by the EU Institutions (see ERTA, 
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paragraph 16). The Court has also held that whenever Community law created 
for those institutions powers within its internal system for the purpose of 
attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to undertake 
international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even 
in the absence of an express provision to that effect.’620 
and 
‘any competence, especially where it is exclusive and not expressly conferred 
by the Treaty, must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a specific analysis 
of the relationship between the agreement envisaged and the Community law 
in force and from which it is clear that the conclusion of such an agreement is 
capable of affecting the Community rules.’621 
The implied powers case law was also codified with the adoption of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which is not in necessarily the same as in Opinion 1/03.622 Article 3(2) primarily 
touches upon the nature of EU external competence and provides for two relevant provision: 
the EU has exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement (1) if the agreement 
is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence (the ‘parallelism clause’); 
and (2) insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope (‘common rules 
clause’). 
Article 216(1) is devoted to the existence of EU external competence. The latter 
provides for two relevant clauses: the EU may conclude an international agreement (1) where 
the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the 
Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties (the ‘necessary clause’); and 
(2) when the agreement is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope (the ‘common 
rules clause’). 
While the ECJ has already equated the ‘common rules clauses’ of both articles in its 
Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), 623  it did not do the same for others. 624  Further, most 
importantly for our purposes, although the ‘parallelism’ and ‘common rules’ clauses 
seemingly follow from the case law, the ‘necessary clause’ is not as clear. It brings the implied 
powers doctrine dangerously close to the flexibility clause, which will be discussed next. 
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4.7.2 The flexibility clause 
The flexibility clause625 is a TFEU provision that establishes a procedure for creation 
of powers for the EU in case of necessity. The clause existed since the inception of the 
European Communities.626 However, the ‘classical’ wording was provided in the EEC Treaty 
in 1957 (Article 235): 
‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of 
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community 
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
Assembly, take the appropriate measures.’627 
The use of the flexibility clause was virtually non-existent prior to 1973.628 But it was 
eventually used to expand the substantive area coverage of the EU, such as legislating in 
environment and regional policy fields, and after that they were incorporated in the Treaties.  
It has not been changed in substance until the Lisbon Treaty. It provides now as follows 
(Art. 352(1) TFEU): 
‘If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. 
Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.’629 
Therefore, the language of the flexibility clause has changed considerably as compared 
to the original formulation. There are different views on what are the consequences of this 
change, however it usually believed that the new wording has expanded the applicability of 
the clause, as previously it was limited only to the common market, while now it covers other 
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3. Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases 
where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation. 4. This Article cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives 
pertaining to the common foreign and security policy and any acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall respect 
the limits set out in Article 40, second paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union.” 
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policies as well.630 However, it is also argued that the change in the wording did not introduce 
a new substantial meaning (only conditions to be satisfied), but merely codified the evolved 
understanding of the provision.631 
Weiler labelled the EU’s flexibility clause a ‘necessary and proper clause’, hinting at 
the provision of the US Constitution.632 According to him, the flexibility clause gave rise to 
the implied powers in the EU, somewhat enabling the concept as the necessary and proper 
clause in the US. Certain authors go further and explicitly equate the implied powers with the 
flexibility clause.633 This is however not necessarily so. Firstly, as has been demonstrated 
above, there was no need for such a clause to exist for the implied powers to be enabled neither 
in the US, nor on the international plane.634 
Secondly, the implied powers mainly arise through interpretation of the explicit 
powers, while the flexibility clause is about creation of new norms. Indeed, the implied powers 
doctrine as developed by the ECJ generally requires the existence of express powers in a 
certain field, unlike the flexibility clause.635 Moreover, the flexibility clause explicitly requires 
the absence of powers in the treaties as a condition for invoking the clause. This could mean 
that the existing powers cannot be increased through the clause, while it is possible through 
the implied powers doctrine.636 Thus, as a general rule, it could be argued that the limits of the 
                                                 
630 E.g. P. Kiiver, "The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: A Court-Ordered Strengthening 
of the National Legislature in the EU," European Law Journal 16, no. 5 (2010): 583. 
631 Dashwood argues that initially ‘common market’ was understood by the drafters ‘as a term of art, covering 
all the aspects of the Community’s “task” other than the progressive approximation of national economic 
policies.’ But then this was undermined due to extension of the Community competences. However, he argues 
that Article 308 ought to be interpreted in an ‘evolutionary’ way and he shows from the case law that the Court 
did embrace this. The Lisbon Treaty only adopted this understanding. See A. Dashwood, "Article 308 EC as 
the Outer Limit of Expressly Conferred Community Competence," in The Outer Limits of European Law, ed. 
C. Barnard and O. Odudu (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), 36, 38, 39 and 43. 
632 Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 2443. This is the way Weiler’s notion was understood, see H.G. 
Schermers, "The Transformation of Europe: Comment," Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991). 
633 See in particular C. Lebeck, "Implied Powers beyond Functional Integration? The Flexibility Clause in the 
Revised EU Treaties," Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 17 (2008).  
634 It is clear from McCulloch v. Maryland, that the Supreme Court did not come to its conclusion because of 
the clause, and, when disproving the “limiting” argument of Maryland, that the clause limits the powers of the 
Congress, Chief Justice Marshall in fact stated that the Congress would have the choice of means that “would 
most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished” and even “any means adapted to the end, any means 
which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the government”, which is indeed the 
implied powers. It did not have to be there for the implied powers to exist. Moreover, the implied powers in the 
US are not interpreted through the necessary and proper clause only. 
635 Literal interpretation of the ‘necessary clause’ in Article 216(1) can challenge this statement. However, even 
in this case, this provision does not necessarily follow from the ECJ case law. This point will be discussed 
below. 
636 Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 128. 
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flexibility clause are the objectives of the treaties, while the limits of the implied powers are 
the powers as stipulated in the treaties.637 
Thirdly, there is a clear difference in the wording of the US and EU provisions. The 
US provisions are concerned about the acts to effectuate the powers, while the EU’s flexibility 
clause provision is about acts to effectuate objectives. Last, but not least, the Court clearly 
distinguishes the implied powers and the flexibility clause. Thus, in Opinion 2/94 the Court 
stated that Article 352 TFEU was ‘designed to fill the gap where no specific provisions of the 
Treaty confer on the Community institutions express or implied powers to act’.638 
Other authors do not equate the flexibility clause and the implied powers doctrine, but 
state that the existence of the flexibility clause combined with the principle of attributed 
powers demands a narrow construction of the implied powers doctrine, which indeed could be 
the case.639 
Engström considers that the flexibility clause article ‘in essence expresses the idea of 
implied powers as known in international law’.640 He calls the implied powers beyond Article 
352 TFEU as parallel powers, which entail ‘deriving external powers from internal 
competence while Article 352 TFEU serves primarily to create internal competence’. It is true 
that the doctrine of implied powers of the EU was developed by the ECJ in a somewhat 
narrower manner, at least as compared to the case law of the ICJ, in particular the Certain 
Expenses opinion. Even though Engström says that authors who do not consider the flexibility 
clause as an embodiment of the implied powers understand the latter in a narrow sense, he also 
seems to have a narrow understanding of the implied powers as developed by the ECJ as only 
the parallel powers in the external relations.641 At a minimum, this view disregards the case 
law outside the external action.642 
According to von Bogdandy and Bast, the existence of the principle of conferral and 
the harmonization clause ‘commands that [implied powers] should be construed narrowly’.643 
                                                 
637 But see T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
110-11, referring to narrow and wide formulations of implied powers. 
638 Opinion 2/94, para. 29. 
639 E.g. A. Bogdandy and J. Bast, "The Federal Order of Competences," in Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, ed. A. Bogdandy and J. Bast (Hart Publishing, 2010), 282. 
640 V. Engström, Constructing the powers of international institutions, The Erik Castrén Institute monographs 
on international law and human rights (Leiden ; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 53. 
641 Ibid. 
642 And also the ‘necessary clause’ in Article 216(1) TFEU. However, indeed, the CJEU usually resorts to 
different terminology with regard to internal powers, such as effet utile. This is not always the case, as shown 
e.g. Case T-240/04, France v Commission, para. 35. In any event, the difference in terminology does not 
necessarily entail the difference in substance. For even more variations see Joined Cases 281, Germany v 
Commission, paras. 28-29. 
643 Bogdandy and Bast, "The Federal Order of Competences," 282. 
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It is also suggested that it can only have the status of a rule of interpretation for explicit 
empowering provisions, and, with a reference to the Fédéchar case, that implied power can 
exist when an ‘undisputedly existing power cannot effectively be exercised without spanning 
a matter that is not (or not explicitly) mentioned in the text of the provision conferring that 
power’.644  
In the view of some researchers, the doctrine of implied powers has extended EU 
powers outside the procedure of the flexibility clause.645 Such a view would mean that the 
doctrine of implied powers (or the ECJ’s version thereof) and the flexibility clause actually 
intersect. Given the ‘necessary clause’ in Article 216(1) TFEU, and its subsequent 
interpretation by the ECJ this could indeed be the case.646 However, as it has been argued by 
Cremona, referring to treaty objectives could greatly extend the scope of competence.647 In 
effect, the reference purely to objectives (at least on its own) cannot be consistently derived 
from the ECJ case law and could have been an expansion of the drafters. 
Overall, implying a power means that the power in fact exists, even though not 
expressly mentioned. Article 352 TFEU deals with creation of new powers, not explicitly 
written and not implied. However, Martinez plausibly sees implied powers as part of what she 
calls ‘endogenous development’—a model of enlargement of EU powers that involves 
changes of the powers and functions without changing the constitutional structure.648 Martinez 
puts not only implied powers in this category, but also the flexibility together with the 
functional allocation of competences. 
4.8 The possibility for implied powers in the EAEU 
The analysis of the implied powers doctrine can now be applied to the relevant EAEU 
provisions. As has been mentioned before, the TEAEU does not discuss implied powers per 
se. However, as identified earlier, the provision that bares relevance for implied powers in the 
EAEU can be found in para. 42 of the Statute of the Court limiting its jurisdiction: 
                                                 
644 Ibid. 
645 Tizzano, "The powers of the Community," 49. 
646 See Opinion 2/15, paras. 237-39; Case C-600/14, Germany v Council, paras. 50 and 58. 
647 See M. Cremona, ‘Defining Competence in EU External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform 
Process’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient 
Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 56-57. See also M. 
Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an 
Integrated Policy’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, second edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2011), 225. 
648 Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 106. 
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‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall not include extension of the competence of 
Bodies of the Union in excess of that expressly provided for by the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union.’649 
This provision can serve to preclude the EAEU Court from finding the implied powers 
in a way the courts of the EU, UN and the US did. This is also part of a general and consistent 
tendency, identifiable through the Treaty and the Statute of the Court, to limit the Court’s 
activism, as will be discussed in the Chapter 6. 
In order to know whether this provision can indeed play this role, it requires further 
interpretation. First, the language must be clarified. The original wording in the authentic 
Russian text, instead of the words ‘extension of the competence’ by the Court uses the words 
‘наделение <…> дополнительной компетенцией’, which literally translates to ‘vesting with 
additional competence’, which is a much stronger language.650 The official English translation 
of the Treaty is not legally binding unlike the texts in the languages of the member states, 
which are equally authentic, and in case of divergence of interpretations, the text in the Russian 
language prevails.651 Therefore I will follow the Russian language version of the text, where 
para. 42 must be translated as follows: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall not include vesting the Bodies of the Union 
with additional competence in excess of that expressly provided for by the 
Treaty and/or international agreements within the Union.’ 
The major problematic point of this provision is that courts do not, in principle, vest 
competence, but rather interpret provisions of legal acts, including those devoted to 
competence. As it follows from the history of application of the implied powers doctrine in 
practice, such competence is not vested by the courts, but exists together with the express 
powers, while a court can only confirm or deny its existence. 
Further, if an EAEU institution determines that it possesses a certain implied power 
and, in accordance with it, adopts a legal act, which will be challenged in the Court, does para. 
42 allow the Court to confirm the existence of such a competence? On the one hand, the words 
‘expressly provided’ competence refer to the powers written in the Treaty, while implied 
powers are not written, but flow from the written ones. On the other hand, Point 42 talks about 
Court ‘vesting’ powers. As I have established, the Court does not ‘vest’ implied powers. The 
only convincing way to interpret this provision as restricting implied powers is when implied 
                                                 
649 Para.42 Statute of EAEU Court (emphasis added). 
650 The wording in the Belarusian text of the Treaty is closer to this meaning as well. 
651 Section XXVIII Final Provisions, TEAEU. 
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powers are understood in a wide sense, i.e. the implied powers flowing not from the 
competence expressly provided in the Treaty and other acts, but flowing directly from the 
objectives, as the ICJ interpreted it in some of its rulings. In this case the interpretation of the 
Court can be indeed considered as ‘vesting additional competence’, since the powers will 
transcend the express powers towards objectives. 
Even so, this will only be possible in the case where the issue is considered by the 
Court. In this case the Court can follow para. 42 and, in principle, deny a competence not 
explicitly provided in the Treaty. In other cases, in particular, when an act is already adopted 
on the basis of implied powers and is being challenged in the Court, the review will be 
essentially done over the issue of whether or not an act was adopted ultra vires.652 As the ICJ 
practice shows, even the wide understanding of implied powers doctrine is not necessarily 
ultra vires. In this case the ruling by the Court against ultra vires of an act adopted under 
implied powers will not be in violation of Point 42 as it will not be the Court vesting the 
competence, but the respective EAEU institution will ‘vest’ itself with a competence. 
However, here I return to the poor choice of wording (‘vesting’), as implied powers are not 
‘vested’ in the first place, and courts do not ‘vest’ powers, but rather interpret existing ones. 
In any event, this provision is only available in the Statute of the Court and is addressed 
only to the Court. There are no similar provisions in the TEAEU, and the only relevant 
provision is the one stipulating that the EAEU institutions ‘shall act within the powers 
accorded to them by this Treaty and international agreements within the Union’. 653 Following 
the implied powers doctrine analysed above, this provision can be interpreted as allowing the 
EAEU institutions to act upon implied powers if necessary, and, if such actions are not 
challenged in the Court, the implied powers will exist. 
In case there was a need to limit implied powers, the wording must have been included 
in the main body of the TEAEU, not in the Statute of the Court, and must have been similar 
to the following: 
The Union possesses only the competence expressly provided for in the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union. 
This would be a complete prohibition of the implied powers. The currently available 
provision is far from prohibiting implied powers and it is not able to prevent the establishment 
                                                 
652 There are other possible issues that could be under review, such as détournement de pouvoir along the lines 
of French administrative law, but also applicable to international organizations. On this and other issues see 
Sarooshi, International organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers, 108-09. 
653 Art.8(2) TEAEU. 
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of implied powers on its own. The question is rather what kind of approach towards implied 
powers is possible within its scope. In order to identify a possible approach, we must find 
whether this provision fits any of the interpretations of the implied powers identified in the 
previous sections. In Table 4 a set of approaches to implied powers are identified on the basis 
of the history of development of implied powers doctrine. 
Name Substance Application 
Seyerstedian approach Expansive approach, 
creation of powers unless 
directly prohibited 
Theoretical concept, no 
practical implementation 
occurred 
Teleological approach Implied powers derived 
from objectives 
UN, EU (Article 352 TFEU; 
Article 216(1) ‘necessary 
clause’) 
Hamiltonian (Hamilton-
Marshall) approach 
Balanced approach, implied 
powers derived from 
express powers 
US, EU (internal 
competence, effet utile; 
Article 216(1) and Article 
3(2) ‘common rules clause’; 
Article 3(2) TFEU 
‘parallelism clause’) 
Jeffersonian approach Restrictive approach, 
implied powers as 
‘indispensability’ 
Theoretical concept, 
influence at certain stages of 
development of the implied 
powers in the US, UN and 
the EU 
Table 4 Approaches to implied powers 
There are both common and differentiating features in all of the approaches. It is 
common to all of them that both express and implied powers exist, but the latter may never go 
beyond objectives of a relevant entity. The differences are in the provisions from which 
implied powers are derived and the way it is done. Thus, implied powers can be derived either 
from express powers or directly from objectives using either effect utile logic or 
‘indispensability’ of certain powers. 
It must be admitted that the widest, teleological, concept of implied powers was 
developed within the UN. This is in a way counterintuitive, given the fact that the UN is a 
looser legal order than the US and the EU. The possible explanation for that is, first, the 
different nature, essence and objectives of a state as compared to an international organization; 
and, in case of the EU, the availability of a tool which achieves the relevant purpose: the 
flexibility clause, which takes the place of the wide interpretation of implied powers. Thus, 
the EU has adopted the teleological approach normatively via inclusion of Article 235 in the 
EEC Treaty from the beginning, which allowed for vesting new powers deriving them from 
the objectives without a direct link to the express powers as provided in the founding treaties. 
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There seems to be no place for such a teleological approach to implied powers in the EAEU 
given the absence of a flexibility clause. Clear conferred powers principle coupled with other 
TEAEU provisions makes deriving them from objectives extremely hard. This essentially 
limits deriving implied powers from express powers. Given an even wider scope, this makes 
it impossible for the EAEU to take the Seyerstedian approach, which in fact has not seen 
practical implementation in international law to date. 
This leaves the narrower Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian approaches open for 
consideration, with their major differences being the scope of the implied powers. These 
approaches to implied powers do not fall outside the limits of conferred powers set out in 
Article 8(2) TEAEU, as they claim that implied powers are conferred together with express 
powers. Following these two approaches, implied powers must be compatible with the 
attributed character of powers and should not exist on their own but must be part of express 
powers. This does not fall beyond the conditions set out in the TEAEU provisions. 
These two approaches can be used for both internal and external implied powers. 
However, the external competence has a separate provision in the TEAEU. The Regulation of 
the Commission provides that the Supreme Council ‘may vest into the Commission the power 
to sign international agreements on matters within the competence of the Commission’.654 
This provision has a direct bearing on the possibility for implied powers in the external 
relations. On the one hand, it resembles the parallelism approach, and effectually replaces it. 
However, the provision is not strict (‘may vest’) and is narrow (concerns only signing 
agreements). Therefore, it does not effectively preclude either the parallelism approach or the 
Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian approaches towards external competence. 
In order to limit the speculations, a better formulation regarding implied powers could 
be made in the TEAEU: 
The Union possesses only the competence expressly provided for in the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union, as well as the competence 
necessary to effectively carry out the express competence and which does not 
go beyond its limits. 
This provision limits the implied powers only with the tools necessary to effectively 
carry out the express competence. 
                                                 
654 Para.6 Regulation on the Commission. 
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4.9 Intermediate conclusions 
The EAEU is founded on the principle of attributed competences, which is common in 
the law of international organizations. Although the TEAEU does not single out attributed 
competences as a separate principle, it follows from a number of its provisions. However, the 
system of EAEU competences does not provide for a precise classification, which makes it 
difficult to identify the exact character of competences of the EAEU institutions in particular 
fields. 
The TEAEU drafters made an attempt to pre-empt finding of implied powers, which 
does not correspond to international practice of functioning of international organizations and 
stands on the way of legal order autonomy and, more generally, can be harmful to effective 
functioning of the EAEU. The drafters could not have foreseen all the possible ways of 
development. The concept of implied powers allows to avoid this. Precisely the implied 
powers doctrine has played an instrumental role in the dynamic development of the entities 
analysed in the chapter. 
There seems to be a fear that the Court would encroach on Member States’ powers. 
The analysis conducted above shows that this fear is unfounded, if a balanced doctrine is 
adopted. Neither scholarship nor case law makes a clear distinction between the principles of 
attributed powers and the implied powers doctrine. In my view there is no need to do so and 
in fact it should not be done. The basic sense of the implied powers is that they do not exist by 
themselves. The implied powers doctrine should fit the attributed character of competences. 
International practice and doctrine shows that implied powers are not provided separately by 
the courts, which is a misconception on the part of the TEAEU drafters, but form part of 
expressly attributed powers. As we saw earlier, starting as of Hamilton and further on, powers 
can be attributed both expressly and by implication. The institutions can exercise such powers, 
while the judiciary can either confirm or deny their existence through treaty interpretation. 
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5 Law of the Union and autonomy 
‘… we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding.’ 
Chief Justice John Marshall655 
 
5.1 Sources of EAEU law 
The EAEU legal order, as a totality of legal rules regulating this community and a unity 
thereof, is referred by the TEAEU to as the ‘law of the Union’. The Treaty does not provide 
for a definition, but according to Article 6 it consists of the following sources: 
1. The EAEU Treaty itself; 
2. International agreements within the EAEU framework; 
3. International agreements of the EAEU with third parties; 
4. Decisions and orders of the EAEU institutions. 
However, although this article and the Treaty as a whole do not refer to other sources 
of law, it is important to note, that the Statute of the EAEU Court, which lists sources of 
applicable law for the purposes of administration of justice, contains a wider list of sources. 
In addition to those sources of law unique to the EAEU, it adds such sources of international 
law as: 
5. Generally recognized principles and regulations of international law; 
6. International agreements, to which the states that are parties to the dispute are 
participants; 
7. International custom as evidence of the general practice accepted as a legal norm.656 
This additional list of sources corresponds to a widely accepted list of sources 
established in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.657 Interestingly 
enough, it avoids the last point of the enumeration of sources: “judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determinations of rules of law”. Some international legal scholars indeed separate the 
last point by giving it the role of verifying the rules, rather than establishing them.658 However, 
                                                 
655 McCulloch v. Maryland, at 407. 
656 Para.50 Statute of EAEU Court. 
657 E.g. Shaw, International Law, 70-71; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 5; M.O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice : a treatise 
(New York: Macmillan, 1934), 601 ff. 
658 See e.g. Georg Schwarzenberger, International law, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1957), 26-27. 
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others rightly point out that such a distinction is often hard to make, given the fact that, for 
instance, ICJ judgments may create law in the process of interpreting existing law.659 This 
point is important to the general discussion of the powers of the EAEU Court in Chapter 6, 
and, in particular, regarding the provision of the Statute of the Court that limits the Court’s 
powers to create new rules, and regarding the effect of the Court’s judgments. 
As has been underlined in the introduction to this research, the EAEU Court actively 
cites case law of other courts, in particular the ECJ. It has underlined that 
‘legal position and case law of other courts can be taken into account when 
deciding analogous issues, which corresponds to the principle of persuasive 
precedent, according to which certain judicial decisions and points of view 
expressed therein do not create precedent on their own, but are taken into 
account when issuing future judicial decisions.’660 
Essentially, it integrates sources of international public law into the EAEU legal order, 
although not formally making them part of the ‘law of the Union’. This makes it possible to 
distinguish sources of law unique to the EAEU, and other sources, equally applicable within 
the EAEU legal order. As a certain hierarchy between legal rules is part of the concept of the 
legal order, as discussed in Chapter 1, practical application of such rules without clearly 
established hierarchies can be complex. This will be addressed later in the chapter with regard 
to the legal force of the rules. 
5.1.1 Sources of law internal to EAEU 
This group essentially consists of international agreements and acts of institutions. 
There are three types of international agreements in the EAEU: the founding Treaty, or 
TEAEU; international agreements within the Union; and international agreements of the 
Union with a third party. International agreements within the Union are those, which are 
concluded “between Member States on issues related to the functioning and development of 
the Union”.661 Therefore, such agreements have a limited scope of participants as well as a 
specific subject-matter. The major agreement within this category is the EAEU Customs 
Code.662 However, in practice, the definition provided is not all-encompassing. The Treaty 
stipulates that international agreements of member states concluded in the establishment of 
the legal framework of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space and effective 
on the date of entry of the TEAEU into force form part of this group as well and apply to the 
                                                 
659 See e.g. Shaw, International Law, 71. 
660 Case SE-1-2/2-15-KS, Tarasik v Commission (28 December 2015). 
661 Art.2 TEAEU. 
662 Dogovor o Tamozhennom kodekse Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza. 11 April 2017. 
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extent not inconsistent with the TEAEU.663 Thus, the number of applicable agreements of this 
kind is larger. Further, there is a specific provision that international agreements within the 
Union must be consistent with the WTO Agreement when drafted.664 
International agreements of the Union with a third party are concluded “with third 
countries, integration associations thereof and international organisations”.665 However, it is 
not specified whether only the EAEU concludes such agreements, or member states also, or 
member states and the EAEU concurrently, i.e. mixed agreements. The practice of mixed 
agreements involves agreements concluded by the EAEU and member states on the one side 
and a third party on the other side. It must be noted that this type of agreements is characteristic 
to the EU.666 The ECJ defines them as agreements ‘signed and concluded both by the European 
Union and by each of its Member States’,667 although it is a little more complex than that. 
Such agreements exist due to a division of competence between the organization and its 
member states.668 The agreements include provisions relating to both the competence of the 
organization, and to the competence of member states. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude 
such an agreement without the participation of all competent parties. Given the existing 
divisions of competences in the EAEU, ‘international agreements of the Union with a third 
party’ must be interpreted as including mixed agreements. The EU practice shows that ‘pure’ 
EU international agreements are rather exceptional.669 The EAEU practice also favours this 
interpretation: for example, the free trade agreement with Vietnam has been concluded as a 
mixed agreement.670 Therefore, a more complete, albeit not obligatory,671 formulation would 
be as follows: ‘international agreements of the Union with a third party and international 
agreements of the Union and its Member States with a third party’. As the EU’s practice shows, 
mixed agreements bring a number of complexities, including those which concern division of 
competences and the jurisdiction of the judiciary, which might occur in practice.672 
                                                 
663 Art.99(1) TEAEU. 
664 Art.2(4) Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the framework of the Multilateral Trading 
System. 
665 Art.2 TEAEU. 
666 E.g. C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos, Mixed agreements revisited: the EU and its member states in the world, 
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669 Eeckhout, EU external relations law, 212. 
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672 E.g. Tobias Lock, The European Court of Justice and international courts, International courts and tribunals 
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An additional kind of international agreements are accession agreements. Such 
agreements outline the scope of legal rights and obligation of the candidate state, as well as 
the format of its participation in the work of the Union institutions.673 Such an agreement is 
signed by Member States and the candidate state based on the decision of the Supreme 
Council.674 Similarly as in the case of accession treaties in the EU, the Union does not become 
a party to the agreement. When Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU, they concluded 
such agreements, which stipulate that these countries accede to the TEAEU and other 
international agreements adopted within the framework of the formation of the legal basis of 
the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, that form part of the law of the Union.675 It 
is stipulated in both accession agreements that they form part of Union law.676 Structurally, 
such agreements are somewhat similar to those concluded by the EU with candidate countries 
in the sense that they regulate the details of transitional periods, specific commitments, etc.677 
In the EU the accession treaties from part of primary law.678 It should be no different for the 
EAEU, and accession agreements must become part of primary law along with the TEAEU 
given the fact that such agreements amend the TEAEU. 
Among the acts which the EAEU institutions adopt there are decisions, dispositions 
and recommendations. The latter, however, not being obligatory, do not form part of the law 
of the Union. Certain kinds of decisions are reminiscent of EU regulations as defined in Article 
288 TFEU as having general application and binding in their entirety and directly applicable 
in all member states, albeit with the specifics spelled out further in the chapter. Other kinds of 
decisions are closer to EU decisions as they may specify those to whom they are addressed 
and are binding only on them. Finally, among the aforementioned EAEU acts, there are no 
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acts that would be similar to EU directives, which are binding as to the result to be achieved, 
leaving to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
The Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council adopt only decisions and 
dispositions,679 where the former are regulatory acts, while the latter—organisational and 
administrative acts.680 In addition, decisions of the predecessors of these institutions (i.e., as 
explored in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, these are the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council at the 
level of heads of states and Supreme Eurasian Economic Council at the level of heads of 
governments respectively) effective on the date of entry into force of the TEAEU remain in 
force and shall be applied to the extent not inconsistent with the Treaty.681 Dragneva refers to 
the decisions of these institutions as “firmly grounded in international law”.682 According to 
her, this is the result of a compromise during the negotiations, where another attempt to 
provide for directly binding acts of the Councils failed in favour of a strict intergovernmental 
solution. Therefore, the effect of such decisions in national legal orders is determined by the 
status granted to international law.683 This is a plausible interpretation as, indeed the TEAEU 
does not mandate the effect and legal force of decisions of these institutions in the same way 
as it does for the Commission. 
The Commission, on the other hand, adopts all three types of acts.684 And it is the only 
institution that is described as a body adopting decisions “with regulatory and binding effect 
for the Member State” which form “part of the Union law and shall be directly applicable on 
[their] territories”,685 which will be explored further. For now, it must be noted that there is no 
direct applicability envisaged for decisions of the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental 
Council, as the way they are to be applied is left for national procedures of member states.686  
5.1.2 Sources of law external to EAEU 
Sources of law external to the EAEU are those outside of the EAEU decision-making 
framework, but are mentioned as applicable law in the Statute of the EAEU Court. Among 
those of particular importance are international agreements concluded by the Member States, 
which are, however, not referred to in the TEAEU. Such agreements can be adopted by the 
Member States prior to joining the EAEU or afterwards. In the latter case, the TEAEU does 
                                                 
679 Art.13 and 17 TEAEU. 
680 Art.2 TEAEU. 
681 Art.99(2) TEAEU. 
682 Dragneva, "The Eurasian Economic Union: balancing sovereignty and integration," 60. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Art.8(2) TEAEU; Para.13 Regulation on the Commission. 
685 Para.13 Regulation on the Commission. 
686 Art.6(1) TEAEU. 
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not prohibit the Member States concluding international agreements, which are not 
inconsistent with the objectives and principles of the TEAEU.687 Further, agreements between 
the Member States envisaging deeper integration or stipulating any additional benefits for their 
natural and/or legal persons shall be applied in the relations between the contracting states and 
may be concluded only provided that they do not affect their rights and obligations and rights 
and obligations of other Member States.688 
However, there are no clear provisions in the Treaty regarding the agreements 
concluded by member states prior to accession to the EAEU. Problems can ensue in case of 
contradictions of their norms with the norms of Union law. It becomes more complex by the 
fact that such agreements have an interested party, which is not a member of the EAEU. 
Therefore, the EAEU legal order does not extend to such a party. It must be mentioned, that 
EU law provides the following solution: if such agreements were concluded before 1 January 
1958 (for the founding member states of the European Economic Community) or, for acceding 
states, before the date of their accession, between one or more member states on the one hand, 
and one or more third countries on the other, the arising rights and obligations are not affected 
by the TEU and TFEU.689 However, no obligations arise for the EU in this case either. At the 
same time, to the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the TEU and TFEU, 
member states must take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established up 
to the termination of such agreements. There is considerable ECJ case law in applying these 
provisions, 690  which shows that issues related to international agreements concluded by 
member states prior to accession can be complex, and the agreements themselves can have 
different degrees of normative status in EU law.691 
Two motivations could be identified behind these rules. First, these provisions reflect 
Article 34 of the VCLT,692 according to which a treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third state without its consent. They were introduced into EU law in order to avoid 
                                                 
687 Art.114(1) TEAEU. 
688 Art.114(2) TEAEU. 
689 Art.351 TFEU. 
690 Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant); Case C-466/98, Commission v UK, EU:C:2002:624 (5 
November 2002); Case C-467/98, Commission v Denmark, EU:C:2002:625 (5 November 2002); Case C-
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691 See e.g. A. Rosas, "The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States," 
Fordham International Law Journal 34, no. 5 (2011). 
692 P.J. Kuijper et al., The law of EU external relations: cases, materials, and commentary on the EU as an 
international legal actor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1041. 
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open conflict between obligations arising from EU law with obligations arising from public 
international law. Such provisions allow EU member states to temporarily suspend application 
of the totality of EU law, including the founding treaties, in favour of such agreements. It is 
necessary in order to avoid international responsibility. 
However, second, integrity of EU law must be preserved, and therefore such 
incompatibility must be eliminated as soon as possible, and it is virtually impossible to 
constantly invoke such incompatibility. In practice, such issues did arise, which has led to a 
number of judicial proceedings.693 Odermatt argues that in these cases the ECJ applies the 
concept of autonomy in order to avoid legal order being undermined by rules outside of it.694 
The issue whether to accept international agreements which do not fall neither under 
the category of an ‘international treaty within the Union’ nor a ‘treaty between the Union and 
a third party’ as sources of EAEU law has been dealt with by the EAEU Court. Based on the 
EU case law,695 the EAEU Court found that checking the compliance of an international 
agreement to the criteria of all member states being a party thereto and conferral of respective 
competences to the supranational level, is an established international practice in considering 
such an agreement binding on the organization.696 Essentially, the Court has concluded that 
the EAEU is bound by an international agreement if two conditions are met: 1) all Member 
States are parties to such international agreement; 2) the agreement pertains to the field of 
EAEU common policy. Thus, in the General Freight case the Court ruled that the agreement 
in question ‘shall be applied along with Union law to regulate the customs and tariff relations 
within the EAEU.’697 
5.2 WTO law 
WTO law plays a special role in the EAEU legal order, albeit not all Member States 
have joined the WTO and EAEU itself is not party to WTO agreements. The initial plan back 
in 2009 was for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia to join the WTO as the Customs Union.698 
                                                 
693 Case 10/61, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1962:2 (27 February 1962); Case C-84/98, Commission v Portugal, 
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However, they rather opted for special arrangements to accommodate WTO law, which are 
now part of EAEU law. 
Annex 31 to the TEAEU attaches the Protocol on the Functioning of the EAEU within 
the Multilateral Trading System to the TEAEU.699 It refers to the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the Customs Union within the Multilateral Trading System concluded on 19 May 2011700 
essentially extending its validity and introducing it into the EAEU legal framework. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union within the Multilateral Trading 
System (hereinafter ‘Multilateral Trading System Agreement’) was adopted to accommodate 
accession of the Customs Union member states into the WTO. Primarily, this concerned 
Russia, who was to accede first, which eventually happened on 22 August 2012.701 
Article 1(1) of the Multilateral Trading System Agreement goes as follows: 
‘From the date of accession of any of the Parties to the WTO, the provisions of 
the WTO Agreement as set out in its Protocol of Accession, including the 
commitments undertaken by this Party as part of the terms of its accession to 
the WTO, which relate to matters that the Parties have authorized Customs 
Union Bodies to regulate in the framework of the Customs Union, as well as 
the legal relationships, regulated by the international agreements, constituting 
the legal framework of the Customs Union, shall become a part of the legal 
framework of the Customs Union.’702 
Thus, the WTO Agreement is part of the law of the Union in part, which is covered by 
the exclusive competence of the EAEU, on the conditions of the first Member State acceding 
to the WTO, meaning Russia. Further, upon accession of other Member States to the WTO, 
their obligations also become part of Union law. 
This means that even Member States that are not part of the WTO are bound by WTO 
legal norms. Although, there are caveats. Thus, Member States who are not part of the WTO 
are allowed to deviate from WTO law, to the extent that (1) Union law is required to be 
adjusted and/or (2) national legal order autonomously regulates the matter in hand. To take 
advantage of this exception, a Member State must notify the Commission of the nature and 
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extent of such deviations. Such exceptions cease to exist upon accession of such a Member 
State to the WTO, unless it is expressly provided for by the terms of accession to the WTO.703 
What is striking, is that WTO law has priority over Union law until the latter is 
amended to comply with the former.704 This rule has been confirmed in the case law of the 
EURASEC Court. In the case Novokramatorsky zavod, the EURASEC Court, on the one hand 
stated that international agreements, concluded within the Customs Union are lex specialis to 
the agreements, concluded within the WTO, as they regulate the relations exclusively within 
the Customs Union.705 On the other hand, in the case of conflict of the WTO agreements with 
agreements adopted within the Customs Union, as well as with decisions of Customs Union 
institutions, WTO agreements prevail. This language is rather strong and provides for priority 
of WTO law over Customs Union law. Given that the Multilateral Trading System Agreement 
is in force for the EAEU706 and this judgment is valid for the EAEU as well,707 priority of 
WTO law over Union law remains the case. 
Further, the rights and obligations of the Member States stemming from WTO law 
cannot be abrogated or limited by Commission decisions, and international agreements within 
the Union or by the EAEU Court.708  
It is hard to compare this situation to that of the interrelations of EU law and WTO 
law.  The reason for that is because the EU itself and all of its member states are part of the 
WTO, and general EU rules apply, meaning that it is an integral part of the EU legal order and 
binding upon them.709 Otherwise, if neither the EU nor all of its member states were party to 
an international agreement, the EU would not have been bound by it.710 Nevertheless, the ECJ 
ruled broadly on the possibility for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter 
‘GATT’) (later—other WTO agreements) provisions to be invoked before the ECJ challenging 
EU legislation,711 developing certain conditions for such possibility: 1) intention of the EU to 
implement a particular WTO obligation; and 2) the measure that is being challenged expressly 
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refers to a particular WTO provision.712 However, even these rules were not always followed, 
and the ECJ has been known for narrowing them down.713 Nevertheless, in some cases the 
ECJ applied the rule of harmonious interpretation (i.e. interpretation of EU law in light of 
international agreements).714 
It is therefore clear that WTO law plays a more significant role in the EAEU legal 
order. Not only it is the applicable law within the Union, which is not part of the WTO, but 
also in a Member State that is not part of the organization (Belarus). Despite that, WTO law 
is not only binding, it also has primacy over Union law. This can have profound complications 
for a possible autonomy of the legal order, since such a carte blanche undermines its very 
essence.  
5.3 Effect and legal force of EAEU law 
The key characteristic of any legal order is the legal force of its legal acts. The major 
innovation within the law of the EAEU is the principle of direct applicability.715 In a majority 
of past cases, the acts had to be implemented using national procedures in order to have some 
legal effect. Currently, certain acts do not require any procedures for implementation, so in 
theory, they become part of national law immediately. However, the Treaty explicitly gives 
such effect only to Commission decisions, while the effect of other sources of EAEU law, 
which are mentioned above, is unclear. 
An ensuing issue is the hierarchies of norms. Although the TEAEU explicitly 
establishes some hierarchies, they are not entirely clear in addition to the fact that some legal 
sources are not listed. It is clear that the sources that have been uncovered in this chapter do 
not yet have a place in the hierarchy. It is, however, not clear why others are omitted, e.g. the 
established hierarchy does not include international agreements of the EAEU with a third 
party. 
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5.3.1 Internal hierarchy of sources of EAEU law 
The TEAEU establishes that it possesses the highest legal force.716 It is followed by 
international agreements with the EAEU and, further, by decisions and dispositions of the 
EAEU institutions. 717  Decisions of the Supreme Council prevail over decisions of the 
Intergovernmental Council and the Commission, while decisions of the Intergovernmental 
Council—over Commission decisions.718 However, there are a number of issues which were 
left unsettled. Thus, there are no provisions on the legal force of international agreements 
between the EAEU and a third party. The Treaty only provides that international agreements 
of the Union with a third party shall not contradict the basic objectives, principles and rules of 
the functioning of the Union.719 It can be deduced that such agreements are lower than the 
TEAEU. 
As far as the relations of the norms of international agreements within the Union and 
norms of international agreements of the Union with a third party are concerned, the situation 
is less clear. On the one hand, since the compliance of agreements concluded within the EAEU 
can only be assessed vis-à-vis the TEAEU and not vis-à-vis international agreements with 
third parties,720 it can be argued that there is no hierarchy between EAEU agreements with 
third parties and international agreements within the Union.721 However, it must be added to 
this matter that there is no mechanism of ensuring judicial control over the compliance of 
international agreements with third parties with the EAEU Treaty.722 This is different from the 
EU where not only international agreements can be reviewed by the ECJ ex ante through an 
advisory opinion function upon request of member states, the European Parliament, the 
Council or the Commission and binding effect,723 but also ex post by challenging the Council 
decision for concluding the agreement within the action for annulment.724 
On the other hand, EAEU agreements with third parties are listed third, right after the 
international agreements within the Union, in the list of EAEU law sources in Article 6 
TEAEU. In international law there is also a numbered listing of sources in Article 38(1) of the 
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ICJ Statute. While there is controversy about whether the numbering indicates the hierarchy, 
there is a leaning towards such a claim.725  
As has been mentioned before, there is no direct applicability envisaged for decisions 
of the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council, as the way they are to be applied 
is left to national procedures of member states. This indeterminacy regarding the decisions 
and dispositions of these institutions can have a negative effect on their implementation. It can 
be argued that in the case where legal force and obligatory nature of a body of an international 
organization is not defined, the common rule is that such a decision has recommendatory 
character.726 This argument has its support.727 However, such interpretation cannot be easily 
extended to Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council decisions. First, Article 6(1) 
TEAEU provides that such acts “shall be enforceable by the Member States”. Second, 
according to Article 6(4) TEAEU, they prevail over Commission decisions, which, in their 
turn, are directly applicable on the territories of member states.728 At the same time, for an 
integration entity where cooperation of states is on a higher level, and the degree of 
interrelation of states is on a qualitatively different level, an accurate stipulation of legal force 
of decisions adopted by respective institutions is a necessary condition, since absence of such 
stipulation influences implementation of such decisions, complicates the work of law 
enforcement and, correspondingly, negatively affects the efficiency of functioning of the entity. 
5.3.2 Effect and legal force of Union law in national legal orders 
5.3.2.1 Effect and legal force of EU law 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, direct effect is one of the main features of the autonomous 
legal order of the EU.729 The essence of direct effect is that legal norms, which are sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional (i.e. don’t require further implementing measures by 
institutions or member states) are regarded as the law of the land in the member states in the 
application of EU law. This principle has been developing through the case law of the ECJ 
                                                 
725 E.g. Shaw, International Law, 123; Study Group of the International Law Commission (Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi), "Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law," 47. 
726 Kashirkina and Morozov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovye modeli Evropeiskogo soiuza i Tamozhennogo soiuza: 
sravnitelnyi analiz, 150. 
727 E.g. Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law, 823; Klabbers, An introduction to 
international institutional law, 182. 
728 Para.13 Regulation on the Commission. 
729 Differences between direct effect and direct applicability are omitted since this goes beyond the scope of 
this contribution. See e.g. T. Eilmansberger, "The relationship between rights and remedies in EC law: In 
search of the missing link," Common Market Law Review 41, no. 5 (2004); J. A. Winter, "Direct Applicability 
and Direct Effect Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law," ibid.9, no. 4 (1972); Craig and De 
Búrca, EU law : text, cases, and materials, 105. 
  
143 
starting with provisions of the Treaties730 and expanding to other sources of EU law. This has 
led to different kinds of direct effect with particular conditions and scope thereof. Thus, Treaty 
provisions have been confirmed to have direct effect in key sphere of EU law. Particular focus 
of the ECJ has been on direct effect of directives as one of the most complex issues, and where 
the Luxembourg Court has developed the standard formula for a provision to be directly 
effective,731 and differentiations of various types of legal relationships. Importantly, unlike 
Treaty provisions, which are seemingly capable of having both vertical (in relations between 
individuals and the country) and horizontal (in relations between individuals) direct effect,732 
directives are normally precluded from having the latter.733  Similarly with EU decisions, 
which are also limited to vertical situations.734 
Even though there is no single view on the issue,735 a distinction is sometimes made 
between direct effect and direct applicability, which is from the outset important in the case 
of EU regulations. Regulations are the only acts that are explicitly provided in the treaties as 
directly applicable,736 meaning that they do not need national measures of incorporation.737 In 
principle, being directly applicable can in parallel also mean they can be relied on by 
individuals in national courts, i.e. being directly effective.738 Indeed, the Luxembourg Court 
initially equated the terms.739 However, this is not necessarily so as not all provisions of 
regulations confer rights on individuals that they can rely on in national judiciary. The relevant 
provisions would still require to satisfy the direct effect criteria developed by the ECJ (clear 
and unconditional and of requiring no further legislative action for implementation).740 Thus, 
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the notion of direct applicability is binding upon all those who fall under its scope of 
application, be it a member state or individual. 741  Further, direct applicability is not a 
precondition for direct effect, as e.g. directives, while not directly applicable, as has been 
shown above, can be in certain cases relied on by individuals in national courts, notably in 
conflict with government authorities,742 as explained above. 
International agreements of the EU and general principles of EU law743 also can have 
directly effective provisions according to the ECJ.744 However, WTO agreements are a special 
case, since according to the ECJ they do not confer individual rights.745 
The important essence of direct effect as such is that individuals can directly invoke 
such norms in national courts. The courts, in their turn, are obliged to apply such norms as if 
they were adopted by domestic legislative bodies. The effect of this doctrine is far-reaching. 
The ECJ has changed the typical public international law presumption, where international 
legal obligations were addressed to member states. In international public law, even when an 
international obligation, such as an international trade agreement or a human rights instrument, 
gives rights to individuals, when a state for some reason does not provide for such a right, the 
individual would not be capable of invoking international legal obligations in a domestic court, 
unless domestic law provided for it. Therefore, in public international law legal obligations 
are typically aiming at the results and are addressed to states, and the national constitutional 
legal order determines the method and degree to which such international obligations can have 
effect for individuals within the respective state.746 It means that individuals cannot invoke an 
international obligation of a state in domestic courts except for the cases where national law 
provides for such a legal remedy. A typical means of legal remedy in international public law 
in such a case is an interstate dispute. The EU has conceptually changed the situation and the 
approach taken by a member state towards international law does not change this, and both 
monist and dualist countries must equally apply such norms. Therefore, upon violations of 
obligations within the EU, member states are no longer capable of putting a dispute on an 
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2006), 185-87. 
742 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v Home Office. 
743 Case C-144/04, Mangold, EU:C:2005:709 (22 November 2005); Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, 
EU:C:2010:21 (19 January 2010); Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri, EU:C:2016:278 (19 April 2016). 
744 However, for the limitations of such effect see A. Semertzi, "The preclusion of direct effect in the recently 
concluded EU free trade agreements," Common Market Law Review 51, no. 4 (2014). 
745 Starting with Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company, paras. 14-18. For the discussion of invoking 
WTO agreements before the CJEU to challenge EU legislation see Section 5.3. 
746 The Dutch and Belgian governments in the Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos. case precisely referred to this 
line of reasoning based upon national constitutional law. 
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interstate level or the EU level. They face suits from individuals before their own courts within 
their own legal order.747 
The principle of direct effect acquires full effect when applied together with primacy, 
which is another major feature of autonomy. 748  Regardless the absence of the explicit 
provisions on the primacy of EU law in the founding treaties, the ECJ developed the notion in 
its case law: in the field of application of EU law, any EU legal rule sets aside a contradicting 
rule of national law regardless the time of its adoption. As for the field of application of EU 
law, the ECJ possesses the kompetenz-kompetenz, i.e. it identifies which norms fall under the 
field of EU law application, essentially meaning the limits of EU competences.749 
The importance of linking primacy and direct effect lies in the following. Normally, 
even in monist states where provisions of international agreements, including self-executable 
agreements, can automatically have effect in national law, their status equals to national law. 
Thus, the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori applies. On the contrary, in the EU, due to the 
doctrine of primacy, an EU legal rule, which, in accordance with the principle of direct effect, 
must be regarded as the law of the land, will have priority even in such circumstances. This 
feature makes the legal rule lex posterior derogat anterior inapplicable in cases where national 
legal norms do not comply with respective norms of EU law. Regardless of the time of its 
adoption, EU law prevails.750 
The two principles are linked in terms of effectiveness—both acquire higher 
effectiveness when applied together in order for a directly applicable provision not to be 
overruled by national law in accordance with the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori. 
However, they can also exist separately, albeit with ensuing limitations.  
International public law shares the notions of primacy and direct effect to a certain 
degree.751 However, the EU phenomenon lies in the quantitative changes of such a degree 
where they transform into qualitative ones. Direct effect can exist in international law, 
however it is realized to such a small extent that it must be considered as an exception, which 
confirms the general rule of its absence. Direct effect in the EU is a presumption. However, 
                                                 
747 Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 2414. 
748 First established in the EU by the ECJ in Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL. However, it was preceded by the case 
under the ECSC Treaty, see Case 6/60, Humblet, EU:C:1960:48 (16 December 1960), 569.  
749 Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 255. The term kompetenz-kompetenz is borrowed from 
German following the Maastricht decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 October 1993, reported in 
English as Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
750 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL. 
751 See A.V. Barbuk, "Neposredstvennoe primenenie norm mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov v natsional'nykh 
pravovykh sistemakh" (BSU, 2006). 
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the main difference is in the effectiveness of primacy in international public law and EU law. 
The system of horizontal enforcement in international aw, which is usually realized through 
the principle of state responsibility, reciprocity and countermeasures, makes primacy rare and 
very different from constitutional legal orders of states with centralized monopolies on 
enforcement. The judicial system and ensuring fulfilment of obligations under EU law differs 
the EU legal order from classical public international law. 
5.3.2.2 Effect and legal force of EAEU law 
In contrast to these features of EU law, the effect of EAEU law within the national 
legal orders of Member States is unclear. The EAEU Treaty does not specify the relation of 
legal force between Union acts and national legislation. This in itself is not exceptional or 
problematic, since, e.g. the EU Treaties did not historically specify it in legally binding terms 
either, apart from the Declarations concerning primacy adopted with the Treaty of Lisbon (no. 
17), which reiterates the well settled ECJ case law. Therefore it is primarily the EAEU Court’s 
job to outline the details of effect and legal force of EAEU law. 
The regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission provides that decisions of the 
Commission are binding on Member States.752  However, there is nothing on primacy of 
Commission decisions over national law. To compare, one of the drafts of the EAEU Treaty 
had the following provision: 
‘. . . legal acts of the Union shall be binding, shall have direct applicability on 
the territories of Member States, and shall have priority over the legislation of 
Member States.’753 
Therefore, the drafters of the final version of the EAEU Treaty did not only decide to 
limit themselves to the binding nature of the Commission decisions instead of all EAEU legal 
acts, but also have decided to exclude the notion of priority over national law. This means the 
final EAEU provisions are limited to the binding character and direct applicability of certain 
acts, but their legal consequences are not described. This means that priority (or primacy) is 
not regulated by the Treaty. 
In the Kaliningrad transit case the Court both reinforced the principle of direct 
applicability as well as spelled out the priority of certain provisions of Union law.754 The Court 
stated that one of the agreements applicable in this case, and which was part of Union law, 
                                                 
752 Para.13(1) Regulation on the Commission. 
753 Draft Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, http://kazenergy.com/ru/2012-09-05-04-11-04/2011-05-13-
18-20-44/10777-2013-09-10-07-03-15.html. 
754 Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit) (21 February 2017). 
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was directly applicable and had priority in customs control. In essence this means that Member 
States have to follow this particular agreement setting aside national rules, which contradict 
it. The Court justified it by stating that provisions of the relevant agreement have an imperative 
character, do not have exclusions and references. According to the Court, Member States’ 
actions beyond the requirements of Union customs rules and broad interpretation of their rights 
are not compatible with the principles of functioning of the customs union and violate the 
freedom of movement of goods.755 The use of this kind of logic and reasoning by the Court 
approaches closely the recognition of direct effect of these provisions as such, i.e. the 
possibility for individuals to invoke these provisions in national courts. 
In its Vertical Agreements advisory opinion (described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3) the 
Court extended this logic regarding direct applicability to competition law provisions.756 
Based on the fact that competition policy on cross border markets is the exclusive competence 
of the EAEU, general competition rules are directly applicable. However, as mentioned above, 
direct applicability can be different from direct effect. To reiterate, in the case distinction is 
made, direct effect is understood as an ability of an individual to acquire rights and obligations 
from corresponding legal rules, while direct applicability is operation of an act on the territory 
on its own, without the need for national legislative intervention (effectively self-executing 
norms as they are known in international law757). Importantly, the Court did not establish direct 
effect in the Vertical Agreements advisory opinion, since it explicitly explained that it meant 
direct application of these rules by Member States.758 Taken together with the fact that the 
EAEU Treaty only uses the language of direct applicability,759 this issue is yet to be decided. 
Returning to primacy Union law, the Court has also pronounced itself on the issue in 
its advisory opinion upon request of an employee of the Commission on civil service 
matters.760 The case concerned the provision of the TEAEU on concours for Commission 
staff761 and provision that employment in the EAEU bodies is regulated by national law of the 
host state.762 The issue raised was that application of these rules in case of changes of an 
employment contract or termination of employment, and possibility for employment 
                                                 
755 Ibid., para. 5. 
756 Opinion SE-2-1/1-17-BK, Vertical Agreements. 
757 Shaw, International Law, 164-77. 
758 Opinion SE-2-1/1-17-BK, Vertical Agreements, para. 2. 
759 See, e.g., point 13, para. 2 Regulation on the Commission. 
760 Opinion SE-2-3/1-17-BK, Adilov (11 December 2017). English language summary is available at 
http://courteurasian.org/page-25481. 
761 Art.9(3) TEAEU. 
762 Para.43 Regulation on Social Guarantees, Privileges and Immunities within the Eurasian Economic Union, 
Annex 32 to the TEAEU. 
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bypassing concours. The Court ruled that concours is obligatory in all cases. The Court also 
noted that it is advisable to develop internal personnel rules and to sequentially move away 
from national legal framework for internal organisation of Union institutions. However, even 
in the case there are no such rules, national norms are applicable only to the degree allowed 
by Union law. 
Judge Chaika in his dissenting opinion to the Kaliningrad Transit judgment went 
further and stated that by concluding the TEAEU, Member States have concluded an 
“autonomous totality of legal norms, which are binding upon all Member States”. He came to 
this conclusions, essentially quoting the ECJ in the Costa v ENEL case but with application to 
the EAEU law: 
‘By creating the Eurasian Economic Union of unlimited duration, which is an 
international organization of regional economic integration, vested with 
international legal personality according to Article 1(2) of the Treaty on the 
Union, and having its own system of institutions, Member States of the Union 
have transferred real powers, have limited their sovereign rights in strictly 
specific fields and created an autonomous totality of legal norms, which are 
binding upon all Member States.’763 
Referring to Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal764 case law, Judge Chaika noted that 
incorporation of Union law provisions into national legal systems makes it impossible for 
Member States to give national legal norms priority over Union law. He reinforced his point 
by adding that Union law is being created by Member States on condition of reciprocity. It is 
not clear why this would be a convincing point, since an autonomous legal order would 
eliminate the issue of reciprocity altogether.765 However, in my view, it is rather a point to 
reassure Member States that they are transferring their powers to introduce legal norms in 
certain fields with binding effect and priority over national legislation in their own interests, 
since others are doing the same. 
According to Chaika, the binding nature of Union law differs from state to state 
depending on this or that national legal act in force or to be adopted in the future, which allows 
or directly provides for actions or decisions violating Union law. Another interpretation would 
                                                 
763 Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Chaika) (21 
February 2017). Compare to Costa v ENEL: “By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane 
and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the 
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and have thus created a body of law which bind both their nationals and themselves”. 
764 Case 92/78, Simmenthal v Commission, EU:C:1979:53 (6 March 1979). 
765 See e.g. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 2422. 
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make obligations under the TEAEU not unconditional, but only possible and depending on 
circumstance. 
The view went as far as using the word autonomous. What was not included in this 
view, however, is the ability of such law to bind not only Member States, but also nationals. 
However, as has been explored in Chapter 1, this is an essential part of an autonomous legal 
order, which therefore, arguably, is implied in the notion autonomous used. The reason for not 
going as far as including actors along Member States could be related to the specifics of the 
case at hand, which was a dispute between Member States not involving other actors. The fact 
that this view on autonomy has been voiced only in the dissenting opinion of one judge and 
not in the judgment itself can also be explained by that. However, other reasons are also 
possible, such as the view has not yet acquired a mainstream view in the Court or it is not yet 
a good timing for this development. 
5.3.3 Situating the Member States 
As it is known from EU practice, primacy (along with direct effect) was not defined 
by the founding treaties, but was established by the ECJ teleologically.766 Similarly, primacy 
seems to have been identified by the EAEU Court, although the ability of the EAEU Court to 
develop it further has been diminished as compared to its predecessor: it has lost a number of 
powers, the biggest being the preliminary ruling procedure, as will be shown in the following 
chapter. However, this could also be done by a joint interpretation of member states.767 
Direct applicability, on the other hand, is part of the TEAEU to a certain extent, and 
has been confirmed by the Court. This is in stark contrast with the EURASEC, where decisions 
were to be implemented into national legislation. Lack of direct applicability of decisions of 
EURASEC institutions and their provisions was confirmed by the CIS Economic Court, 
performing the duties of the EURASEC Court.768 Upon request of the EURASEC Integration 
Committee, the Economic Court analysed the relevant agreements and the legislation of 
EURASEC member states and came to the conclusion that member states were free to choose 
when, in which manner and which legal acts implementing decisions of EURASEC 
institutions to enact: confirm the rules of such decisions therein and/or establish rules aimed 
                                                 
766 See e.g. De Witte, "Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order." 
767 Para. 47 Statute of EAEU Court provides that the Court’s ‘clarifications of provisions of the Treaty’ do not 
deprive the Member States of the right for joint interpretation. 
768 Reshenie Mezhgosudarstvennogo Soveta Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva No.123. Ob 
organizatsii funktsionirovaniia Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva. 27 April 2003; Reshenie 
Soveta Glav Gosudarstv SNG. O vozlozhenii na Ekonomicheskii Sud Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv 
funkcii Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva. 19 September 2003. 
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at their implementation.769  Therefore, on the territories of member states not the decisions of 
EURASEC institutions were applicable, but norms of national legal action aimed at their 
implementation. Also, the Economic Court noted that there was no national constitutional 
basis for direct applicability of EURASEC acts. 
The ruling is still pertinent since the national constitutional basis for direct applicability 
(and direct effect for that matter) of acts of EAEU institutions is not clear to date. No 
constitutional changes took place in the EAEU member states, even though not all national 
legal orders can accommodate the new features of the EAEU. Member states have various 
provisions on this issue in their respective national legislation. In case of the EU, it is true, for 
instance, that certain EU member states do not recognize supremacy of EU law over their 
constitutions, or, more precisely, certain constitutional norms.770 However, this is not so for 
all other acts. Moreover, before joining the EU, a number of countries, when needed, have 
changed the provisions of their constitutions.771  
The specifics of the EAEU legal order call for two major inquiries into the relations 
with national legal orders: the effect of EAEU agreements (i.e. the EAEU founding treaty, 
international agreements concluded in the EAEU framework and international agreements of 
the EAEU with third parties) and the directly applicable decisions of the Commission. Two 
countries deserve particular attention: Russia and Belarus. The reason for the choice of these 
two jurisdictions is that the former has had the most controversial encounters with the EAEU 
legal order in a practical sense. The latter has the strictest constitutional limitations, which 
have direct bearing on the EAEU legal order. Therefore, two separate sections with deep 
analysis are devoted to them (see infra 5.4 and 5.5). This section will give an overview of the 
other Member States. 
                                                 
769 Opinion 01-1/3-05, EURASEC Competences (10 March 2006). 
770 See Craig and De Búrca, EU law : text, cases, and materials, 268-96. 
771 Many examples of constitutional provisions are available in Sarooshi, International organizations and their 
exercise of sovereign powers, 66, fn. 3. See e.g. ‘The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act’, 
available at: http://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-constitution/. The main provisions are: § 1. 
Estonia may belong to the European Union, provided the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia are respected. § 2. When Estonia has acceded to the European Union, the Constitution of 
the Republic of Estonia is applied without prejudice to the rights and obligations arising from the Accession 
Treaty; See also ‘Constitutional Act of the Republic of Lithuania on Membership of the Republic of Lithuania 
in the European Union’, 
http://www.lrs.lt/upl_files/Lietuvos_pirmininkavimas_ES/dokumentai/CONSTITUTIONAL_ACT.pdf 
(accessed 27 December 2016); Additionally see Alfred E. Kellermann and T.M.C. Asser Instituut., The impact 
of EU accession on the legal orders of new EU member states and (pre-)candidate countries : hopes and fears 
(The Hague: TMC Asser, 2006). See also Art.23 of the ‘Basic Law for the Republic of Germany of 1949 (rev. 
2012)’, available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/German_Federal_Republic_2012?lang=en 
and Art.88 of the ‘Constitution of France of 1958 (rev. 2008)’, available at: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008?lang=en. 
  
151 
The Constitution of Kazakhstan772—one of the founding Member States—stipulates 
that ratified international agreements have priority over national laws and are directly 
applicable except when the application of an international treaty requires the promulgation of 
a law. Such norms become part of domestic law.773 Consequently, the EAEU Treaty is also 
part of the national law of Kazakhstan. Moreover, the Constitutional Council of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan consistently prioritizes ratified international agreements over national laws.774 
As for the legal acts of international organizations and their bodies, and more specifically 
decisions of the Commission which can be directly applied under the EAEU Treaty, the 
Constitution of Kazakhstan is likely the only exception among EAEU Member States: “… 
international treaty and other commitments of the Republic … shall be the functioning law in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan”.775 The Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
has ruled that the obligations of Kazakhstan that stem from the decisions of the Commission 
of the Customs Union (now the EAEU Commission) fall under the category of ‘other 
commitments’ under its Constitution.776 
The Constitution of the new Member State—Armenia777—contains provisions similar 
to those in the Russian Constitution, which will be explored in the case study. In short, where 
international agreements are a constituent part of the legal system, and if a ratified international 
agreement stipulates norms other than those in the legislation, then the norms of the agreement 
shall prevail. International agreements that do not comply with the Constitution cannot be 
ratified.778 When joining the EAEU, Armenia had to conclude the Accession Treaty.779 Prior 
to the ratification of the Accession Treaty, the president submitted an application to the 
                                                 
772 See the English version of the Kazakhstani Constitution at “Kazakhstan 1995 (rev. 1998)”, Constitute 
(2016), available at <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_1998?lang=en>. 
773 Art.4(1) and 4(3) Kazakhstani Constitution. The legal force of agreements that do not require ratification is 
not clear from the constitution and other legal acts. 
774 V.A. Malinovskii, "Verkhovenstvo Konstitutsii Respubliki Kazakhstan v sfere mezhdunarodnykh 
otnoshenii," Konstitutsionnoe i munitsipalnoe pravo, no. 42 (2005): 75. 
775 Art.4(1) Kazakhstani Constitution. (emphasis added) 
776 Normativnoe postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Soveta Respubliki Kazakhstan No. 6. Ob ofitsial’nom 
tolkovanii norm stat’i 4 Konstitutsii Respubliki Kazakhstan primenitel’no k poriadku ispolneniia reshenii 
mezhdunarodnykh organizacii i ikh organov. 5 November 2009. para. 4. 
777 See the English version of the Armenian Constitution at “Armenia 1995 (rev. 2005)”, Constitute (2016), 
available at <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2005?lang=en>. 
778 Art.6, para.4, Armenian Constitution. 
779 Dogovor o prisoedinenii Respubliki Armeniia k Dogovoru o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom soiuze ot 29 
maia 2014 goda. 10 October 2014. 
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Constitutional Court to review the conformity of the agreement with the constitution,780 which 
the Constitutional Court ruled to be such.781 
The Constitution of another new Member State—Kyrgyzstan—stipulates that 
‘international agreements to which the Kyrgyz Republic is a party that have entered into force 
… and also the universally recognized principles and norms of international law shall be the 
constituent part of the legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic.’ 782  The same provision is 
stipulated in the Law “On International Agreements of the Kyrgyz Republic”.783 However, 
only international agreements on human rights are given direct effect and also take precedence 
over other international agreements.784 At the same time, the hierarchy of legal acts established 
by the Law “On normative legal acts of the Kyrgyz Republic” does not list international 
agreements among them.785 
5.4 Case study: Russian legal order vis-a-vis EAEU legal order786 
To start with, Russian participation in the EAEU is based on Article 79 of the 
Constitution: 
‘The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and transfer 
to them part of its powers according to international treaties and agreements, if 
this does not involve the limitation of the rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen and does not contradict the principles of the constitutional system of the 
Russian Federation.’787 
This provision refers to Russia’s participation in international organizations in a wide 
sense. It should not be understood as giving a right to participate in international organizations, 
since it is hard to imagine a sovereign country not being able to join an international 
organisation without an explicit provision for such a right in its constitution, especially as not 
                                                 
780 N. Ghazaryan and L. Delcour, "From EU integration process to the Eurasian Economic Union: the case of 
Armenia," in Post-Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration: Adapting to European and 
Eurasian integration projects, ed. R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege (Routledge, 2018), 138. 
781 The Case on Conformity of the Obligations Stipulated in the Treaty on ‘The Accession to the Treaty of May 
20, 2014 on “The Eurasian Economic Union” signed by the Republic of Armenia on October 10, 2014 in 
Minsk with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, November 14, 2014 DCC – 1175, para 4. 
782 Art.6(3) Kyrgyzstani Constitution. See the English version of the Kyrgyzstani Constitution at “Kyrgyzstan 
2010”, Constitute (2016), available at 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2010?lang=en>. 
783 Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki “O mezhdunarodnych dogovorakh Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki” (24 April 2014) 
No.64, Gazeta “Erkin-Too” 09.05.2014, No. 35. 
784 Art.6(3) Kyrgyzstani Constitution. 
785 Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki “O normativnykh pravovykh aktakh Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki” (20 July 2009) 
No.241, Gazeta “Erkin-Too” 07.08.2009, No. 68-69. 
786 Parts of this section are based on my previously published work: M. Karliuk, "Russian Legal Order and the 
Legal Order of the Eurasian Economic Union: An Uneasy Relationship," Russian Law Journal 5, no. 2 (2017). 
787 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-
01.htm 
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all countries have such a provision. This is especially so given the fact that Russia became a 
member of a number of international organizations prior to the entry into force of the 
Constitution.788 Moreover, absence of the explicit ‘right’ to withdraw from an international 
organization does not mean that the country cannot pursue this option. Therefore, this 
provision’s focus is other than permission. The focus is rather on the transfer of powers and 
conditions thereof, which will be crucial in our further examination. Thus, there are three 
conditions under which Russia can join an international organization and transfer powers. 
First, the transfer of powers is only possible by means of an international agreement (ratified 
by a federal law789). Second, such an international agreement cannot limit the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. Third, the international agreement must not contradict the principles 
of the constitutional system. Indeed, limitations of transfer of powers are common, also among 
the countries that joined the EU. For instance, the Danish constitution specifically required 
that the powers vested in the constitution might only be transferred to a specific extent.790 In 
fact, the limited character of transfer was a pre-requisite in the majority of the EU member 
states.791 
It must be noted that the Russian Constitution and other constitutional norms do not 
distinguish the EAEU in any respect, which could have given the latter’s legal order some 
additional weight or value. For instance, in the case of the EU, a number of EU member states, 
such as Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania make such distinctions.792 It must be 
concluded from this that general rules applicable to international law and international 
agreements must be consulted in order to clarify the effect of the EAEU Treaty itself. Article 
15(4) of the Constitution provides: 
‘The universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of 
its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian 
Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied.’ 
                                                 
788 L.V. Lazareva, "Kommentarii k Konstitutsii RF,"  http://constitution.garant.ru/science-
work/comment/5366634/chapter/3/#block_79. 
789 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation on International Agreements], Sobranie Zaokonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No. 29, Item 2757, Art.15. 
790 Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 122. 
791 Ibid. 
792 See Section 5.3.3. 
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Based on this provision, it is observed in literature that Russia has adopted the strictest 
definition of primacy of rules of international law. 793  According to the abovementioned 
provision, international agreements form part of the Russian legal system and have primacy 
over national law. It is crucial that the wording chosen for the provision is “part of its legal 
system” rather than “part of Russian (legislation)”, which in certain interpretation could invoke 
the principle lex posteriori derogat legi priori, and future laws could prevail.794 The second 
sentence of the provision traces back to the 1992 law amending the 1978 Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, which, however, established supremacy only with regard to the 
internationally recognized human rights rules.795 The Constitutional Court established that 
international agreements prevail over all national rules, and not only laws. 796  The only 
exception is the constitution itself, as “international treaties of the Russian Federation that do 
not correspond to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, shall not be implemented or 
used.”797 Thus, if an international agreement establishes rules necessary to change certain 
provisions of the Constitution, a decision on its obligatory force for Russia is only possible in 
a form of a federal law after introduction of the corresponding amendments into the 
Constitution or after the revision of its provisions.798 The Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation has explained that national courts cannot apply national legal rules that are different 
from the rules established by an international agreement ratified by a federal law—in this case, 
rules of such an agreement apply. 799  Similarly, the range of international agreements 
possessing priority over Russian laws is limited to those ratified by a federal law.800 As a 
result, the EAEU Treaty is part of Russian national law as well and has priority over its 
                                                 
793 A.S. Ispolinov, "Status mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov v natsional'nom prave," Rossiiskii iuridicheskii 
zhurnal, no. 1 (94) (2014): 191. However, it must be noted, that the issues is far from clear, and the whole idea, 
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794 See more in S.Y. Marochkin, Deistvie i realizatsiia norm mezhdunarodnogo prava v pravovoi sisteme 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: Norma; Infra-M, 2011). 
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Federation Constitutional Court of Jul. 3, 1997], Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 1997, No. 5. 
797 Art.125(6) Russian Constitution. 
798 Art.22 Law on International Agreements. 
799 Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii “O Nekotorykh Voprosakh Primeneniia 
Sudami Kostitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Pri Osushchestvlenii Pravosudiia” ot 31 oktiabria 1995 g., abz. 2 p. 5 
[Part 5, Section 2 of the Russian Federation Supreme Court Plenary Ruling on Selected Issues of Damage 
Compensation of Oct. 31, 1995], Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda RF [BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation] 1996, No. 1. 
800 Ibid. 
  
155 
legislation, albeit with certain limitations and although the Treaty itself does not provide for it 
explicitly. 
With respect to the customs regulations, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
has ruled that: 
‘In the case of collision between the Union law rules regulation customs 
relations and the rules of the legislation of the Russian Federation on customs, 
in accordance with Article 15(4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
the law of the Union shall be applied.’801 
However, following that, the Supreme Court underlined, that such priority of Union 
law cannot lead to the violations of individual rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the 
Constitution.802 In particular, with regard to customs rules, application of EAEU rules, which 
introduce (change or discontinue) rights and obligations regarding customs duties, using 
customs facilities, the principle of inadmissibility of retroactive effect of new customs 
regulatory regime worsening the conditions for the parties involved.803 
There are no separate provisions regarding acts of international institutions in Russian 
constitutional law. However, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation delivered a 
ruling that gives jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of decisions of the Commission 
based on human rights concerns and foundations of constitutional order. 804  The issue 
concerned the judgment of the EURASEC Court in the case of SeverAvtoProkat.805  The 
EURASEC Court was establishing a possibility for a retroactive application of a provision of 
a decision of the Commission, and the Constitutional Court, upon the request of an Arbitration 
Court, ruled that EURASEC Court’s decisions cannot violate human rights and freedoms as 
established in international agreements and the Constitution. This is reminiscent of the Solange 
                                                 
801 Para.2, subpara.2 Plenary Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2016 No.18 
“On Certain Questions of the Application of Customs Legislation.” 
802 Para.2, subpara.3, ibid. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po zaprosu Arbitrazhnogo suda Tsentral’nogo 
okruga o proverke konstitutsionnosti punkta 4 Poriadka primeneniia osvobozhdeniia ot uplaty tamozhennykh 
poshlin pri vvoze otdelnykh kategorii tovarov na edinuiu tamozhennuiu territoriiu Tamozhennogo soiuza ot 3 
marta 2015 g. [Decision of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court upon request of the Central District 
Arbitration Court on Examination of Constitutionality of pt. 4 of the Procedure of Application of Customs 
Duties Exemption when Importing Certain Categories of Goods to the Single Customs Territory of the 
Customs Union of Mar. 3, 2015] Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF [Russian Federation Constitutional Court 
Bulletin] 2015, No. 3. 
805 Case 2-4/1-2014 (1-7/4-2013), SeverAvtoProkat v Commission (1 November 2013). 
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doctrine of the German Constitutional Court, albeit the latter is restricted to the situation where 
the degree of protection of fundamental rights is lower than that of the national constitution.806 
The Constitutional Court has also voiced its differences in approaches with the 
Eurasian judiciary. Thus, there are challenges to the interpretative role: according to the 
Constitutional Court, on the Russian soil, the norms of the Customs Union Customs Code, 
which have become part of EAEU law, should be implemented according to its own 
interpretation. 807  Further, there are different approaches to retroactive applications of 
Commission decisions. 808  Although, the Constitutional Court does not directly state the 
wrongness of the Eurasian judiciary, it can be deduced from the Constitutional Court’s 
reasoning, that in certain cases, positions of the Eurasian judiciary should only be taken into 
account by national courts, rather than complied with.809 Essentially, such challenges are based 
on concerns regarding human rights and foundations of the constitutional system, which brings 
us to a different dimension of source for tension. 
The tensions can also come from a certain line of case law involving other external 
judicial authorities. First and foremost this concerns the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court of Russia concerning decisions of the ECtHR.810 The most recent case is the Yukos 
decision, 811  which has seen the Constitutional Court establishing an impossibility to 
implement the 2014 ECtHR judgment finding Russia in violation of its obligations under the 
ECHR and requiring it to pay a considerable sum to Yukos shareholders.812 However, essential 
preconditions for the ruling have been set out in another ruling of the Constitutional Court 
                                                 
806 See cases Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
(Solange I) [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) [1987] 3 CMLR 225. On the 
relationship between the German Constitution and EU law see e.g. M. Payandeh, "Constitutional review of EU 
law after Honeywell: ConMehrdad Payandeh, 'Constitutional review of EU law after Honeywell: 
Contextualizing the relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice," 
Common Market Law Review 48, no. 1 (2011). 
807 See Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii N 1050-O ot 2 iiulia 2013 g. [Determination 
of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court No. 1050-O of Jul. 2, 2013] Ofitsialnyi Portal 
Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF [Russian Federation Constitutional Court Official Portal], available at: 
http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision136123.pdf. 
808 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii N 417-O ot 3 marta 2015 g. [Determination of 
the Russian Federation Constitutional Court No. 417-O Mar. 3, 2015] Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF 
[Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation] 2015, No. 3. 
809 Ibid. 
810 For a wider overview and discussion see P. Kalinichenko, "The constitutional order of the Russian 
Federation and its adaptability to European and Eurasian integration projects," in Post-Soviet Constitutions and 
Challenges of Regional Integration: Adapting to European and Eurasian integration projects, ed. R. Petrov 
and P. Van Elsuwege (Routledge, 2018). 
811 Postanovlenie Kostitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii N 1-P ot 19 ianvaria 2017 g. [Ruling of the 
Russian Federation Constitutional Court No. 1-P of Jan. 19, 2017] Rossiiskaia Gazeta [Ros. Gaz.] 03.02.2017. 
812 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v. Russia, no. 14902/04, ECHR 2014. 
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concerning implementation of ECtHR judgments as such,813 which has been followed by a 
respective law.814  According to that ruling, the Constitutional Court maintains that Russia can 
set aside international obligations if it is the only option to prevent the violation of principles 
and norms of the Russian Constitution. When formulating its own position, the Constitutional 
Court heavily relied on the rulings of the constitutional authorities of Germany,815 Italy,816 
Austria, 817  and the UK, 818  which were quite critical of the ECtHR. However, the 
Constitutional Court also went beyond that. First, the Constitutional Court referred to the 
VCLT, in particular Article 31(1) which establishes that a treaty must be interpreted “in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”. 819  Following this provision, the 
Constitutional Court argued that an international treaty is binding on the parties in the meaning 
arrived at using this rule of interpretation. The court continued, that if the ECtHR, when 
interpreting a provision of the European Convention on Human Rights, attributes to a term a 
meaning different from an ordinary one, or if it interprets contrary to the object and purpose 
of the Convention, a state gets a right to refuse to implement a judgment against it as going 
beyond the obligations voluntarily accepted when ratifying the Convention. This is a far 
reaching statement, which presupposes the ability to set aside not only interpretations of 
international courts, but international obligations in general. It can easily be used with regard 
to interpretations made by the EAEU Court in the future. 
But the Constitutional Court went further, stating that a judgment of the ECtHR cannot 
be considered obligatory if an interpretation of a provision of the Convention, made in defiance 
of the general rule of interpretation, would disagree with the imperative norms of general 
international law (jus cogens). The Constitutional Court considers sovereign equality and 
                                                 
813 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii N 21-P ot 14 iiulia 2015 g. [Ruling of the 
Russian Federation Constitutional Court No. 21-P of Jul. 14, 2015] Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF 
[Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation] 2015, No. 5. 
814 Federalnyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Federalnyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon “O 
Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii” N 7-FKZ ot 14 dekabria 2015 g. [Federal Constitutional Law of 
the Russian Federation on Amending the Federal Constitutioanl Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation] Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2015, No. 51 (Part I), Item 7229. 
815 GFCC, Order of the Second Senate of 14 October 2004 - 2 BvR 1481/04 (regarding Gorgulu v. Germany, 
no. 74969/01 ECHR 2004); BVerfG, 29.05.1974 - 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I.  
816 Judgment Corte Costituzionale of 19 November 2012 no. 264/2012 (regarding Maggio and others v. Italy, 
nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08 ECHR 2011); (regarding Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, 2012 ICJ Rep. 
99). 
817 VfGH decision of 14 October 1987, B 267/86. 
818 Judgment of 16 October 2013 UKSC 63 (regarding Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2), no. 74025/01 ECHR 
2005). 
819 Art.31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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related rights, as well as non-interference into domestic matters as ‘undoubtedly’ norms jus 
cogens. 
There are several issues with this point of view. It is not entirely clear if the 
interpretation violating jus cogens is a special case of possible ‘wrongful’ interpretations, 
particularly relevant for the case in hand, or the only one. Either way, sovereignty and non-
interference, if considered as part of jus cogens, could be interpreted quite broadly. The norms 
of jus cogens are far from clear in international law.820 Even so, sovereign equality and non-
interference are not usually listed as part of jus cogens. Generally speaking, it remains a 
mystery why the jus cogens argument was made at all. 
5.5 Case study: Belarusian legal order vis-a-vis EAEU legal order821 
The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus822 possesses the highest legal force on the 
territory of Belarus. It is believed that according to Napoleon, constitutions should be court et 
obscure, and, similarly, according to some of the American founding fathers—‘short and 
dark’.823 The Belarus’ Constitution, as well as the constitutions of the other EAEU Member 
States, is almost twice as long as the American one.824 It is, arguably, not as ‘dark’ either.825 
However, there is an exception. A ‘dark’ spot of the Belarus’ Constitution, which interests us 
the most for the purposes of this research, concerns the relation of international law and 
national law in general, and the acts of international institutions, specifically. 
The Belarusian Constitution is strikingly different from those of all other EAEU 
Member States as far as relations with the international legal order are concerned. It does not 
have provisions on the priority of international agreements and only stipulates that the state 
shall recognize the supremacy of the universally acknowledged principles of international law 
and ensure that its laws comply with such principles.826 Some of these principles are listed: 
                                                 
820 See e.g. A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
821 Parts of this section are based on my previously published work: M. Karliuk, "The constitutional order of 
Belarus and its adaptability to the Eurasian Economic Union: a 'living constitution' workaround," in Post-Soviet 
Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration: Adapting to European and Eurasian integration 
projects, ed. R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege (Routledge, 2018). 
822 17 October 2004) The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (as amended on 24 November 1996, ,. 15 
May 1994.The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, adopted on 15 May 1994, No 2878-XII (as amended by 
the republican referendums on 24 November 1996, 17 October 2004). The full text of the Constitution in 
English is available at: http://law.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=V19402875e. 
823 G. Frankenberg, "Comparing constitutions: Ideas, ideals, and ideology-toward a layered narrative," Icon-
International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 3 (2006): fn. 2. 
824 See the Constitute Project for the English versions of constitutions at www.constituteproject.org. 
825 Thus, there are no such debatable provisions as “proper and necessary” clause. 
826 Art.8(1) Constitution of Belarus. 
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‘In its foreign policy the Republic of Belarus shall proceed from the principles 
of equality of states, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of 
frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs 
and other generally recognised principles and norms of international law.’827 
The former head of the Constitutional Court believes that the universally 
acknowledged principles of international law are, in fact, higher than the national Constitution, 
and the latter must be interpreted in light of the former.828 
At least as compared to the previous, 1978 Constitution of the Byellorussian Soviet 
Socialistic Republic, which referred to international agreements only with regard to the 
competence of concluding and ratifying them, the current Constitution recognizes them as a 
source of law and refers to them six times in the text.829 One of the provisions precludes 
conclusion of international agreements that contradict the Constitution.830 
Another notion used alongside ‘international agreements’ is ‘international legal acts’. 
The latter are used in the Constitution in the context of ratification,831 but can be understood 
as including such acts as international agreements and acts of international organizations, as 
well as international individual legal acts.832 
The status of international agreements (and here I have in mind the EAEU Treaty) is 
not clearly defined in other national legislative acts either. In principle, it depends on the status 
of national legal acts, by which such agreements are adopted as binding. According to the Law 
on International Agreements, legal norms of international agreements concluded by Belarus 
form part of national legislation and are subject to direct applicability, apart from situations 
where it follows from the agreement itself that a national legal act should be adopted. In this 
case, international agreements essentially have the force of the ratifying act.833 A similar 
provision is part of the Law on Normative Legal Acts.834 This means that the legal force of 
Belarus’ international agreements is equated to that of national legal acts, by which such 
agreements are adopted as binding. As a general rule, in case of a collision between legal acts, 
                                                 
827 Art.18 Constitution of Belarus. 
828 G.A. Vasilevich, Konstitutsionnye osnovy implementatsii mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov Respubliki Belarus’ 
i norm, integratsionnogo prava (Minsk: Pravo i ekonomika, 2015), 104. 
829 I.I. Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii Respubliki Belarus’, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Minsk: Amalfea, 2015), 
209. 
830 Art.8(3) Constitution of Belarus. 
831 Art.61, Art.116(part 4) Constitution of Belarus. 
832 Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii Respubliki Belarus’, 1, 248. 
833 Zakon Respubliki Belarus’ ‘O mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh Respubliki Belarus’’ (Law on international 
agreements of the Republic of Belarus), adopted on 23 July 2008, No 4213, Natsionalnyi reestr pravovykh 
aktov Respubliki Belarus’ (4 August 2008) No 184, 2/1518, Art.33(2). 
834 Zakon Respubliki Belarus’ ‘O normativnykh pravovykh aktakh Respubliki Belarus’’ (Law on normative 
legal acts of the Republic of Belarus), adopted on 10 January 2000, No 361-Z, Natsionalnyi reestr pravovykh 
aktov Respubliki Belarus’ (13 January 2000) No 2/136, Art.20. 
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the act with higher legal force is applicable. However, in case such acts are of equal legal 
force, the act adopted later takes precedence. Following this rule, as noted by L. Pavlova835 
and A. Zybailo,836 the force of norms of an international agreement on the territory of Belarus 
can be annulled through adoption of a new law, decree or edict. Similar provisions are part of 
the civil code, bank code and a number of other legal acts.837 Only the civil procedure code, 
criminal code and labour code as well as a number of other laws give prevalence to 
international agreements in case of conflict with national legislation.838 
Therefore, according to these rules, the EAEU Treaty, which was ratified by a national 
law, could in principle become lower in status than a future new act of national legislation. 
Hence, there is nothing to prevent the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori. However, 
Vasilevich believes that this principle does not apply, but the principle lex specialis derogat 
legi generali applies instead.839 In this case international agreements enjoy priority over any 
kind of laws, while still remaining lower than the Constitution, essentially claiming that the 
legislative provisions mentioned above are unconstitutional.840 At any rate, it is plausible that 
international law-friendly interpretation would give prevalence to the EAEU Treaty over 
national legislation. 
In terms of direct applicability of international agreements, the Constitution does not 
provide for a relevant formulation. However, Article 116 can be interpreted in such a manner, 
since the Constitutional Court can recognize laws, decrees and edicts of the President 
unconstitutional, if they do not conform to ratified international legal acts.841 
                                                 
835 L.V. Pavlova, "Osobennosti zakonotvorchestva Respubliki Belarus’ v oblasti zakliucheniia 
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chastnogo prava, ed. E.V. Babkina and Y.A. Lepeshkov (Minsk: BGU, 2009), 109. 
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1999, No 2753, Art.7 (regarding extradition); Labour Code, adopted on 26 July 1999, No 2963, Art.8 
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January 2000, No 3653, Art.3 (prioritises self-executive norms of international agreements). See also the 
Investment Code, adopted on 22 June 2001, No 373, Art.6(3); Marriage and Family Code, adopted on 9 July 
1999, No 2783, Art.237; Tax Code, adopted on 19 December 2002, No 1663, Art.5; Air Code, adopted on 16 
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839 Vasilevich, Konstitutsionnye osnovy implementatsii mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov Respubliki Belarus’ i 
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840 See also Kostitutsionnoe parvo (Minsk: Registr, 2012), 37; Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii 
Respubliki Belarus’, 1, 244. 
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In any event, the overview above shows regulatory deficiencies regarding the status of 
international agreements in the national law of Belarus. The situation is even more 
complicated in the case of acts of international institutions, which is relevant for the legal 
consequences of Commission decisions. 
The starting point, and, in fact, the only point of discussion of the acts of international 
organisations in the Belarusian legal system is a provision on the Constitutional Court. While 
the president is the guarantor of the Constitution,842 the Constitutional Court has been set up 
to review constitutionality of legal acts.843 The legal force of acts of international organisations 
can be deduced from the competence of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court 
has powers to deliver opinions on the conformity of acts adopted by international institutions 
to the Constitution, international agreements ratified by Belarus, and to laws and decrees of 
the President (Article 116(4) Constitution). The Constitutional Court cannot do this on its own, 
but only on the proposal of the president, the parliament chambers, the supreme courts, and 
the government. 844  In any event, the acts of international institutions are therefore 
hierarchically lower than national legal acts. Until recently, it was even possible for acts of 
international institutions (as well as international agreements of Belarus) to be unilaterally 
found inapplicable by the Constitutional Court: 
‘. . . laws, decrees and edicts of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 
international treaty and other obligations of the Republic of Belarus, acts of 
intergovernmental entities, in which Republic of Belarus participates, ..., acts 
of other state bodies, which are found by the Constitutional Court inconsistent 
with the Constitution or acts, which have higher legal force, are considered 
void . . . as of the moment determined by the Constitutional Court.’845  
However, the new Law on Constitutional Legal Procedure 846  no longer has this 
provision and foresees that when an international obligation or an act of an international entity 
contradicts certain legal acts, the relevant state authorities take measures to terminate the 
participation of Belarus in such an international agreement, terminate the obligatory nature of 
such an act, or introduce changes therein.847 In my view, one of the reasons to introduce such 
                                                 
842 Art.79 Constitution of Belarus. 
843 Art.116 Constitution of Belarus. 
844 The Constitutional Court possessed the powers of its own initiative prior to the amendments to the 
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a change is to avoid international legal responsibility of Belarus, which could have followed 
if the original provision was applied in practice. The new law has found a compromise between 
national constitutional rules and rules of international law with a view to ensure that the 
Constitution is respected while avoiding international legal responsibility. Arguably, these 
new provisions are also aimed at ameliorating the constitutional rules with a view to taking a 
more favourable stance towards Belarus’ participation in the EAEU. However, these changes 
fall short of changing the dependency direction – according to domestic law, the decisions of 
EAEU institutions remain dependent on national legislation. 
Belarusian legal scholars are of the opinion that acts of international institutions are of 
lower force than national legislation. For instance, A. Zybailo states that acts of international 
institutions rank below the Constitution, ratified international agreements, laws and decrees of 
the president.848 G. Vasilevich agrees: the wording of Article 116(4) of the Constitution, 
discussed above, gives him reason to believe that acts of international institutions are of 
sublegislative character.849 However, he has also proposed a solution to the issue of primacy 
of acts of international institutions in Belarus.850 
It has been mentioned before that Belarus acknowledges the generally recognised 
principles of international law. Among such principles is pacta sunt servanda. Vasilevich 
claims that without fulfilment of decisions of an interstate entity and its bodies it is not possible 
to talk about fulfilment of this principle.851 He further claims that this conclusion does not 
contradict Article 116 of the constitution as “a constitutional norm lives in time and its 
perception can change (if its formulation allows it).” 852 This resonates with the epigraph to 
this chapter and the statement by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court made in the case 
McCulloch v. Maryland.853 This statement showed the understanding of a constitution as a 
‘living document’, which should be distinguished from a legislative act and should be 
interpreted in a different way, changing with time. 
Based on the provision of the Law on Normative Legal Acts854 that a new law enjoys 
priority over an older law (lex posterior derogat legi priori) and based on the principle lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, the author proposes to specify the status of acts of interstate 
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entities in a special law (and better in a programme law). The same should be done with regard 
to decrees. This will comply with the requirement of Article 116 of the Constitution regarding 
the compliance of acts of interstate entities with laws and decrees, and other constitutional 
provisions, and will comply with international agreements. 
This proposal is, of course, an important contribution to the issue of collision of 
international legal obligation and national legal rules and could be valid for other EAEU 
member states as well. At the same time, some remarks should be made. 
As it has been mentioned above, the final EAEU provisions are limited to the binding 
character and direct applicability of certain acts, but their legal consequences are not described. 
Therefore, formally, there are no contradictions with the provisions of Article 116 of the 
Constitution, as the Commission decisions can be binding and directly applicable, while also 
can be checked for the consistency with the Constitution, laws and decrees. There would be a 
contradiction in case primacy is introduced into the Treaty or identified by the EAEU Court 
or by a joint interpretation of the member states. 
The way to resolve the collision, proposed by Vasilevich, can help in avoiding 
international responsibility while respecting the Constitution. However, a special act 
determining the force of acts of international entities can be overruled by a new special law. 
This will mean that functioning of the EAEU legal order will still be dependent on national 
legislation. This will not favour effective functioning of the former and a collision can still 
take place. 
In my view, the best way, even though not the easiest one, to deal with the issue is to 
amend Article 116 of the Constitution by removing the ability of the Constitutional Court to 
rule on conformity of acts of international institutions with laws and decrees. The window of 
opportunity to amend this provision might indeed exist, since the President of Belarus has 
mentioned a possibility to amend the Constitution: 
New problems and challenges have emerged. And time may require something 
new. It is necessary to start with important things if we dare to do it. We should 
create a group of wise people, lawyers to analyze the Constitution. If necessary, 
we will [amend the Constitution].855 
Amendment of the Constitution is indeed the best option. However, it is not clear how 
soon this will happen, whether the relevant provision will be amended, and whether the 
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Constitution will be amended at all at the end of the day. Moreover, this part of the Constitution 
can be amended only by a referendum.856 
In these circumstances, there is another way to deal with the issue: by reading the 
Constitution further as a “living document”. To do so, at the very start I must clarify what an 
‘interstate formation’ is. When analysing the notion of an ‘interstate formation’, the 
Constitution commentator Pliakhimovich turns to Article 8(2), which goes as follows:  
‘The Republic of Belarus in conformity with the rules of international law may 
on a voluntary basis enter interstate formations and withdraw from them.’ 
This provision was added to the Constitution following the 1996 referendum. 
Pliakhimovich attributes it to the integration processes that were taking place in the post-Soviet 
space, in particular the rapprochement of Belarus and Russia.857 Given that, and since the 
Constitution uses the standard notion of ‘international organizations’ as well, 858 
Pliakhimovich understands ‘international formations’ as a type of ‘international 
organizations’, which, among others, possess features of supranationality and closer 
cooperation of member states.859 This is, however, hard to sustain. There are a number of 
reasons for that. First, making this differentiation will mean that Article 116 does not empower 
the Constitutional Court to check the compatibility of acts of other international organizations. 
There are, however, no compelling reasons, why acts of international organizations, which do 
not possess supranationality, would be excluded from constitutional control. The argument 
could be that acts of such other international organizations are not directly applicable on the 
territory of Belarus. However, this does not deny the possibility for implementation of such 
acts on the territory of Belarus, which would mean that it could give rise to implementation of 
an unconstitutional act. Second, the notion of an ‘interstate formation’ was not introduced with 
the amendment of the Constitution in 1996, but existed in the original Constitution of 1994 
with regard to the powers of the Constitutional Court on checking constitutionality of acts 
adopted by interstate formations.860 Moreover, when interpreting Article 116, Pliakhimovich 
himself abandons his own theory by proposing to interpret ‘interstate formations’ as 
encompassing international organizations.861 
                                                 
856 Art.140 Constitution of Belarus. 
857 Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii Respubliki Belarus’, 1, 221. 
858 Art.61, 79, 84 (para.20) Constitution of Belarus. 
859 Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii Respubliki Belarus’, 1, 223. 
860 Art.127 Constitution of Belarus of 1994. 
861 Pliakhimovich, Kommentarii k Konstitutsii Respubliki Belarus’, 1, 233. 
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Vasilevich suggests that the provision of Article 116 was formulated in that manner 
due to the discourse in which the drafting took place: the fall of the Soviet Union and belief 
that Belarus and other post-Soviet states would not join interstate entities, and in case they do, 
national legislation would always prevail. 862  Either way, for a ‘living constitution’ 
interpretation the original meaning is not paramount. 
This leads to either understanding the notions of ‘interstate formations’ and 
‘international organizations’ as interchangeable, or to making ‘interstate formations’ a broader 
term encompassing all kinds of international organizations and institutions, e.g. those which 
are not considered international organizations. The latter interpretation is less plausible, since 
it would deny individuals the ability to defend their rights and freedoms in such other 
international organizations and institutions (such a right is provided by Article 61, which refers 
to ‘international organizations’), deny the president the right to represent Belarus in relations 
with such other international organizations and institutions (Article 79 provides for 
representation in relations with ‘international organizations’), including conducting 
negotiations and signing agreements, appointing and recalling diplomatic representatives 
to/from them (Article 84 pt. 20 provides for that vis-à-vis ‘international organizations’). 
Therefore, it seems to be more plausible to use the notions of ‘international organizations’ and 
‘interstate formations’ interchangeably. 
Having established that, I turn to the interpretation of Article 116, which empowers 
the Constitutional Court to check the compatibility of acts of interstate formations. The ‘living 
constitution’ reading of this provision I propose would suggest that the provision is devoted 
to intergovernmental entities and institutions, while leaving supranational ones outside of its 
scope. Effectively, this provision would not be applicable to supranational institutions and 
organizations. Taking into account certain supranational features of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission (or at least the Commission Board), with powers conferred from the 
intergovernmental to supranational level, it is conceivable to recognize it as a supranational 
body of the EAEU. In this case, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be interpreted 
as not applicable to the Commission because of its supranational, rather than interstate 
character.  
This proposal is unorthodox for the interpretation practices in the country; therefore, 
several objections could be raised. First is that the “living document” interpretation should not 
                                                 
862 G.A. Vasilevich, Konstitutsionnye osnovy implementatsii mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov Respubliki Belarus’ 
i norm integratsionnogo prava (Minsk: Pravo i ekonomika, 2015), 113. 
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limit interstate formations to intergovernmental institutions only, but should be expanded to 
include supranational institutions in its scope. Therefore, following this counterargument, 
there is a deadlock, which seemingly can only be overcome by a constitutional change. 
However, this is precisely the point of this ‘living constitution’ interpretation: the discourse 
has changed dramatically since the days of drafting the Constitution. And although either 
interpretation is plausible, the one removing supranational institutions from the scope of 
interstate formation is more consistent with the current discourse and practice. 
Second, the logic of the interpretative proposal seemingly contradicts Article 8(2) 
discussed above: that Belarus can join and withdraw from interstate formations. If the 
distinction between intergovernmental and supranational institutions is made, the notion that 
Belarus can join interstate formations can be interpreted by some as only allowing Belarus to 
be part of intergovernmental institutions, barring it from (or not explicitly allowing) joining 
supranational ones. Therefore, according to this counterargument, Belarus might well not be 
able to become part of such an institution or organization in the first place. A reply to this lies 
mainly in the fact that there is no express prohibition to participation in such entities. In fact, 
Article 8 is not a permission to join or withdraw from interstate formations. Indeed, this 
provision is fundamentally different from provisions, say, some countries that joined the EU 
introduced regarding the transfer of powers. Thus, Danish constitution specifically required 
that the powers vested on the constitution might only be transferred to a specific extent.863 In 
fact, the limited character of transfer was a pre-requisite in the majority of the European 
countries.864 Belarus does not have a constitutional clause for the transfer of sovereign powers. 
Article 8 is not about that. This article starts with a provision that Belarus respects the priority 
of generally recognised principles of international law, and then continues: “in accordance to 
the norms of international law may on a voluntary basis enter interstate formations and 
withdraw from them”. It is important to note the wording of this passage, which underlines 
the sovereignty and independence of the country, by mentioning that joining is voluntarily and 
it is free to withdraw from such entities. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a sovereign country not 
being able to join an international organisation without an explicit provision for such a right 
in its constitution, especially that not all countries have such a provision. At the same time, 
the provision shows respect to international law. Therefore, this provision’s focus is other than 
permission or drawing a limit. 
                                                 
863 Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations, 122. 
864 Ibid. 
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Thirdly, the question arises regarding the effect of acts of other institutions, which 
under the majority of criteria are not supranational.865 At this stage of development of Eurasian 
integration this issue should not cause difficulties as only Commission’s decisions are deemed 
directly applicable on territories of member states. 
Fourthly, this would mean that the Constitutional Court will not have powers to check 
constitutionality of acts of interstate formations. One answer to that is that Constitution 
hierarchically still remains the highest law of the land, which ipso facto means that any other 
legal norm operating on the territory has to be in compliance with the Constitution. Therefore, 
the proposed interpretation will de facto only exclude the compatibility check with laws and 
decrees, but not the Constitution. 
Finally, the entire division into intergovernmental and supranational institutions is 
doubtful. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, the issue of supranationality is complex indeed, 
and there is no single definition thereof, but rather a number of fundamental characteristics. 
However, it is clear that some organizations and institutions are more dependent on respective 
member states, while others are less so and possess more powers. In some cases, there is 
recognition of such distinctions between organisations in national constitutional law of other 
states.866 Even that Belarus’ constitutional law does not make such a distinction, this can be 
made using the power of interpretation, which is being proposed here. 
How this is to work in the current national legal framework in practice is yet to be seen. 
The Constitutional Court, when checking constitutionality of laws, “takes into account” 
international obligations of Belarus singling out the EAEU.867 But so far, no challenges were 
made regarding this issue, and the Commission decisions are being implemented, the 
government works closely with the EAEU institutions. 
The analysis above shows that Belarus’ legal order is not entirely compatible with the 
EAEU legal framework. Such compatibility is relevant for the full effect of EAEU law.  In 
order to ensure its effectiveness, it would certainly help to change certain national 
constitutional norms as well as interpret the EAEU Treaty with doctrines to effectuate the 
Union law in the Belarus’ legal order. 
                                                 
865 Karliuk, "The Eurasian Economic Union: An EU-Inspired Legal Order and Its Limits," 57-58. 
866 See e.g. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 - 2 BvE 2/08 (Lisbon judgment), available 
at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en
.html (accessed 28 December 2016). 
867 See e.g. Reshenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Respubliki Belarus' No. R-1084/2017. O sostoianii 
konstitutsionnoi zakonnosti v Respublike Belarus' v 2016 godu. 18 January 2017. 
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The main problematic provision is, according to one interpretation, the ability of the 
Constitutional Court to check the compatibility of decisions of the Commission with national 
laws and decrees. As long as changing constitutional norms does not seem to be easy, and the 
one in hand requires a referendum, I propose a different, albeit temporary, interpretation based 
on the ‘living document’ doctrine and using the concept of supranationality. The ‘living 
constitution’ reading of this provision suggests that supranational institutions fall outside the 
Constitutional Court’s right to check compatibility of decisions of the Commission with 
national laws and decrees, while leaving its right to rule on constitutionality of such decisions. 
This solution makes Belarus’ legal order fully compatible with the current EAEU law and 
allows it to function and develop more effectively.  
5.6 Intermediate conclusions 
The TEAEU establishes its own legal order and its sources, which fulfils one of two 
preconditions for an autonomous legal order set out in Chapter 1. One of the interviewees from 
the EAEU Court has even suggested that the EU’s term of art acquis must be introduced into 
the EAEU legal order.868 
However, this legal order does not provide for certain important hierarchies. Among 
international agreements, the legal force of international agreements of the EAEU with a third 
party, international agreements of the Member States, adopted prior to joining the EAEU are 
not provided for. The latter can lead to complications in case of norms contradicting to EAEU 
law. The issue becomes more problematic since such agreements have third parties as 
stakeholders, which are not EAEU Member States and are not bound by EAEU law. In case 
of a collision of legal rules, this situation can lead to complications in legal implementation 
and to disputes, including with third parties. 
The legal force of decisions and of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental 
Council are not clear either. It follows from the TEAEU that such decisions are binding, but 
are not directly applicable on the territories of the Member States. In order to prevent 
infringements in implementation of such decisions, to simplify enforcement and generally 
ensure effective functioning of the legal order, it seems reasonable to clarify the legal force of 
such decisions. 
It has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that tensions between the legal 
orders of the EAEU and Member States should have been minimized from the beginning. 
                                                 
868 Interview 2 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017, Moscow. 
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However, this does not seem to be necessarily so. As has been shown in this chapter, this 
concern for national constitutions was not fully reflected in the final version of the EAEU, as 
there are a number of issues with regard to the effect of the EAEU law in the national legal 
orders as a result of national constitutional restrictions and unequivocal judicial practices. 
A problematic issue remains regarding compatibility of national legal orders of the 
Member States with the EAEU legal framework. Such compatibility is relevant for the full 
effect of EAEU law. In order to ensure its effectiveness, it would certainly help to change 
certain national constitutional norms as well as interpret the EAEU Treaty with doctrines to 
effectuate the Union  law in national legal orders. 
In Belarus, the main problematic provision is, according to one interpretation, the 
ability of the Constitutional Court to check the compatibility of decisions of the Commission 
with national laws and decrees. As long as changing constitutional norms does not seem to be 
easy, and the one in hand requires a referendum, I propose a different, albeit temporary, 
interpretation based on the ‘living document’ doctrine and using the concept of 
supranationality. The ‘living constitution’ reading of this provision suggests that supranational 
institutions fall outside the Constitutional Court’s right to check compatibility of decisions of 
the Commission with national laws and decrees, while leaving its right to rule on the 
constitutionality of such decisions. This solution makes the Belarusian legal order fully 
compatible with the current EAEU law and allows it to function and develop more effectively. 
In case of Russia, it is not the constitutional provisions that are problematic, but rather 
legislative acts and judicial practice. Thus, Russian procedural law (and case law) does not 
allow revision of an enforceable court ruling in the light of new facts pursuant to a judgment 
of the EAEU Court, although it permits it to decisions of the ECtHR, the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court.869 More globally, Russian judicial authorities have issued judgments 
challenging the EAEU Court’s interpretations. Beyond that, it challenged the validity of 
ECtHR’s judgments, which can also been used against the Eurasian judiciary. The possible 
solution for this particular issue is more interinstitutional dialogue between the national and 
Eurasian judiciaries.  
 
                                                 
869 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 64-65. 
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6 EAEU judiciary as the guardian of the autonomous 
legal order 
‘[J]udicial law-making is a permanent feature 
of administration of justice in every society.’ 
Hirsch Lauterpacht870 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been explored in Chapter 1, supranational judiciary with exclusive jurisdiction 
that is capable of ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all member states is paramount for 
an autonomous legal order. Thus, there are two sides to this: the internal dimension—ensuring 
uniform interpretation of Union law on the territories of member states; and the external 
dimension—exclusive jurisdiction, i.e. elimination of the danger of alternative interpretations 
of Union law coming from other dispute settlement institutions. 
The starting point is promising since the objective of the EAEU Court is to ensure 
‘uniform application by the Member States and Bodies of the Union of the 
Treaty, international agreements within the Union, international agreements of 
the Union with a third party and decisions of the Bodies of the Union.’871 
The fact that this provision talks only about application and not about interpretation872 
does not deny the latter, since it would be impossible to achieve the former otherwise. 
Effective ability to do that would require a certain degree of independence of such an 
institution. This aspect, along with the institutional set up, was explored in Chapter 3. 
However, as any institutional set up, it is only a foundation for its ability to enjoy its main 
function. The other aspect is availability of appropriate corresponding powers to exercise, and 
tools to be deployed for the purposes outlined above. Nevertheless, this chapter is also about 
interpretative abilities of the EAEU Court, which could lead to development of principles 
having a direct bearing to autonomy of the legal order, essentially concerning the supranational 
effect of legal norms: direct effect and primacy. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to the 
                                                 
870 Hersch Lauterpacht, The development of international law by the International Court (London: Stevens, 
1958), 155. 
871 Para.2 Statute of EAEU Court. 
872 Compare to Article 19(1) TEU, according to which the CJEU ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed [emphasis added].’ 
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analysis of powers and tools of the EAEU Court with a view to establishing the existence of 
those relevant for ensuring an autonomous legal order.873 
The chapter starts with exploring judicial remedies available in the EAEU. In the EU 
legal order, the ECJ claims that a complete system of judicial protection has been 
established.874  Moreover, according to Weiler, the EU system of judicial remedies is an 
essential component that has largely “nationalized” the obligations stemming from EU 
membership and introduced the “habit of obedience” and the respect for the rule of law, which 
is traditionally less associated with international obligations than national ones. 875  Thus, 
national courts are guardians of the EU legal order alongside the CJEU,876 albeit the CJEU is 
the ultimate authority. The latter is considered to be a supreme or even a constitutional court 
of the EU.877 The EU judicial set up, its functioning and practices are relevant for comparative 
purposes from this point of view. However, given the focus of our research, the task is not to 
establish how comprehensive the EAEU judicial system is, but rather to pick and spell out key 
characteristics, which could be of relevance for the autonomy analysis. Thus, next, the chapter 
proceeds directly to the internal dimension of a supranational judiciary as part of the legal 
order autonomy indicia developed in Chapter 1, Section 5—the issue of ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law. Here I draw on the EU experience of the preliminary ruling procedure 
as the main tool for this purpose. Although the EURASEC Court possessed this mechanism, 
the EAEU Court no longer does. The question is therefore what other tools are available or 
could be deployed by the Court. The chapter proceeds to the external dimension of a 
supranational judiciary indicia and looks into the issue of exclusive jurisdiction. Next, the 
chapter considers an important limitation of the interpretative powers of the Eurasian judiciary 
regarding its interpretative powers. The chapter concludes with an overview of possible 
                                                 
873 More generally on the EAEU Court see Z. Kembayev, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: An 
Adequate Body for Facilitating Eurasian Integration?," Review of Central and East European Law 41, no. 3-4 
(2016). 
874 Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, EU:C:1986:166 (23 April 1986), para. 23; Case C-583/11 P, Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2013:625 (3 October 2013), para. 92. Most recently see 
Case C-72/15, Rosneft, EU:C :2017:236 (28 March 2017), para. 66. 
875 Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 2421-22. 
876 Opinion 1/09, para. 66. 
877 See e.g. B. Vesterdorf, "A constitutional court for the EU?," Icon-International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 4, no. 4 (2006); H. Schepel and E. Blankenburg, "Mobilizing the European Court of Justice," in European 
Court of Justice, ed. J.H.H. Weiler and G. de Búrca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); F.G. Jacobs, "Is 
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G. De Baere, "The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator," in A Constitutional Order of States? 
Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood, ed. A. Arnull, et al. (Hart, 2011); M. Claes and M. de Visser, 
"The Court of Justice as a Federal Constitutional Court: A Comparative Perspective," in Federalism in the 
European Union, ed. Elke Cloots, G. de Baere, and S. Sottiaux (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 
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reasons for the reduction in powers of the EAEU Court and for the introduction of other 
limitations.  
6.2 EAEU judicial remedies 
The Statute of the EAEU Court establishes that the Court can adjudicate on issues 
arising from the implementation of Union law.878 More specifically, both Member States879 
and economic entities880 (albeit the latter entail certain limitations to be discussed below) can 
raise issues concerning compliance of Commission decisions with Union law, as well as 
challenge Commission actions or omissions. Retaining the ability of economic entities to 
challenge the Commission before the Court is a positive feature that was kept from the 
EURASEC times. However, only Member States can raise issues concerning compliance of 
international agreements within the Union with the TEAEU, compliance of other Member 
States with Union law, and compliance of Commission decisions with Union law.881 
These EAEU remedies broadly correlate with the EU’s direct actions: 
infringements, 882  actions for annulment, 883  and failures to act, 884  albeit there are no 
equivalents to the EU’s actions for damages 885  or pleas of illegality. 886  However, more 
importantly for the purposes of this research, i.e. regarding mechanisms of ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law, two important features are missing. First and foremost, there is no 
preliminary ruling procedure (neither references on interpretation nor references on validity), 
which would allow uniform interpretation and application of Union law, and which, however 
limited, was available in the EURASEC legal framework. This will be discussed later in this 
chapter, following the section on judicial remedies. Second, within the framework of direct 
actions, to which this section is devoted, the Commission cannot refer Member States failing 
to comply with EAEU law to the Court. This feature, which would make Member States wary 
                                                 
878 Para.39 Statute of EAEU Court. 
879 Member States can also authorise state authorities and organisations to make a request to resolve a dispute 
or make a request for clarification, see para.49 Statute of EAEU Court. 
880 The EAEU Treaty defines an ‘economic entity’ or ‘market participant’ as a “commercial organization or a 
non-profit organization operating with generation of profit, an individual entrepreneur, as well as a natural person 
whose professional income-generating activities are subject to state registration and/or licensing under the 
legislation of the Member States” (Para.2(20) Protocol on General Principles and Rules of Competition, Annex 
19 to the EAEU Treaty, English version available at: <https://docs.eaeunion.org/en-us>). However, the Statute 
of the Court has its own definition of an economic entity: “juridical person registered under the legislation of a 
Member State or a third State or a natural person registered as an individual entrepreneur in accordance with the 
legislation of a Member State or a third State.” Para.39(2). 
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882 Art.258-259 TFEU. 
883 Art.263 TFEU. 
884 Art.265 TFEU. 
885 Art.268 and 340(2) TFEU. 
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of avoiding fulfilling their obligations, was similarly available in EURASEC. The issue will 
be explored in this section. 
In procedural terms, prior to referring a dispute to the Court, the applicant must follow 
a pre-trial obligation to consult, negotiate or use other tools provided in Union law with the 
relevant Member State or the Commission to address the issue (except as expressly provided 
for by the TEAEU).887 
In addition to aforementioned direct actions, the Court has competence to provide non-
binding clarification of EAEU law provisions upon request of Member States, bodies of the 
Union or EAEU civil servants.888 This issue will be covered later in this chapter. 
The overview of various procedural avenues to the EAEU Court is shown in Figure 3. 
887 Para.43 Statute of the Court. 
888 Para.49 Statute of the Court. 
Figure 3 Avenues to the EAEU Court 
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6.2.1 Infringement proceedings 
The infringement (or enforcement) proceedings are actions against Member States who 
fail to fulfil their obligations under Union law. The Statute of the Court refers to them as 
actions 
‘concerning the observance by another Member State (other Member States) of 
the Treaty, international agreements within the Union and (or) decisions of the 
Bodies of the Union, as well as particular provisions of the said international 
agreements and (or) decisions.’889 
Only Member States can bring such actions against other Member States. This is a 
novelty comparing to the EURASEC legal framework, since only the Commission could bring 
such actions therein.890 In EURASEC the procedure went as follows. If after the Commission’s 
monitoring there were reasons to believe that a member state had not complied with 
international agreements, which formed the legal basis of the Customs Union and Single 
Economic Space, or Commission decisions, the Commission Council could inform the 
relevant member state and establish a timeframe to address the infringement. If the decision 
was not complied with, the Commission Council had the right to refer the issue to the 
EURASEC Court. The Court could also introduce reasonable interim measures to ensure 
compliance with the decision or to prevent possible further infringements. The chance of 
reaching this stage was small since the Commission Council adopted consensus decisions and 
the infringing member state could block any such decision. If the issue arose before the Court, 
it was not clear what such interim measures would look like. Further, if the Court’s decision 
was not complied with, the issue was to be referred to the EURASEC Supreme Council where 
decisions where taken unanimously, which could have led to the exercise of the veto power 
by the infringing state. Regardless of these limitations, the Commission could react to the 
infringements by member states, which it no longer can. 
Replacing the Commission with Member States for the task of initiating infringement 
proceedings is not a welcome novelty. First, existence of an obligatory and exclusive judicial 
body for these kinds of cases with a regulatory institution as an applicant would have made 
the EAEU different from many other international organizations. The lack of such a procedure 
in the EAEU is a clear rollback in supranationality and a return to the common practice in 
public international law where compliance with international contractual obligations is 
889 Para 39(1), alinea 2 Statute of EAEU Court. 
890 Art.20 Dogovor o Evraziiskoi ekonomicheskoi komissii. 
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decided between parties to respective agreements.891 In the EU, where there is a comparable 
infringement proceeding,892  usually, infringements, or breaches of EU law, constitute a failure 
to implement a directive or an enactment of national legislation contrary to EU law, 893 and 
this procedure is the most important tool to ensure implementation and observance of EU law. 
Although there are no instruments like directives in the EAEU, there are no guarantees that 
Member States, whether willingly or not, will not enact national legislation contrary to EAEU 
law. Inability of the Commission to challenge such action in the Court reduced the capacity of 
the Commission to perform its monitoring obligations and does not promote effective judicial 
control or functioning of the EAEU legal order in general. 
Second, as many years of EU experience suggest, a member state rarely brings an 
action against another member state to the ECJ,894 as it is a sign of malevolence and there is a 
risk of analogous actions against them in the future, and member states prefer political dispute 
resolution. 895  Moreover, the procedure requires member states to first inform the 
Commission, 896  which can take over the procedure after which it becomes a traditional 
Commission vs. member state infringement procedure. Thus, actions brought by the European 
Commission against member states are common and member states tend to comply with ECJ 
decisions against them,897 since, among others, they risk financial sanctions.898 Hence, the 
entire system of judicial review is aimed at ensuring compliance of member states. This 
experience, together with the general preference for political resolution of disputes in the post-
Soviet integration attempts, implies that the prospects for such actions are rather low. 
Nevertheless, the EAEU Court has already dealt with an infringement action. 
The Kaliningrad transit case was filed by Russia against Belarus in September 2016 
claiming that Belarus did not fulfil its obligations under the EAEU Treaty.899 The essence of 
the dispute was that Belarusian customs authorities repeatedly detained and seized household 
appliances produced by Russian companies in Kaliningrad and transported them by transit via 
                                                 
891 A. Evans, "The Enforcement Procedure of Article 169 EEC: Commission Discretion," European Law Review, 
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Lithuania and Belarus to the other territory of Russia. Belarusian authorities did not recognize 
the relevant decisions and documentation of Russian authorities, and upon checking the 
validity of the relevant documents considered the goods as imported. The case was not an easy 
task for the Court, not only because of the general political sensitivity of the whole situation 
within the infringement procedure involving two states as explained above, but also since it 
was a time of considerable tension in the relations of the two countries at that moment. 
The Court stated that decisions of customs bodies must be mutually recognized by 
default and must not be subject to any reservations or conditions. Such decisions have a 
presumption of their full compliance with the EAEU customs rules unless the contrary is 
proven. Regarding goods transiting from Kaliningrad oblast’ to the other part of Russia, the 
Court noted that in this case the customs authorities should ‘refrain from unilaterally deciding 
on the authenticity, admissibility, sufficiency of documents issued by competent authorities of 
the sending state.’900 Thus, the Court tried to eliminate legal uncertainty regarding transit of 
goods from Kaliningrad oblast’. It did so referring to the provisions of the Treaty on Accession 
of Armenia. The latter state can be regarded as an enclave situated apart from the territory of 
the Customs Union. This Treaty states directly that EAEU goods when moved from the EAEU 
customs territory to the EAEU customs territory via territories of third states using the 
procedure of transit retain the status of Union goods. Moreover, the Court referred to the 
provisions of the EAEU Customs Code, which was not adopted at the time, but where the issue 
was regulated in a more concrete manner. 
Thus, the case was, in principle, decided in favour of the applicant. However, the 
language of the judgment and the conclusions are formulated rather carefully. Thus, the Court 
has established that Belarus complied with the TEAEU, but not in full.901 Therefore, the Court 
did not establish the fact of infringement but a fact of observance, but not in full. This is a very 
peculiar formulation, given that, according to the Statute, the Court can only deliver a decision 
either on finding a member state as observing or not observing EAEU law.902 Thus, the Court 
seemingly played a role of interpreter of relevant provisions and presented the situation as a 
difference in understanding, interpretation and application of relevant EAEU law rules by the 
parties, rather than laying direct blame on either party. 
                                                 
900 Ibid. 
901 The word to word translation goes as follows: ‘the fact of observance by the Republic of Belarus of the 
EAEU Treaty provisions not in full.’ 
902 Para.105 Statute of EAEU Court. 
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Further, high political sensitivity has been underlined by the record number of 
dissenting opinions: five out of ten judges voiced their differences, which include all judges 
from Belarus (one of which was the President of the Court) and Russia (as has been mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the Court consists of two judges per Member State). Thus, both Belarusian judges 
wrote dissenting opinions essentially in favour of Belarus, claiming that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the case and therefore the judgment was ultra vires.903 Respectively, both 
Russian judges wrote dissenting opinions blaming the soft formulation used by the Court and 
claiming infringement in full by Belarus.904 
On the one hand, this situation once again raises the issue of independence of judges 
discussed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, political elements are inherent in any judiciary.905 
The fact that the Court managed to effectively arrive at a judgment effectively interpreting 
EAEU law shows the Court’s ability to balance political challenges ensuring legal ends 
striking a judgment in difficult political circumstances. It also hints at the Court’s ability and 
willingness to go beyond its orthodox dispute resolution function it is being forced to accept 
as explored further in the chapter. 
6.2.2 Challenges of Commission decisions 
Challenges of Commission decisions are actions concerning the compliance of a 
decision of the Commission or its particular provisions.906 A comparable procedure in the EU 
is the action for annulment. However, within actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU 
the reviewable acts are broadly understood907 (as well as the number of institutions capable to 
initiate the action). Therefore, the comparison should include the challenges of actions part of 
the procedure explored in the next subsection. 
                                                 
903 See dissenting opinions of judges Kolos and Fedortsov: Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus 
(Kaliningrad Transit) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kolos) (21 February 2017); Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad 
Transit) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fedortsov) (21 February 2017). 
904 See dissenting opinions of judges Neshataeva and Chaika: Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit) 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Neshataeva) (21 February 2017); Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit) 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Chaika). 
905 In the case of the ECJ, see L.J. Conant, Justice contained : law and politics in the European Union (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002); M.L. Volcansek, Judicial politics and policy-making in Western Europe 
(London: Cass, 1992). 
906 Para 39(a1), alinea 3 and para 39(2), alinea 1 Statute of EAEU Court. 
907 Art.263, 289-291 TFEU with relevant lists. The CJEU can also review acts which are listed, but which are 
capable of affecting applicant, see Joined Cases 8-11/66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. 
Cementsbedrijven N.V. v Commission, EU:C:1976:62 (5 May 1976), p. 91; Case 60/81, IBM v Commission, 
EU:C:1981:264 (11 November 1981), para. 9; Case C-362/08 P, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, 
EU:C:2010:40 (26 January 2010), para. 52; Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA), para. 42. 
  
179 
In the EU there is a special classification of applicants for judicial review based on the 
locus standi: privileged, semi-privileged, and non-privileged. 908  Privileged applicants are 
member states and the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council, since 
they do not have to satisfy any locus standi conditions.909 Other institutions (the Court of 
Auditors, the European Central Bank, and the Committee of the Regions) are semi-privileged 
applicants, since they are able to bring an action only when their prerogatives are in 
question.910 This leaves the non-privileged applicants category for natural and legal persons, 
which have to satisfy strict standing conditions, unless they are not addressees of an act in 
question.911 Thus, under the so-called general test of standing they must show direct and 
individual concern, and under the special standing test (or Lisbon test), the act in question 
must be a regulatory act, they must show direct concern and that the act does not entail 
implementing measures.912 The ECJ developed rather strict rules under the general test of 
standing. In particular, the individual concern part is the most problematic, since following the 
ECJ’s interpretation in the Plaumann case, the non-privileged applicants must show that the 
act in question concerns the applicant per se (a closed category) following its specific and 
distinctive features or due to circumstances, which distinguish it from all other persons, which 
could be affected by the act.913 Such strict rules have been introduced in order to ensure that 
certain applicant go through the national judicial system instead. The Lisbon test has been 
introduced to improve the ability at least of some private parties to challenge EU acts, which 
is however far from perfect.914 
Within the EAEU, challenges of Commission decisions can be brought by Member 
States and economic entities, but not by institutions. Economic entities have more stringent 
rules applicable to them. As well as in the EU, the locus standi for economic entities is stricter. 
Thus, there are two conditions for economic entities to fulfil: 1) direct concern (Commission 
decision or provisions thereof must directly affect “the rights and legitimate interests of the 
economic entity in the sphere of business and other economic activities”), and 2) violation of 
rights (they must entail “a violation of any rights and legitimate interests of the economic 
entity envisaged by the Treaty and/or international agreements within the Union”).915 It is 
argued, however, that in practice locus standi of an economic entity includes only the first 
                                                 
908 Albors-Llorens, "Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Union," 274. 
909 Case 45/86, Commission v Council, EU:C:1987:163 (26 March 1987), para. 3. 
910 Art.263(3) TFEU. 
911 Art.263(4) TFEU. 
912 Albors-Llorens, "Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Union," 275. 
913 Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, EU:C:1963:17 (15 July 1963). 
914 See e.g. Albors-Llorens, "Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Union," 283-87. 
915 Para.39(2), alinea 1 Statute of EAEU Court. 
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requirement.916 In Sevlad case, the Court underlined that the second condition can only be 
assessed during the merits stage of the judicial procedure: 
‘verification of a violation of rights and legitimate interests of the plaintiff ... 
granted by the Treaty and (or) international agreements within the Union, 
should be preceded by an assessment of legality of the decision of the 
Commission that is being challenged.’917 
Since violation of rights and legitimate interests can be caused only by application of 
a Commission’s decision contradicting Union law,918 the Court first determines legality of 
such a decision. Moreover, following the Court’s wide interpretation, economic entities only 
must show that Commission’s decision could be applied to them—it does not have to have 
been applied already: 
‘In accordance with the principle of legal certainty, Commission’s decision or 
its particular provisions may be recognized as directly affecting the rights and 
legitimate interests of an economic entity ... inter alia in cases where the 
corresponding decision is applied to the specific economic entity in connection 
with its business activities.’919 
In addition, there is no strict timeframe to challenge Commission’s decision. If you 
add that there is a strict timeframe of two months in the EU (to ensure legal certainty),920 it 
becomes clear that, generally, the EAEU Court is much more flexible about locus standi 
requirements as compared to the ECJ. The reason for that could be to ensure better access to 
justice by private entities in the view of lack of certain judicial procedures, while in the EU 
there are other avenues available for these purposes, i.e. the preliminary ruling procedure 
(discussed in Section 6.3). 
The EAEU Member States have higher discretion as compared to economic entities in 
the sense that, they can request the Court to assess compliance of Commission decisions not 
only with the TEAEU and international agreements within the Union, but also with decisions 
of EAEU institutions.921  However, it does not mean that applicants cannot invoke other 
provisions as long as they relate to the application of the TEAEU and international agreements 
within the EAEU and are directly applicable.922 Moreover, as Diyachenko and Entin suggest, 
there is nothing to prevent economic entities from relying on other grounds to challenge 
                                                 
916 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 70. 
917 Case SE-1-2/1-16-KS, Sevlad v Commission (7 April 2016), para. 7.2.1. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid., para. 6.2. 
920 Art.263(6) TFEU. 
921 Para.39(1), alinea 3 Statute of EAEU Court. 
922 Case SE-1-2/2-16, General Freight v Commission (4 April 2016). 
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Commission decisions, e.g. lack of competence, infringement of substantive procedural 
requirements or misuse of powers.923 This follows from the Rules of Procedure of the Court, 
which stipulate that in the actions of economic entities challenging Commission decisions, the 
Court verifies the competence of the Commission to adopt contested decisions.924 Moreover, 
the Court gave a broad interpretation of this provision, extending the requirement to assessing 
compliance with procedural requirements.925 The latter move may be seen as an attempt to 
expand the limited remedies. 
6.2.3 Challenges of actions and failures to act 
These proceedings challenge Commission actions or failures to act upon its 
obligations. Unlike the EU, which distinguishes similar actions into separate procedures under 
different articles (actions for annulment and failures to act926), in the EAEU they are bundled 
into one procedure. The division in the EU can seem rather artificial, as one effectively 
complements the other.927 However, there are differences, such as the relevant institution (any 
institution, body, office or agency of the EU can be a respondent) must be called to act prior 
to bringing the action to the CJEU, and there are limited grounds of review.928 
In the EAEU this coupled procedure is limited only to the Commission. The EU also 
provides for a wider list of applicants, which includes private parties, member states and EU 
institutions. In the EAEU such actions can be submitted by Member States and economic 
entities. 
The procedure of challenging actions of the Commission is similar to that of 
challenging decisions of the Commission discussed in the previous section, and therefore their 
distinction is rather artificial. A difference to note is that in the case of challenges of actions 
there is no list of legal acts to be triggered under such challenge. 
The failure to act proceedings has no other comparable ones within the EAEU legal 
framework. Diyachenko and Entin note that the failure to act proceedings are different from 
that of the ECJ due to a broader interpretation thereof by the EAEU Court.929 The Court has 
formulated its interpretation of a failure to act in the Tarasik v Commission judgment. The 
                                                 
923 E.B. Diyachenko and K.V. Entin, "Kompetentsiia Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza: mify i 
real'nost'," Mezhdunarodnoe pravosudie, no. 3 (23) (2017): 78.  
924 Art.45(1)(a) Rules of Procedure. 
925 Case SE-1-2/1-16-KS, Sevlad v Commission, para. 7.1.2. 
926 Art.265 TFEU. 
927 Case 15/70, Chevalley v Commission, EU:C:1970:95 (18 November 1970), para. 6. 
928 Alexander Türk, Judicial review in EU law, Elgar European law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009), 171. 
929 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 59. 
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case concerned Commission’s alleged failure to act with regard to its duty to ensure realization 
of international agreements that form the legal basis of the Customs Union, conduct 
monitoring and control implementation of such international agreements and Commission 
decisions. The applicant concluded that such failure to act led to the dispute with the customs 
authority of Kazakhstan. In formulating its position towards failure to act, the Court invoked 
general legal understanding of an (illegal) failure to act and referred to national judicial 
practice of the Russian Federation. It further turned to the ECJ case law citing the so-called 
Comitology case: ‘A refusal to act, however explicit it may be, can be brought before the Court 
<…> since it does not put an end to the failure to act.’930 The Court came to the conclusion 
that 
‘in general, ‘improper failure to act’ means lack of action or improper action 
by the supranational body (official) of the duties assigned to it by Union law, 
in particular leaving a request from an economic entity without consideration 
in whole or in part, a response to the applicant not on the merits of her request, 
if the consideration of this request falls within the competence of the 
supranational body (official).’931 
Extending further, the Court stated that a negative response of the Commission can 
also be challenged as part of a failure to act action ‘if pursuing the action requested by the 
applicant constitutes [Commission’s] direct duty, which cannot be delegated to other persons 
(the so-called “special duty”).’932 The broader choice of the EAEU Court renders failure to act 
actions more effective. It can be argued that it is one of the ways for the Court to compensate 
for the limited number of legal remedies.933 
Diyachenko and Entin argue that the EAEU Court decided not to take ECJ’s position 
and rather take an approach similar to that of EAEU Member States, since in the EU the case 
is closed as soon as the relevant institution provides a clear position, even a negative one. The 
latter would work even if the institutions provided a position in the course of judicial 
proceedings.934 Indeed, as the ECJ underlined, ‘[Article 265 TFEU] refers to failure to act in 
the sense of failure to take a decision or to define a position’935 (the latter, following the call 
on the institution to act). Unlike the quoted Comitology case, in other cases the CJEU 
                                                 
930 Case 302/87, Parliament v Council, EU:C:1988:461 (27 September 1988), para. 17. In the EAEU Court 
judgment it is incorrectly cited as European Parliament v. European Council. 
931 Case SE-1-2/2-15-KS, Tarasik v Commission. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 69. 
934 Ibid., 59. 
935 Case C-258/05 P(R) (Order), Makhteshim-Agan and others v Commission, EU:C:2005:663 (28 October 
2005), para. 14. 
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considered the refusal to comply as a definition of position.936 Indeed, the ECJ wrapped up 
that ‘it follows from a constant case law that a decision to reject a complaint constitutes the 
definition of a position’.937 Therefore the Comitology case rather stands alone in the CJEU’s 
case law and does not fall in line for various reasons.938 
Therefore, the EAEU Court, either by mistake or consciously has decided to follow 
early CJEU’s case law instead of its more contemporary practice. In any event, this approach 
makes failure to act proceedings a more effective judicial remedy, which is a positive outcome 
as far as access to justice is concerned. 
6.2.4 Challenges of international agreements within the Union 
Challenges of international agreements within the Union are actions concerning the 
compliance of such agreements or their particular provisions with the TEAEU.939 This action 
must not be compared to the advisory opinion procedure on the conclusion of international 
agreements in the EU, which is an ex ante procedure, 940  only applicable to envisaged 
international agreements with third states, and will be discussed later in the chapter. In the 
EAEU law, as described in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1, international agreements within the Union 
are special kinds of agreements concluded between Member States. 
This is a rather obscure type of actions, an ex post review, which can be brought only 
by Member States.941 This is yet to happen. The obscurity follows from the fact that in order 
for the action to be considered by the Court, a plaintiff and a respondent must be identified, 
while international agreements within the Union are signed by heads of states at the meetings 
of the Supreme Council, the latter being only a platform for signing.942 Thus, only a Member 
State can be a respondent. However, the Statute of the Court states that: 
‘Any dispute may be accepted for examination by the Court only following a 
prior appeal of an applicant to a Member State or the Commission to address 
the issue in the pretrial order through consultation, negotiation or other means 
                                                 
936 Case T-66/02, Institouto N. Avgerinopouloy and others v Commisison, EU:T:2004:74 (15 March 2004), 
para. 33; Case T-34/05 R (Order), Makhteshim-Agan and others v Commission, EU:T:2005:147 (27 April 
2005), para. 70; Case 48-65, Lütticke v Commission, EU:C:1966:8 (1 March 1966), p. 27; Case T-28/90, Asia 
Motor France and others v Commission, EU:T:1992:98 (18 September 1992), para. 37. 
937 Case C-211/-05 P (Order), Campailla v Commission, EU:C:2005:760 (8 December 2005). 
938 See more on that in Türk, Judicial review in EU law, 187-88. 
939 Not to be confused with the EU’s advisory opinion procedure, see more further in the chapter. 
940 Although there is a possibility for such international agreements to be challenged ex post by challenging the 
Council decision for concluding the agreement within the action for annulment. 
941 For a discussion of some problematic points see Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian 
Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 57. 
942 Diyachenko and Entin, "Kompetentsiia Suda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza: mify i real'nost'," 77. 
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provided for by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union, 
except as expressly provided for by the Treaty.’943 
This means a Member State that considers that there is a violation of Union law would 
need to communicate with the rest of Member States prior to starting judicial procedures. This 
would be strange since all Member States must agree on the international agreement prior to 
signing it in any event. Similarly with acceding states, who are obliged to adopt all Union 
rules, which is preceded by accession negotiations.944 
6.2.5 Binding nature of EAEU Court’s decisions and their 
enforcement 
All direct actions before the EAEU Court lead to binding judgments, which follows 
from the Statute of the Court: “[h]aving reviewed the disputes …, the Court shall issue a 
decision that shall be binding on the parties to the dispute.”945 In one of its judgments, the 
EURASEC Court went further by declaring that its rulings were binding not only on the parties 
to the dispute, but erga omnes (discussed in Section 6.6).946 It can be argued that the wording 
of the aforementioned provision of the new Statute (it does not state that judgments are binding 
only on the parties to the disputed), similar to that of the EURASEC Court,947 allows for the 
same interpretation with regard to EAEU Court’s judgments.948 To refer to the international 
practice, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute has a much stronger provision, which clearly excludes 
binding force of its judgments except between parties to a dispute. This, however, did not 
preclude a precedent-like force of ICJ rulings.949 Nowadays, it is no longer convincing to only 
think of the role of international courts as dispute settlement, since the effects of their decisions 
exceed the confines of concrete cases.950 In fact, most judgments of international courts reach 
beyond the dispute and the parties.951 
Coupled with the Court’s task to ensure uniform application of Union law and with the 
need to respect the principle of legal certainty, which the EAEU Court often invokes, it only 
makes sense to make the findings of the Court with regard to Union law to be understood in 
the same way by other actors and by national judiciary. By no means it is intended to say that 
                                                 
943 Para. 43 Statute of EAEU Court. 
944 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives." 
945 Paras. 99 and 100 Statute of EAEU Court. 
946 Case 1-7/1-2012, Yuzhny Kuzbass v Commission (1 May 2017). 
947 Art.20(1) Statute of EURASEC Court. 
948 Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 55. 
949 See e.g. Shaw, International Law, 110. 
950 A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, "Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers," 
German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 979. 
951 Ibid., 987. 
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legal principles established should be blindly applied to future cases, as the circumstances and 
conditions should be met. However, it goes beyond the Aristotelian ‘treat like cases alike’. It 
is not a mechanical application of a previously decided point, and in no way it is ‘an avowed 
substitute for reason’.952 This point will be elaborated more as the chapter unveils. 
It is not yet clear how national judiciary will be affected. So far, for instance the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has pronounced itself in this respect regarding 
customs legislation in a rather soft manner: ‘When applying [decisions and dispositions of the 
Commission in the field of customs regulation], the courts should take into consideration the 
acts of the EAEU Court <…>’.953  
Further, unlike EU law,954 EAEU law does not designate explicit powers to the Court 
to impose any form of financial sanctions.955 In the EU this tool is rather developed and can 
take the form of periodic penalty payments or lump sums for a member state failing to fulfil 
an obligation.956 In the EAEU it is left to the parties of a dispute to determine the form and the 
manner of execution of the Court’s decision. If a judgment is not implemented, a Member 
State can apply to the EAEU Supreme Council “for measures required for its 
[implementation]”. 957  The EAEU Treaty does not clarify the procedure which follows 
specifically in this case, making the EAEU Supreme Council’s general rule of consensus 
applicable.958 As it consists of the heads of Member States, it can be concluded that when an 
EAEU Court decision is not implemented by a Member State, the head of that state can still 
vote on the measures to be adopted by the Supreme Council to ensure implementation. 
The Court cannot invalidate decisions of the Commission, meaning that even if it finds 
them contrary to the TEAEU or international agreements within the Union, they still remain 
in force until the Commission complies with the judgment.959 It is in line with the provision 
of the Statute of the Court stipulating that the Court cannot alter or override norms of Union 
                                                 
952 J. Bentham, "Extracts from Bentham’s Memorandum Book, 1818–19," in The works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. 
J. Bowring (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 511. 
953 Para.3, subpara.2 Plenary Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2016 No.18 
“On Certain Questions of the Application of Customs Legislation.” (emphasis added) 
954 Pecuniary sanctions may be imposed by the CJEU under Art.260 TFEU. 
955 However, the original EC Treaty did not provide penalties for member states failing to comply with the 
ECJ’s decision in the infringement proceedings. See Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 47. 
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law.960 It is different from the EU, where the ECJ is able to declare the act concerned to be 
void.961 In the EAEU the Commission is given no more than 60 days from the date of the entry 
into force of the Court’s judgment to bring its decision in compliance with Union law (unless 
the Court sets another timeframe). However, there is a way for the Court to suspend the 
decision of the Commission in case a party to the dispute provides for a reasonable request to 
do so.962 
6.3 Internal dimension of a supranational judiciary: mechanism 
ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all member states 
As has been mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 4, one of the major attacks on 
the powers of the Court has been the abolishment of, arguably the most important procedure, 
with the advent of the EAEU—preliminary ruling. Since it is the primary tool of the internal 
dimension of the autonomous legal order for ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all 
member states, it will be uncovered in stages. First, I will briefly look at the procedure how it 
stands in the EU. Second, I will review the procedure as it existed within the EURASEC legal 
framework. Third, since there is no preliminary ruling procedure in the EAEU, I will look into 
other possible avenues therein. 
6.3.1 Preliminary ruling: EU 
The preliminary ruling procedure in the EU is a system of judicial oversight within the 
judicial systems of member states in cooperation with the ECJ. Although the ECJ’s 
intervention is incidental, it is, in the words of the ECJ, ‘indispensable to the preservation of 
the very nature of the law established by the Treaties’,963 and even a ‘keystone’ of the judicial 
system of the EU: 
‘the judicial system as thus conceived has as its keystone the preliminary ruling 
procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue 
between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and 
the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of securing 
uniform interpretation of EU law . . . thereby serving to ensure its consistency, 
its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of 
the law established by the Treaties . . .’964 
                                                 
960 Para.102 Statute of EAEU Court. 
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This concerns both the interpretation of EU law provisions965 and their validity.966 
Therefore there are two types of preliminary references: 1) on the interpretation of EU law; 2) 
on the validity of EU law. 967  The importance of preliminary ruling can hardly be 
overestimated—it is within this procedure that all the major principles and doctrines of EU 
law, such as direct effect, primacy, state liability in damages, etc. were developed. The ECJ 
itself described it as  
‘the veritable cornerstone of the operation of the internal market, since it plays 
a fundamental role in ensuring that the law established by the Treaties retains 
its Community character with a view to guaranteeing that the law has the same 
effect in all circumstances in all the Member States of the European Union.’968 
Essentially, the ECJ gets involved in litigation in the national courts in order to promote 
uniform application of EU law.969 When the issue of interpretation of EU law appears before 
a national court, the latter can stay the case and make an inquiry to the ECJ for interpretation. 
When the national court is the court of final instance, it is obliged to refer to the ECJ with such 
an inquiry,970 unless two exceptions are in place: 1) the question referred is materially identical 
to a question that has already been dealt with in another preliminary ruling;971 or 2) points of 
law have been decided in a previous ruling, and ‘correct application of Union law may be so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question 
raised is to be resolved’972 (acte claire doctrine).973 After the ruling is delivered, it is sent back 
to the national court, which rules on the case in hand. 
The goal of the EU preliminary ruling procedure is similar to the whole mission of the 
EAEU Court, which is to preserve the uniform interpretation of the law and the effective 
functioning of the legal order itself.974 However, this procedure also goes beyond that stated 
purpose to also protect individual rights. This procedure includes participation of an individual 
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or an organization as a party to a dispute in a national court, where such an individual claims 
that a certain national legal norm is not to be applied due to its incompatibility with EU law.  
This procedure creates a unity of the judiciary since in integrates national courts into 
the CJEU system providing judicial oversight. It is a manifestation of the cooperation between 
the national judiciaries and the ECJ.975 This integration mitigates the limits of direct access of 
individuals to the CJEU, as described above. The fundamental principles of primacy and direct 
effect enable any individual or organization to turn to their own national courts and challenge 
the actions of respective states using EU law.  
EU practice suggests that the ECJ and national courts of the EU member states take 
advantage of this procedure widely. 976  In fact, national courts have a unique position to 
recognize problems in application of EU law in domestic legal orders, and they are (and have 
been) indispensable in precluding attempts of member states to circumvent certain EU legal 
obligations. 977  Through this procedure, individuals become, to a certain extent, agents 
monitoring member states’ compliance with EU legal obligations.978 An important factor is 
that national courts deliver the final ruling. The obligatory nature of such a ruling and its 
enforcement gain extra weight when a national court delivers it. 
6.3.2 Preliminary ruling: EURASEC 
Judicial architecture of the EURASEC provided for a preliminary ruling procedure, 
albeit with certain limitations. Thus, only a supreme judicial body of the Customs Union 
member state could make such a reference, depriving lower courts of the same possibility. 
This was rather unfortunate given the fact that in the EU the majority of preliminary reference 
requests come from lower courts.979 
However, such judicial bodies could institute a preliminary reference not only of its 
own volition, but also upon a request by economic entities.980 The issues to be raised should 
                                                 
975 CILFIT v Ministry of Health, para. 7. 
976 Court of Justice of the European Union Annual Report 2014: Synopsis of the Work of the Court of Justice, the 
General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2015, 
pp. 113-114. Altogether 8710 references for a preliminary ruling, which is almost equal to all direct actions 
(8901). 
977 Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 640. 
978 Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," 2419. 
979 66% of the total number of references for preliniary ruling submitted to the ECJ in 2016 (6372 out of 9616). 
See Court of Justice of the European Union Annual Report 2016: Judicial Activity, pp.109-111, available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_315741/. 
980 Art.3, para.2 Dogovor ob obrashchenii v Sud Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva 
khoziaistvuiushchikh sub"ektov po sporam v ramkakh Tamozhennogo soiuza i osobennostiakh 
sudoproizvodstva po nim. 
  
189 
have regarded the application of international agreements concluded within the Customs 
Union as well as acts of the Commission of the Customs Union.981 The preliminary ruling 
reference was subject to two conditions: 
1. The relevant international agreement or Customs Union Commission act affected the 
rights and legitimate interests of economic entities; 
2. The issues raised could have a substantial influence on the decision on the merits. 
The supreme judicial bodies of the Customs Union member states were reluctant to 
take advantage of that right. In fact, in one of the requests by an economic entity, the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation underlined that it was a right and not an obligation and 
therefore refused to proceed with the request.982 The fact that only economic entities could 
request the relevant judicial body to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling (and not e.g. 
state bodies) led to a substantial number of refusals.983 Once it was refused because the court 
ruled that the issue did not fall under the law of the Customs Union.984 
Regardless these shortcomings, a supreme judicial body was obliged to refer for a 
preliminary ruling if it was not subject to further appeal and if the EURASEC Court did not 
already decide on analogous issues.985 
During its short existence that lasted three years, the EURASEC Court gave only one 
preliminary ruling upon reference of the now defunct Supreme Economic Court of Belarus.986 
The national court asked to clarify the application of the rules of a number of decisions of the 
Customs Union Commission regarding customs duties. The case is prominent not only for 
being the only preliminary ruling dealt with by the EURASEC Court, but also for the Court’s 
persistence in delivering the ruling regardless the attempts of the referring national court to 
withdraw the request. Peculiarities of this case and the unenviable consequences thereof will 
be discussed in the Section 6.6 of this chapter. 
                                                 
981 Art.3, para.1 ibid. 
982 Opredelenie Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 29 maia 2015 goda No. 87-PEK. 
983 E.g. the supreme courts of the Russian Federation denied at least ten requests because they were submitted 
by customs authorities. See Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Challenges 
and Perspectives," 61. 
984 Opredelenie Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot 8 sentiabria 2013 goda No. VAS-8698/13. 
985 Art.3, para.3 Dogovor ob obrashchenii v Sud Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva 
khoziaistvuiushchikh sub"ektov po sporam v ramkakh Tamozhennogo soiuza i osobennostiakh 
sudoproizvodstva po nim. 
 
986 Case 1-6/1-2013, Tour Trans Company (10 July 2013); For analysis, see A.S. Ispolinov, "Naviazannyi 
monolog: pervoe preiuditsial’noe zakliuchenie Suda EvrAzES," Evraziiskii juridicheskii zhurnal, no. 8 (63) 
(2013). The Supreme Economic Court of Belarus no longer exists as a separate institution following the reform 
of the judiciary that took place in 2014 in accordance with Dekret Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus' No.6. O 
sovershenstvovanii sudebnoi sistemy Respubliki Belarus'. 29 November 2013. 
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6.3.3 Mechanisms available in the EAEU: Advisory Opinion? 
The removal of the preliminary ruling procedure in the EAEU Court disintegrates 
national courts from the Eurasian judicial system as there is no link to the domestic courts, 
which is similar to most other international courts. This might lead to differing practices and 
make the job of the EAEU Court to ensure the uniform application of Union law extremely 
difficult. The question stands whether there is a mechanism to substitute for it. 
The only procedure before the EAEU Court that has not yet been discussed is the 
advisory opinion. The procedure goes as follows: 
‘At the request of a Member State or a Body of the Union, the Court shall 
provide clarifications to provisions of the Treaty, international agreements 
within the Union and decisions of the Bodies of the Union and, at the request 
of employees and officials of the Bodies of the Union and the Court, to 
provisions of the Treaty, international agreements within the Union and 
decisions of the Bodies of the Union regarding labour relations . . .’987 
It has been argued in the literature that this is the procedure that could compensate for 
the lack of the preliminary ruling procedure in the EAEU.988 The reason is that Member States 
can assign national authorities and organisations (which arguably includes courts) to request 
clarifications from the EAEU Court: 
‘. . . a request to resolve a dispute or a request for clarification shall be lodged 
with the Court on behalf of a Member State by its authorised authorities and 
organisations, the list of which shall be compiled by each Member State and 
sent to the Court via diplomatic channels.’989 
However, this claim cannot stand for a number of reasons. Even in the case that 
Member States assign their national judiciary the right to ask for an advisory opinion, which 
has not happened yet, there are many problems with this procedure, which has little in common 
with the preliminary ruling procedure described above. 
Apart from the fact that it is left to Member States to decide whether and which national 
courts are to be included in the lists of referring organizations, there are at least three other 
major problems with the advisory opinion procedure. Two of them follow from the following 
provisions: 
                                                 
987 Para.46 Statute of EAEU Court. 
988 Para.49 Statute of EAEU Court. See e.g. Diyachenko and Entin, "The Court of the Eurasian Economic 
Union: Challenges and Perspectives," 62. 
989 Para.49 Statute of EAEU Court. 
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‘Providing clarifications by the Court shall mean providing an advisory opinion 
and shall not deprive the Member States of the right for joint interpretation of 
international agreements.’990 
and 
‘Advisory opinion issued following clarification requests shall be non-binding.’991 
Thus, advisory opinions are not binding, and the Court’s interpretation can be 
overruled by Member States, while preliminary rulings of the ECJ are binding with no 
possibility to be overruled by other actors. 992  Moreover, the ECJ stated that although 
preliminary rulings on interpretation are binding on the national referring court, other national 
courts and public authorities should treat the ruling as authoritative, when a question has 
already been answered,993 or the points of law dealt with.994 Preliminary rulings on validity 
give grounds for non-referring courts to consider the act as void.995 
However, what is meant by joint interpretation of international agreements by Member 
States is not entirely clear. As one of the interviewees from the Court underlined, this might 
prove a non-working provision, as there is no explanation of what it is exactly and at what 
level it must be done.996 
 A third problem that can be identified is that there is no requirement to make a 
reference for an advisory opinion in the EAEU, while preliminary ruling references in the EU 
are compulsory for national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law.997 
It should be noted that the first provision talks about “international agreements” 
without specifying which ones. However, given the context, it is rather clear that it means the 
TEAEU and international agreements within the Union, and, probably, other international 
agreements. Importantly, decisions of the Bodies of the Union are left out. Therefore, in 
principle, the Court can rule on the validity of decisions of EAEU institutions using this 
procedure, without being able to be overruled by Member States. However, the effect of such 
a ruling within the advisory opinion is still dubious, given it’s not binding. 
                                                 
990 Para.47 Statute of EAEU Court. 
991 Para.98 Statute of EAEU Court. 
992 Case 52/76, Benedetti v Munari, EU:C:1977:16 (3 February 1977), para. 26. 
993 Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, p. 38. 
994 Case 283/81, CILFIT v Ministry of Health, para. 14. 
995 Case 66/80, International Chemical Corporation v Administratzione delle finanze dello Stato, para. 13. 
996 Interview 3 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
997 Art.267 TFEU. 
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Finally, the issue of validity of EAEU law provisions pertains. As has been mentioned, 
in the EU, the preliminary reference procedure is also used by private parties to indirectly 
challenge the legality of EU acts.998 This is done by challenging a national measure that 
implements an EU act in a national court. Then, if a national court has any doubt regarding 
the legality of underlining EU act, it is obliged to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ.999 
In principle, it seems that the issue of validity of an EAEU act can be brought before the Court 
through an advisory opinion procedure. However, given the above, the effect of an opinion 
declaring invalidity is questionable within this procedure. 
Having established that the advisory opinion procedure in the EAEU is no substitute 
to the preliminary ruling procedure, it must be uncovered what the advisory opinion procedure 
can offer. 
Generally, an advisory function is not an inherent function of judicial bodies, which 
are first and foremost conceived to settle legal disputes.1000 Only a handful of international 
judicial bodies (however, including such major ones as the ICJ and ECtHR) possess advisory 
opinion powers, albeit differing considerably in terms of its extent from a very large scope to 
a very limited one.1001 Even less of them have had exercised the function.1002 
Of particular interest is the advisory function of the ECtHR, since the ECJ in its 
Opinion 2/13 drew parallels between this procedure and the EU’s preliminary reference,1003 
which, arguably, could be seen by proponents as justifying the substitutive role of an advisory 
function as compared to preliminary ruling. However, the ECtHR advisory opinion is subject 
to the main limitation set out above: such opinions are not binding.1004 Therefore, while some 
authors claim that the CJEU considered these two procedures as ‘the same’,1005 this hardly 
follows from the wording of the Luxembourg Court. The ECJ did not say the procedures were 
equal, it rather used the comparison in order to underline that the preliminary ruling procedure 
could be undermined in the existence of an additional procedure, although not equating one to 
another.1006 
                                                 
998 Mainly to bypass the rigorous standing test imposed by Art.263 TFEU in the action for annulment. See 
Albors-Llorens, "Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Union," 296-98.  
999 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, paras. 15 and 17. 
1000 K. Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions," German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 
1033. 
1001 See ibid. 
1002 Ibid., 1039. 
1003 Opinion 2/13, para. 196. 
1004 Art.6 Protocol 16 ECHR. 
1005 See e.g. F. Korenica, The EU accession to the ECHR: between Luxembourg's search for autonomy and 
Strasbourg's credibility on human rights protection (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015), 416. 
1006 See Opinion 2/13, paras. 197-99. 
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If available, advisory opinion as a non-judicial function is usually introduced as 
complementary to the contentious power without substituting it. Therefore, the power to 
request such opinions is given to institutions that could not be parties in a contentious case. 
This would eliminate inclination to favour non-binding advice instead of binding contentious 
jurisdiction.1007  The EAEU Court is different since Member States can request advisory 
opinions, and therefore can have an inclination to avoid binding jurisdiction. 
The ECJ also has an advisory opinion power. However, it is also not comparable to the 
EAEU Court’s advisory function. The ECJ is not generally empowered to give advisory 
opinions except for issues relating to conclusion of international agreements: 
‘A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission 
may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement 
envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is 
adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended 
or the Treaties are revised.’1008 
Therefore, it is binding. The latest prominent example of application of this provision, 
with a particular relevance to the legal order autonomy, is Opinion 2/13, where the 
Luxembourg Court held that the draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR is 
incompatible with the EU treaties.1009 Following this advisory opinion, the agreement in the 
current form cannot be concluded. 
This competence is rather similar to the national constitutional courts’ involvement 
regarding conclusion of international agreements in order to prevent declaration of 
unconstitutionality of an agreement after its entering into force.1010 Therefore, this procedure 
is rather irrelevant for the analysis of the EAEU Court’s advisory opinion powers. It is, 
however, relevant in the sense that this advisory opinion procedure was used by the ECJ in a 
law-making capacity1011 regarding the legal order autonomy, meaning that it was the source 
of new norms. 1012 
Moreover, there is a similar provision in the EAEU: 
                                                 
1007 Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions," 1033-34. 
1008 Art.218(11) TFEU. 
1009 Opinion 2/13. See more in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3. 
1010 Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions," 1033-38; For instance, in Russia, see Aust, 
Modern treaty law and practice, 165. 
1011 Contra Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions," 1040. 
1012 Chapter 1 of this thesis shows the development of rules around legal order autonomy largely using the 
vehicle of advisory opinions. 
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‘The Court shall provide clarifications to provisions of an international treaty 
of the Union with a third party, if it is provided in the international treaty.’1013 
This is however different, since it is an ex post advisory opinion, rather than ex ante, 
as in the case of the ECJ, and also a non-binding one. 
On the other hand, the EAEU advisory opinion procedure does not have the limitation 
to be discussed in Section 6.5 of this chapter, which is a ban on the “creation of new norms”. 
The question is therefore whether an advisory opinion can be a source for new norms, i.e. 
whether they have a law-making character. 
Altogether, the architecture of the EAEU’s advisory opinion procedure looks very 
similar to the way decisions of international judiciary influence the legal discourse.1014  This 
shows that there are essentially two competing discourses: one of the Court and the other one 
of the Member States (see Figure 4).  
 
                                                 
1013 Para.48 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1014 N. Petersen, "Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice – Factors of Success," German Law Journal 
12, no. 5 (2011): 1298-99. 
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Figure 4 The cycle of the normative change and the dual legal discourse1015 
 
However, Member States have priority position in this. Thus, if the issue is brought to 
the EAEU Court, the connection between its advisory opinion and a development of the rule 
is in no way guaranteed due to the availability of a competing Member States’ discourse 
having priority. The extent of influence of the Court in this scenario is dependent on Member 
States’ accepting its interpretation. Member States are essentially the final arbiter who decide 
the discourse and determine the prevailing rule. However, this is not to deny the influence in 
case of non-acceptance in full, since the Court can sway the opinion of Member States to a 
                                                 
1015 The figure has been inspired by one in ibid., 1299., which itself is based on Wayne Sandholtz’s model of 
normative change. See W. Sandholtz, "Dynamics of international norm change: Rules against wartime 
plunder," European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1 (2008). 
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certain degree. Thus, advisory opinions in international law, regardless their non-binding 
character, do nevertheless contribute to the development of international law.1016 Moreover, 
the institution of an advisory opinion has been widely accepted as contributing to the 
development of international law, having authoritative, and even erga omnes character. 
Nevertheless, such authority is still of persuasive nature.1017 This should be no different for 
the EAEU Court’s advisory opinions. It is clear that under such limitations, the impact of 
EAEU Court’s advisory opinions will depend on the reception and acceptance by the Member 
States (and, to a certain degree, EAEU institutions). 
6.4 External dimension of a supranational judiciary: exclusive 
jurisdiction 
Interpretation of Union law raises a question if there is another authority, apart from 
the Court, that is potentially enabled to do that. As it has been shown, Member States are able 
to interpret Union law bypassing (and surpassing) the Court, subject to limitation set out 
above. Another avenue, an external one, is an international dispute settlement institution. If 
disputes e.g. between Member States over Union law are brought to another forum, the 
problem would arise that if Union law is interpreted by different bodies, the autonomy of the 
legal order would be threatened and, eventually, fragmented. 
An exclusive jurisdiction clause would bar ‘litigation before any forum other than the 
one designated under the jurisdiction-granting instrument…’, 1018  which excludes forum 
shopping. It is however a rare thing in international law. By contrast, in the EU, exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ is hardwired into the founding treaties in Article 344 TFEU: 
‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.’1019 
This means that there are limits to what kinds of disputes EU member states can settle 
in other institutions (e.g. ICJ or arbitration1020) and using other practices (e.g. retaliation, 
                                                 
1016 Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions."; Lauterpacht, The development of international 
law by the International Court; L. Boisson de Chazournes, "Advisory Opinions and the Furtherance of the 
Common Interest of Mankind," in International Organization and International Dispute Settlement: Trends 
and Prospects, ed. L. Boisson de Chazournes, C.P.R. Romano, and R. Mackenzi (Brill, Nijhoff, 2002); Y. 
Shany, "No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International 
Judiciary," European Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009). 
1017 Oellers-Frahm, "Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions," 1052. 
1018 Y. Shany, The competing jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 180. 
1019 Art. 344 TFEU. See also Opinion 1/91; Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant). 
1020 For one of the latest rulings on bilateral investment treaty arbitration clauses see Case C-284/16, Slovakia v 
Achmea BV. 
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sanctions) available under public international law. Nevertheless, as has been outlined in 
Chapter 1, the ECJ concluded that the EU can participate in setting up international dispute 
mechanisms issuing binding decisions. This is, however, subject to several conditions, which 
concern exclusive rights of the ECJ. These are impossibility for other dispute resolution 
institutions or other bodies, apart from the CJEU, to interpret EU law and allocation of 
competence. However, this is only the case where such an interpretation becomes binding on 
the EU. It therefore would not have effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order in a situation 
where an EU law issue arises before a national court outside the EU.1021  
TEAEU does not provide for exclusive jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Treaty states 
that a ‘dispute may be referred to the Court of the Union if the parties do not agree on the use 
of other resolution procedures.’1022 Therefore, this provision contains potential danger of 
alternative interpretations of EAEU law coming from other dispute settlement institutions. 
It must be noted that the EURASEC Court pronounced itself on the issue of exclusive 
jurisdiction in the Vichiunai-RUS case.1023 The case concerned a company, which was found 
in breach of both Russian domestic legislation and international agreements on special 
economic zones, as well as the Customs Code of the Customs Union. The company believed 
that the Russian customs authorities and judiciary violated its rights and legitimate interests in 
the field of entrepreneurship and other economic activities, which were provided by the 
international agreements within the then Customs Union and Single Economic Space. It made 
a request to the Commission to seek interpretation from the EURASEC Court of a number of 
issues, such as Customs Union provisions on the outflow of means of transportation 
conducting international shipments and procedures of entry into force of international 
agreements of the Customs Union and Single Economic Space and their temporary 
application. The Commission refused the applicant to make the request to the EURASEC 
Court citing lack of legal uncertainty in application of respective norms and stating that 
interpretation of national law falls beyond the jurisdiction of the EURASEC Court. The 
company turned to the EURASEC Court to challenge Commission’s failure to act.  
The EURASEC Court sided with the Commission and ruled that there was no failure 
to act. Importantly, however, it underlined that interpretation of correlation of rules of customs 
legislation of the Customs Union and national legislation falls under the exclusive competence 
of the EURASEC Court. This was confirmed by the Appellate Chamber of the EURASEC 
                                                 
1021 Case C-131/03 P, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. and others v Commission, para. 102. 
1022 Art.112 TEAEU. 
1023 Case 2-4/6-2014, Vichiunai-RUS v Commission (30 May 2014). 
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Court, 1024  which, in effect went further to justify the treaty interpretation as exclusive 
competence of the Court. According to the Appellate Chamber, there is a distinction between 
interpretation as elucidation and interpretation as clarification. The former makes part of the 
process of law enforcement, while the latter is a special form of external public expression of 
the results of the former for public use, and it is an independent form of law implementation. 
The exclusive nature of the competence to interpret by the Court is intrinsic in the latter case. 
The Appellate Chamber underlined that this view is in line with the VCLT. To justifying this 
conclusion under the EURASEC rules, it relied on the provisions of the EURASEC Treaty 
and Statute of the EURASEC Court stipulating that the Court ensures uniform application of 
the EURASEC Treaty and other international agreements within the EURASEC, and decisions 
of the institutions, and that it interprets international agreements, comprising the legal basis of 
the Customs Union, acts adopted by the institutions of the Customs Union.1025  
Be as it may, the TEAEU provision allowing for using other resolution procedures, if 
interpreted broadly, can include other dispute settlement institutions. However, the 
interpretative practice can (and should) follow another route, taking into account the position 
of the EURASEC Court and the arguments provided below. In fact, as the ECJ has found in 
Opinion 1/91, exclusive jurisdiction follows not from Article 344 TFEU per se, but rather 
from Article 19(1) TEU, according to which the ECJ must ‘ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed’, while Article 344 TFEU only confirms 
this: 
‘[T]he jurisdiction conferred on the EEA Court . . . is likely to adversely affect 
the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, the 
autonomy of the [EU] legal order, respect for which must be assured by the 
Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty [now Article 19(1) 
TEU]. This exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 
[344 TFEU].’1026 
It is not immediately clear why exclusive jurisdiction flows from Article 19(1) TEU, 
especially, as it has been discussed, most other international courts do not provide for 
exclusive jurisdiction. It becomes more clear, along with the differentiation between an 
autonomous legal order, and legal orders of other international organizations, when the direct 
applicability and primacy of EU law are taken into account, which, in themselves, require 
uniform interpretation, aided by the preliminary reference procedure.1027 This leads to the 
                                                 
1024 Vichiunai-RUS v Commission (Appeal) (7 October 2014). 
1025 Art.8 EURASEC Treaty; Art.13(1) and (4)(v) Statute of EURASEC Court. 
1026 Opinion 1/91, para. 35. 
1027 Lock, The European Court of Justice and international courts, 81. 
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ECJ’s monopoly on interpretation of EU law and declaring the norms thereof invalid for 
national courts. The same consideration must apply to international judicial institutions, 
especially that they have less links to the ECJ (no similar preliminary reference procedure).1028 
Further, the ECJ regards Article 344 TFEU to be an expression of the duty of loyal 
cooperation1029—a key constitutional principle of EU law. The last part of Article 4(3) reads 
as follows: 
‘The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives.’1030 
This systemic, legally enforceable principle has become central to prevent and resolve 
conflicts in the EU.1031 It helped to build the foundations of the EU legal order and guarantees 
the cohesion with national legal orders.1032 
A similar provision can be found in the TEAEU, listed as one of the basic principles 
on which the functioning of the Union is based, which has been reiterated by the EAEU 
Court:1033 
‘The Member States shall create favourable conditions to ensure proper 
functioning of the Union and shall refrain from any measures that might 
jeopardise the achievement of its objectives.’1034 
Moreover, exclusive jurisdiction is broader than Article 344 TFEU and essentially 
covers all cases over which the CJEU has jurisdiction.1035 
Further, the EAEU Court possesses broad kompetenz-kompetenz to determine its 
jurisdiction: 
‘All matters regarding the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve a dispute shall be 
resolved by the Court. In determining whether the Court has jurisdiction to 
                                                 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), para. 169. 
1030 Art.4(3) TEU. The provision is however more comprehensive than that, and it was even extended by the 
Lisbon Treaty and in full the provision reads as follows: “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” 
1031 Marcus Klamert, The principle of loyalty in EU law, Oxford studies in European law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 298. 
1032 For the ways in which it does so see ibid. 
1033 Opinion SE-2-1/2-17-BK, Transport Policy Protocol (20 November 2017). 
1034 Art.3 TEAEU. 
1035 Lock, The European Court of Justice and international courts, 91. 
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resolve a dispute, the Court shall be governed by the Treaty, international 
agreements within the Union and/or international agreements of the union with 
a third party.’1036 
The broad character of this kompetenz-kompetenz is underlined by the limits on 
extending the competence of other bodies of the Union, discussed in Chapter 4. To recall, the 
provision of the Statute of the Court goes as follows: 
‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall not include extension of the competence of 
Bodies of the Union in excess of that expressly provided for by the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union.’1037 
It is important to note here that ‘Bodies of the Union’, for the purposes of the Statute 
of the Court, are understood as all except for the Court.1038 Therefore, the possible Court’s 
competence extension is not limited by this provision. 
Therefore, if these provisions are taken together, there are the necessary preconditions 
for the Court to interpret its powers in line with the concept of exclusive jurisdiction. 
6.5 Creating new norms 
In this section I turn to the last major attack on the powers of the Court mentioned in 
the introduction to Chapter 4 along with the removal of the preliminary ruling procedure and 
the direct ban on the ability of the Court to establish implied powers. A novelty as compared 
to the EURASEC Court, the Statute of the EAEU Court provides that Court’s decisions do not 
change and/or invalidate the norms of EAEU law or national law which are in force, and the 
Court does not create new ones.1039  
This provision can be divided into two parts: first, the part on changing and/or 
invalidating Union law or national law, and second, the part on creating new norms. 
The first part refers both to all sources of Union law and national law. This itself can 
be divided into two parts: national law and Union law. The national law part is less 
controversial since the Court still can declare national norms or parts thereof as not in 
accordance with EAEU law, while not encroaching on the power of appropriate national 
authorities to change or invalidate them in practice. The part on Union law is more 
controversial, as, for instance, the ECJ can annul EU acts on its own.1040 If the EAEU Court 
                                                 
1036 Para.41 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1037 Para.42 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1038 Para.2 Staute of EAEU Court. 
1039 Para.102 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1040 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, para. 15. 
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finds a Commission’s decision or certain of its provisions conflicting with the TEAEU or 
international agreements within the Union, they nevertheless remain in effect after the entry 
into force of the relevant decision of the Court until the execution of the decision by the 
Commission.1041 It must be noted that the EURASEC Court interpreted its powers in a manner 
similar to the ECJ.1042  
The second part is even more controversial. In principle, with no explicit provision on 
the CJEU not to create new norms, it can be argued that it is not there to do so either. However, 
such a strict explicit rule is encroaching on a non-existing boundary since no clear distinction 
between the enunciation of a new norm, or law-making, and the interpretation of a norm, or 
law-identification, can be drawn. Further, the question arises how encompassing the idea of a 
“norm” is. If one is to take Dworkin’s distinction between rules and principles, which are both 
categories of norms, 1043 do both fall under the definition? The issue of judicial creation of new 
norms is therefore an issue of perspective and terminology. 
In its rigid interpretation, this provision is a pure Montesquieu’s bouche de la loi 
perception of judiciary, where judges only apply law and do not create legal norms, since it is 
the role reserved for the drafters.1044 Brownlie seemingly believed it was true with regard to 
the ICJ.1045 However, such positions (or at least rigorous understandings thereof) are hard to 
sustain, not least because, as Kant explained in his Critique of Pure Reason, rules do not spell 
out the conditions of their own application.1046 Thus, interpretation inevitably contributes to 
the content, and discretion and creativity in applying law makes the law.1047 
According to some scholars, law-making is an intrinsic element of adjudication, 
although not all law-making falls within a court’s competence.1048 As the epigraph suggests, 
contrary to Montesquieu, Lauterpacht believed that every society had judicial law-making as 
                                                 
1041 Para.111 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1042 Case 1-7/1-2013, Yuzhny Kuzbass v Commission II (8 April 2013). See more in the section “Reasons 
behind the reduction in powers”. 
1043 Ronald Dworkin, Taking rights seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 22-28. 
1044 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, De l'esprit des loix (Paris: Chatelain, 1749), bk. XI, ch. 6, 404. 
1045 “The Court applies the law and does not make it.” However, even following such a strong statement, 
Brownlie spelled out circumstances where this is not necessarily the case. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
public international law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 20-22. The new edition of the 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law by Crawford has the statement softened by adding “in 
theory”. See Crawford and Brownlie, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 40. 
1046 I. Kant, P. Guyer, and A.W. Wood, Critique of pure reason, repr. w. corr. ed., The Cambridge edition of 
the works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); M. Koskenniemi, 
"Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization," 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 1 (2006): 9. 
1047 R. B. Brandom, "Some pragmatist themes in Hegel's idealism: Negotiation and administration in Hegel's 
account of the structure and content of conceptual norms," European Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 
180. 
1048 Bogdandy and Venzke, "German Law Journal," 1345. 
  
202 
a permanent feature of administration of justice.1049 Thus, understanding the enunciation of 
the new rule as no more than an  application of an existing legal principle or an interpretation 
of an existing rule is nothing but a fiction created to reconcile the judicial law-making fact and 
the orthodox doctrine. Kelsen also argued for the impossibility to maintain the line between 
law-creation and law-application.1050 
The EAEU Court judge Neshataeva certainly believes so with regard to the Eurasian 
judiciary, saying, back in the EURASEC times, that the Court was able to create new legal 
rules.1051 Such is the approach of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which confirms 
that it is part of the competence of supranational and international courts.1052 Essentially it 
believes it is particularly warranted when it fills in legal gaps and when it solves 
contradictions.1053 It sees it ultra vires when it goes against what is clearly stated in the text, 
or when it creates new rights or obligations without sufficient justification in the relevant 
positive law; and particularly illegal when it creates new normative foundations or structurally 
alters the fundamental balance of power.1054 
Thus, courts are not merely impartial arbiters who apply and interpret exogenous 
norms.1055 In the majority of cases rules do not allow for only one result and the judges have 
to choose between alternative meanings to be given to the words.1056 As Hart stated: 
‘It is only the tradition that judges “find” and do not “make” law that conceals 
this, and presents their decisions as if they were deductions smoothly made 
from clear preexisting rules without intrusion of the judge's choice.’1057 
In fact, decisions for concrete cases can hardly be derived from abstract legal concepts 
by the mere exercise of logical deduction, and application of legal norms often involves the 
development of the applied norm itself.1058 
                                                 
1049 Lauterpacht, The development of international law by the International Court, 155. 
1050 H. Kelsen, Law and peace in international relations : the Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures, 1940-41 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), 163. 
1051 T.N. Neshataeva, "K voprosu o sozdanii Evraziiskogo soiuza: integratsiia i nadnatsionalizm," Zakon, no. 6 
(2014). 
1052 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, for an English translation, see 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html. The judgment deals with the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).   
1053 Ibid., para.64. 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Petersen, "Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice – Factors of Success," 1295. 
1056 H. L. A. Hart, The concept of law, 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
1994), 12. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Bogdandy and Venzke, "Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers," 985. 
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As has been mentioned in Chapter 5 regarding the ICJ, interpretation of legal rules can 
in fact lead to the creation of new law. Even if one takes an orthodox view that judicial 
decisions exist essentially to settle a particular dispute or question, they in fact usually go far 
beyond that, having a degree of generality with possible application for future cases.1059 Thus, 
they become interpretative ‘rules about (written) rules’. However, they can also become rules 
of their own, or self-standing rules or principles to fill lacunae. 
The norms are made by way of interpreting relevant texts and applying them to novel 
situations.1060 The creation of a new norm involves a development in law, meaning that the 
law on a particular matter has to differ from the way it was previously. This development has 
to be caused by a judgment of the EAEU Court. The EAEU Court’s case law has already 
shown law-creation. For example, in the General Freight case, mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
EAEU Court has created a rule of making the EAEU bound by international agreements, which 
do not fall under any of the categories of Union law, if certain conditions are met.1061 It can be 
deemed a legal norm absent from Union law prior to the EAEU Court’s judgment. 
As for future effect of case law, it must be noted that it can impact the legal order in a 
different manner as compared to traditional sources of law. The binary understanding of case 
law as binding or not is too simplistic vis-à-vis their practical application and the system-
building features of the judiciary.1062 To apply the words of Judge Jessup of the ICJ, “the 
influence of the Court’s decisions is wider than their binding force.”1063 
Generally, in civil law systems, including a treaty-based system such as EU law, and, 
by analogy, EAEU law, precedents function primarily as interpretative precedents (or legal 
topoi)1064: they are “not formally binding but provide interpretative presumptions, that is, 
authoritative but defeasible reasons in favour of a particular interpretation.”1065 However, even 
in such systems precedents retain the character of legal rules since positive law cannot foresee 
                                                 
1059 Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the judicial function, 181-82. 
1060 E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, "Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals," 
German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1058. 
1061 Case SE-1-2/2-16-AP, General Freight v Commission (Appeal). 
1062 M. Jacob, "Lawmaking Through International Adjudication," German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1015-
16. 
1063 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, 163 (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Jessup), para. 9 (1970). 
1064 On the idea of topoi in general as well as legal iteration thereof see S. Rubinelli and D.S. Levene, Ars 
topica : the classical technique of constructing arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, Argumentation library 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2009); T. Viehweg and W.C. Durham, Topics and law : a contribution to basic research 
in law (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993); G. Kreuzbauer, "Topics in Contemporary Legal Argumentation: 
Some Remarks on the Topical Nature of Legal Argumentation in the Continental Law Tradition," Informal 
Logic 28, no. 1 (2008). 
1065 Beck, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, 106. 
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everything or close every lacuna, and self-standing precedent (i.e. a rule or norm) can appear 
along with an interpretative one. 1066  Thus, despite the absence of a formal doctrine of 
precedent and of concept of ratio decidendi in EU law, the CJEU follows closely its own 
rulings.1067 
In its interpretative practices the CJEU employs a combination of three techniques, 
which are based on literal, systemic and purposive arguments.1068 The discretion of the CJEU 
and deployment of this or that technique depends on the degree of legal (un)certainty. 
Although these methods of interpretation must not be examined in isolation, 1069  the 
characteristic element of the CJEU’s interpretative method is the third one, which is also 
known as teleological approach.1070 According to Pescatore, the ECJ opted for this approach 
since the founding treaties are permeated with purpose-driven functionalism.1071 Teleological 
approach can be distinguished into three types: 1072 1) effet utile reasoning, or securing the 
effectiveness of an EU law provision after examining the normative context;1073 2) teleological 
interpretation stricto sensu, where ambiguous or incomplete EU law provisions are interpreted 
in light of the objectives they pursue;1074 3) consequentialist interpretation, where the focus is 
on the consequences of an interpretative choice.1075 
                                                 
1066 Ibid., 106-07. 
1067 Ibid., 438. 
1068 For a comprehensive analysis see ibid. 
1069 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, "To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and 
the European Court of Justice," EUI Working Paper AEL 2013/9: 48. 
1070 N. Fennelly, "Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice," Fordham International Law Journal 
20 (1996): 664. 
1071 P. Pescatore, ‘Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation dans la 
juirsprudence de la Cour de justice’, in Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, vol. 2, (Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 1972), 325-363. 
1072 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, "To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the 
European Court of Justice," 25.   
1073 Regarding the effectiveness of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, Lenaerts gives an example of Case C-439/08, 
VEBIC, EU:C:2010:739 (7 December 2010), para. 64. Regarding the preliminary reference procedure 
enshrined in Article 267 TFEU—Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, EU:C:2010:363 (22 
June 2010), para. 45. Regarding the primacy of directly effective provisions of EU law—Case C-409/06, 
Winner Wetten, EU:C:2010:503 (8 September 2010), para. 56.  
1074 Lenaerts gives an example of Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596 (6 November 2003)., where the 
ECJ ruled that ‘[i]n the light of the purpose of the directive [i.e. the protection of the right to respect for private 
life], the expression data concerning health used in Article 8(1) thereof must be given a wide interpretation so 
as to include information concerning all aspects, both physical and mental, of the health of an individual’.Ibid., 
para. 50.   
1075 Case 6-64, Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66 (15 July 1964). is an example thereof, as the ECJ described the 
consequences that would have followed, had EU law not enjoyed primacy over national law: ‘[t]he executive 
force of [EU] law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without 
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the [Treaties] set out in [Article 3 TEU] and giving rise to the 
discrimination prohibited by Article [18 TFEU]’ (ibid., p. 1159.). Another example provided by Lenaerts is the 
ruling of the ECJ in Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost. Had national courts been empowered 
to declare acts of secondary EU law invalid, the ECJ found that such power would have given rise to 
‘[d]ivergences between courts in the Member States as to the validity of [EU] acts [which] would [have been] 
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Further, the CJEU has developed a communautaire, or integrationist, approach not 
least because of the legal language which enshrines political compromises made by Member 
States, leaving it at times vague and conflicting. The communautaire approach is therefore 
CJEU’s choice to resolve the indeterminacy.1076 
The CJEU interprets the law in order to fill any legal gaps, which, if remain, would 
‘lead to a result contrary both to the spirit of the Treaty […] and to its system’.1077 However, 
there are limits to interpretation. When interpreting EU law the CJEU is bound by the 
principles of institutional balance (each institution acting within the limits of the powers 
conferred) and mutual sincere cooperation,1078 and should strike a balance with those when 
ensuring effective judicial protection.1079 In fact, contrary to the usual perception, teleological 
interpretation does not necessarily mean extension of the scope of EU law, but can act as an 
agent of the opposite.1080 
Further, the freedom of interpretation the CJEU possesses is not the same as that of a 
legislator.1081 The court is always confined to answer the question put before it and by a 
number constraints set by the context of justification.1082 This is similar in the EAEU, where 
no decision of the Court may extend beyond the issues stated in the application.1083 
The EAEU Court relies on various interpretative tools, including teleological 
approach.1084 In its practice it can also rely on more specific approaches to interpretation, such 
as historical interpretation in order to disclose the essence and contents of relevant norms 
through comparison with norms that were in effect previously. 1085  As a general rule, it 
interprets TEAEU provisions in their systemic interrelation on the basis of generally 
recognised principles and norms of international law, taking into account Article 31 of the 
VCLT (which establishes general rules of interpretation).1086  
                                                 
liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of the [EU] legal order and detract from the fundamental requirement 
of legal certainty’.Ibid., para. 15.   
1076 Beck, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, 442. 
1077 Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, para. 25.  
1078 Art.13(2) TEU. 
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1081 Beck, The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, 440. 
1082 Ibid. 
1083 Para.101 Statute of EAEU Court. 
1084 As in the case of Opinion SE-2-1/2-17-BK, Transport Policy Protocol. 
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1086 See e.g. Ibid. 
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Given the aforementioned, the provision regarding the creation of new norms is 
essentially trying to encroach on the Court’s very function,1087 which is virtually impossible 
to uphold in practice, making it rather empty. Therefore, it is not only misleading, it is 
completely unhelpful in deciding the limits of the Court’s powers, and eventually, legally 
speaking, does not change anything in the interpretative practices of the Court, whatever 
approach or technique the Court choses. The only thing it achieves, together with other 
limiting provisions and changes in Court’s competences, is the political pressure from Member 
States, which returns us to the issue of independence. 
6.6 Reasons behind the reduction in powers1088 
This chapter has shown a drastic reduction of powers as well as other peculiar 
limitations of the EAEU Court. It could be argued that the Member States have adopted a 
critical approach to the practice of judicial review on a supranational level along the lines of 
critical approaches to judicial review in general.1089 However, such critical accounts are based 
on the notion of democracy, that is, people and their elected and accountable representatives. 
Thus, it is argued that judicial review threatens democracy and is both fundamentally unfair 
and politically dangerous, as unelected judges who are not directly accountable gain 
considerable power.1090 In theory, the idea that Member States themselves can interpret EAEU 
law, as provided, for example, in the EAEU advisory opinion procedure discussed above, 
would be closer to such accountability. However, how democratic are the Member States in 
question themselves? 
It is more likely that this is just one instance of a range of power-preserving measures 
by Member States. There are many reasons why Member States would want to limit the 
powers of the EAEU judiciary. One of them is the proactive attitude taken by the previous 
EURASEC Court from the very start, borrowing from the CJEU. 
                                                 
1087 On the judicial function in an international context see Hernández, The International Court of Justice and 
the judicial function. 
1088 Parts of this section are based on my previously published work: M. Karliuk, "The Limits of the Judiciary 
within the Eurasian Integration Process," in The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union : moving 
toward a greater understanding 
ed. A. Di Gregorio and A. Angeli (The Hague, The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2016). 
1089 See e.g. J. Waldron, "A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights," Oxford Journal Legal Studies 13, 
no. 1 (1993). 
1090 W. Waluchow, "Constitutionalism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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EURASEC Court’s practices even lead Ispolinov to describe it as a “new-style 
institution of international justice”.1091 He claims that one of its very first judgments—Yuzhny 
Kuzbass1092—was the first case of judicial activism in the post-Soviet space.1093 The Southern 
Kuzbass company challenged a provision of the Commission’s decision as violating customs 
legislation of the Customs Union. The EURASEC Court ruled that the provision in question 
was indeed in violation of integrational agreements within the framework of the Customs 
Union and Single Economic Space,1094 and the Appellate Chamber upheld the judgment.1095 
The Commission abided by the ruling and adopted a decision removing the provision in 
question. However, the decision adopted in order to comply with the judgment was set to enter 
30 days after its official publication. The Southern Kuzbass company disagreed with the 
timeframe arguing incorrect implementation of the EURASEC Court judgment, violation of 
the rights and lawful interests of the applicant, and prevention of the applicant from 
challenging judgments of national judiciary, which applied the provision that had been 
pronounced breaching Customs Union law. The applicant turned to the EURASEC Court for 
a clarification. The Court argued that legal consequences of declaring an act of the 
Commission or its separate provisions as violating norms of higher legal force makes it 
nugatory as of the moment of its adoption or of the moment when it became incompliant with 
international agreements adopted within the Customs Union. Further, the Court’s judgment 
has direct effect since such provisions are considered repealed (meaning void) as of the 
moment of adoption of the act. Moreover, the Court declared its judgment applicable beyond 
the parties to the dispute and extended it erga omnes, which would have as consequence 
possibility to review judgments of national courts that applied the provision in question. 
The Court also gave a broad interpretation of the provision of the Statute of the 
EURASEC Court that it “adopts decisions, imposing measures of its implementation”.1096 The 
Court interpreted it as including the ability of the Court to set the date from which the act or 
separate provisions thereof become void. In case the Court does not set such a date, they 
become void ab initio, which was the case in this situation. 
                                                 
1091 A.S. Ispolinov, "First Judgments of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Community: Reviewing Private 
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The term ‘judicial activism’ is very indeterminate as such,1097 and ‘in and of itself, the 
notion of “activism” is rarely helpful’,1098 however, in this case, interpretation of international 
agreements was indeed more extensive than the textual provisions would suggest. In 
particular, while the relevant EURASEC legal acts did not explicitly provide the EURASEC 
Court with powers to declare Commission’s decisions void, the Court decided otherwise. It 
declared the Commission’s decision void, decided on the time when it became void, and made 
the judgment applicable not only to the parties of the dispute, but erga omnes. Following that, 
it is probably less surprising that the new EAEU Court has been explicitly banned from 
deciding on such issues, and Commission decisions remain in effect until the Commission 
implements the ruling, as has been discussed in the previous section. 
One of the interviewees confirmed that it is a common view in the Court, that it has 
been punished for its excessive judicial activism.1099 However, according to him, it is was not 
related to the EURASEC Court’s practice as such, and not with the Iuzhnyi Kuzbass case, but 
with the preliminary ruling that it delivered. Indeed, such positions, even though potentially 
irritating for Member States, is not something that could promote such tremendous changes as 
removing the preliminary ruling procedure altogether. However, positions which are not well 
grounded and involve direct confrontation could be more than irritating. An example of the 
first (and the last) preliminary ruling is illustrative in this sense. A request for a preliminary 
ruling was made by the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus. However, it almost immediately 
withdrew the request (even asked for it twice).1100 Nevertheless, the EURASEC Court decided 
to open the proceedings as it had a right to reject the withdrawal.1101 EURASEC Court’s 
argumentation was rather peculiar: “as, if decided otherwise, it would not meet the 
requirements of procedural economy and might lead to an unjustified delay in adjudication of 
the case”.1102 It is very unclear how exactly procedural economy would be affected and why a 
delay would take place at all. It has been suggested in a text co-authored by one of the judges 
involved in the case that this approach was taken from the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure (a draft 
at the time).1103 The EURASEC Court’s statement can only be understood in light of the 
explanation given by the drafters of the ECJ Rules of Procedure, and particularly the following 
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norm (in the formulation of the final version of the Rules of Procedure): “The withdrawal of 
a request may be taken into account until notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has 
been served on the interested persons.”1104 
This provision retains the right to deliver a judgment notwithstanding the withdrawal 
of a request for a preliminary ruling. The drafters explain this provision in terms of procedural 
economy “since a number of similar cases may have been stayed, either by the [ECJ] or by 
national courts or tribunals, pending the forthcoming judgment”.1105 In that case not delivering 
a judgment could lead to dealing with every case that has been stayed, which would cause a 
delay in the progress of those cases. However, the drafters underlined that such a withdrawal 
must happen “at a very advanced stage of the proceedings, when the date of delivery of the 
judgment has been communicated” and when “the [ECJ’s] deliberations will have been 
completed”. Conversely, in the case of the EURASEC Court, the withdrawal request was made 
at an early stage, only two weeks after the request for preliminary ruling was accepted.1106 As 
noted in the dissenting opinion of Judge Smirnov, there was no proof of similar cases stayed 
in national courts pending the forthcoming judgment; and no proof that the proceedings before 
the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus could be delayed. 1107  Claims, such as lack of 
explanation of the withdrawal request, that the EURASEC Court had already involved a 
number of experts, do not seem to be enough. Therefore, it is more likely that the Court, having 
had the very first preliminary ruling request, not overwhelmed with a heavy workload, and 
having a proactive stance wanted to seize the opportunity and enforce its jurisdiction. A 
number of proactive provisions in the final ruling (e.g. that the ruling was “directly effective” 
on the territory of all member states) reinforce this position. It could have also been done to 
protect the rights of the legal entity, that asked the Belarusian court to refer to the EURASEC 
Court in the first place. 1108  In any event, the communication between the national and 
supranational institutions did not work out—the EURASEC Court delivered a ruling the 
referring court did not want; an unsolicited advice of sorts. 
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Another interviewee from the EAEU Court believes that indeed, this preliminary ruling 
has been the main reason for major changes in the Court’s competences. 1109  The Court 
engaged into excessive judicial activism and even violated the principles of Roman law, where 
there is no case without a claimant. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Member States wish for 
the EAEU Court the role in the EAEU legal order similar to one the CJEU plays in the EU 
legal order. The role of the Court is rather reduced to a consultant in its essence.1110 
One of the interviewees also suggested that national judiciary was not interested in the 
preliminary ruling procedure.1111 The possible problem was that national courts were afraid of 
dictate on the part of the Court, since the highest national judicial institutions were obliged to 
refer to the EAURSEC Court, and the ruling was to be binding. It is not impossible to say that 
the initiative to remove the preliminary ruling procedure came from national judiciary.1112 
In any event, it must be reiterated that the authority of a court is derived not only from 
the binding nature of its judgments, but from its ability to be rationally persuasive (i.e. able to 
persuade on the merits of its reasoning) or normatively persuasive (i.e. convincing in a manner 
notwithstanding the merits of the assessment itself).1113 The abovementioned argument was 
neither. 
As far as judicial norm creation is concerned, as one of the interviewees opined, the 
reason that it is explicitly limited in the Statute of the Court follows from the stage of 
development of the integration.1114 According to him, it underlines that the Treaty is concluded 
between Member States and all issues are solved through consensus. 
There could be other reasons behind it as well, including the whole sociocultural 
narrative of the post-Soviet space and its influence on the judiciary.1115 Political reasons can 
also be identified. One of them is the ability of powerful states to “capture” the judiciary, i.e. 
to use it to exercise indirect control over international organizations and their bureaucracies or  
modify the parties’ specific treaty-based commitments.1116 Thus, interpretation of legal rules 
does not generally require endorsement by member states, powerful states can pre-empt 
                                                 
1109 Interview 2 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
1110 Interview 2 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
1111 Interview 4 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
1112 Interview 4 EAEU Court official, 14 April 2017. 
1113 Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the judicial function, 183. 
1114 Interview 1 EAEU Court official, 13 April 2017. 
1115 See E.A. Deikalo, "Vliianie sotsiokulturnogo konteksta postsovetskogo prostranstva na razvitie 
mezhdunarodnogo regional'nogo pravosudiia," in Mezhdunarodnoe pravosudie v XXI veke, ed. T.N. 
Mikhaliova (Minsk: Biznesofset, 2016). 
1116 See generally Benvenisti and Downs, "Prospects for the Increased Independence of International 
Tribunals." 
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potential resistance from weaker member states.1117 This can be indicated by congruence of 
international court and powerful state preferences over time and the frequency with which a 
change in the case law follows the changes in preferences of powerful states.1118 “The struggle 
for internal intelligibility by the Court thus serves to resist external pressures to instrumentalize 
international law.”1119 
6.7 Intermediate conclusions 
The importance of having a separate judicial body exclusively for the EAEU legal 
order has been underlined in Chapter 3. However, the analysis conducted in this chapter shows 
many limitations this judicial authority encounters on the way to exercise its functions. To 
some degree, the assertive attitude of the EURASEC Court coupled with the overreaction of 
the Member States, as well as mutual mistrust, could have led to dare consequences for the 
incumbent EAEU Court and the whole legal order as such. After all, “[i]t is through the lens 
of its past decisions that the Court can best understand how the legal order has arrived at its 
present state and establish the parameters for its future development.”1120 
The absence of a strict mechanism ensuring uniform interpretation of law in all the 
Member States and the restriction on the ‘creation of new norms’ are the major blows to the 
EAEU legal order alongside the direct ban on the ability of the Court to establish implied 
powers discussed in Chapter 4. One way to deal with absence of the preliminary ruling is for 
the Court to continue interpreting law through direct actions. Another way is to be 
exceptionally persuasive within the advisory opinion procedure. In a way, within the EAEU 
law, the division into judicial remedies and mechanisms ensuring uniform interpretation of 
law in all Member States is not that strict. This is because it is not possible to ensure uniform 
interpretation with advisory opinions only. Member States’ priority interpretation is an attempt 
to strip the Court of its expression of power in the sense of its influence on what the law means. 
Therefore, the binding interpretation of Union law within judicial remedies is probably 
contributing more to ensuring that. 
As for the ‘creation of new norms’ provision, it seems to be virtually impossible to 
uphold it in practice. Therefore, it is of much less concerns as compared to other limitations 
discussed above. In addition to them, the Court has a very weak mechanism to enforce its 
                                                 
1117 Ibid., 1067. 
1118 Ibid., 1068. 
1119 Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the judicial function, 191-92; M. Koskenniemi, "What is 
International Law For?," in International Law, ed. M. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 44. 
1120 Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the judicial function, 191. 
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judgments. Therefore, the Court has to persuade states and institutions by practicable solutions 
if it wants to influence the development of Union law. It will not have impact on the opinion 
of states about the law solely on the basis of the Court’s authority.1121 The Court must struggle 
for internal intelligibility in order to resist external pressures to instrumentalize Union law. 
                                                 
1121 For the ICJ’s struggles in this respect see Petersen, "Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice – 
Factors of Success."; Hersch Lauterpacht, The development of international law by the Permanent court of 
international justice, Publication of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (London ; New 
York etc.: Longmans, Green and co, 1934). 
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7 Conclusion: What autonomy? Odysseus’s vessel 
redux 
7.1 EAEU’s indicia of legal order autonomy 
Conditiones sine qua nons 
It has been argued in Chapter 1 that prior to delving into assessing whether there is an 
autonomous legal order and the degree of autonomy in an organization, two essential 
conditions must be met by such an organization. It must demonstrate that it possesses a legal 
order, as a unity of legal norms organized in a certain hierarchically relevant structure, and an 
international legal personality as, essentially, a capacity to enter into relations with third 
countries and other international organizations and conclude agreements with them. These 
preconditions are necessary in order to possess autonomy vis-à-vis member states and vis-à-
vis international legal order respectively. 
It is clear that the EAEU has a legal order with an internal structure of legal norms, 
which follows primarily from Article 6 of the TEAEU, establishing Law of the Union. It is 
not unproblematic, though. As described in Chapter 5, the internal hierarchy of sources of 
Union law is not entirely clear. Thus, the TEAEU does not have rules on the legal force of 
international agreements of the EAEU with a third party and of international agreements of 
the Member States, adopted prior to joining the EAEU. Even more problematic is the special 
status of WTO law in the Union legal order, which has primacy of Union law. Further, the 
legal force of decisions of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council are not clear 
either. It follows from the TEAEU that such decisions are binding but are not directly 
applicable on the territories of the Member States. Nevertheless, these problems are solvable 
through interpretation by the Court in the future. Moreover, these problems do not deny 
possession of a legal order and concern more the implementation of norms in practice. 
As for international legal personality, the possession thereof by the EAEU is stipulated 
in the Treaty itself. As explored in Chapter 2, apart from this indication, the TEAEU provides 
the EAEU with rights relevant to international legal personality, such as engaging in 
international cooperation with states, international organizations, etc., and independently or 
jointly with the Member States concluding international agreements therewith on any matters 
within its jurisdiction,1122 which corresponds to the EAEU’s practice.1123  In addition, the 
                                                 
1122 Art.7 TEAEU. 
1123 E.g. the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part. 29 May 2015. 
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TEAEU also provides for the immunities of the EAEU institutions and members of the 
Commission Board, judges, officials, and employees from national jurisdiction.1124 These 
factors taken together indicated that the EAEU possesses the second precondition for legal 
order autonomy. 
Supranational effect of legal norms 
In this research I have delimitated the notions of direct applicability and direct effect. 
It has been demonstrated that direct applicability is a principle of EAEU law. The EAEU 
provides for direct applicability of Commission decisions, and the EAEU Court has 
established direct applicability of certain provisions of the TEAEU.1125 Although Commission 
decisions and the Customs Code seem to be prima facie directly effective, the EAEU Court is 
more careful in using this language yet. Even if one is to assume that the Court does not 
distinguish the terminological difference, in most cases it did not deal with invoking EAEU 
law in national courts. However, the tendency seems to be moving in this direction. The notion 
of primacy has been removed from the final version of the Treaty. Nevertheless, this did not 
stop the EAEU Court from starting incorporating this language in its case law.1126 Here it is 
important to mention the restrictions that the EAEU Court has to overcome to ensure 
development of EAEU law in this direction. The Court must be adamant not to succumb to 
the strict reading of the ‘creation of new norms’ and the ‘implied powers’ provisions. After 
all, the role of the court, among others, is ‘fulfilling what the legislator would have intended 
if he could have foreseen the changes occurring in the life of the community’.1127 
A problematic issue remains regarding compatibility of national legal orders of the 
Member States with the EAEU legal framework. Thus, in Belarus, the main problematic 
provision is the one in the Constitution, according to which the Constitutional Court checks 
the compatibility of decisions of the Commission with national laws and decrees. However, it 
is not a substantial barrier and the solution proposed in this study, based upon a ‘living 
document’ reading of this provision, minimizes the potential conflict. In case of Russia, the 
constitutional provisions are not problematic, but the judicial practice is. Its judicial authorities 
have issued judgments challenging the EAEU Court’s interpretations. Beyond that, it 
                                                 
1124 Annex 32 TEAEU “Regulation on Social Guarantees, Privileges and Immunities within the Eurasian 
Economic Union”. 
1125 Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit); Opinion SE-2-1/1-17-BK, Vertical 
Agreements. 
1126 Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit). 
1127 Lauterpacht, The development of international law by the International Court, 368. 
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challenged the validity of ECtHR’s judgments, which can also be used against the Eurasian 
judiciary. 
Supranational judiciary 
As established in Chapter 1, there are two main ways in which a judicial body can 
ensure legal order autonomy. The first way is via the mechanism ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law in all member states. The most advanced mechanism for these purposes 
is the preliminary ruling procedure as a system of judicial oversight within the judicial systems 
of member states in cooperation with the supranational judiciary. This mechanism integrates 
national and supranational judiciary into one system, ensures their dialogue and secures 
uniform interpretation of law and the same effect thereof in all domestic legal orders. This 
mechanism is absent from EAEU law. This is, arguably, the gravest concern for internal aspect 
of legal order autonomy. This research has not identified any other effective mechanism 
available that could compensate for the lack of preliminary ruling. While the advisory function 
of the EAEU Court can stand on its own, it is a different procedure and nothing close to 
preliminary ruling. This situation endangers the ability of the autonomous legal order for self-
maintenance due to an increased possibility of conflicting application of EAEU law by 
national judiciaries. 
This situation is not limited to the elimination of the preliminary ruling procedure. It 
is complemented by the denial of the Commission’s right to bring the Member States to the 
Court, which brings about a larger possibility of the Member States to violate EAEU law. As 
explored in Chapter 6, this situation is not mitigated by the possibility of the Member States 
to sue each other. Coupled with absence of a preliminary ruling, the Commission’s inability 
to prosecute opens the door for misapplication of Union law only wider. It will be hard for the 
EAEU Court to ensure legal order autonomy in the legal framework established by the TEAEU 
and other international agreements within the EAEU. 
The second main way to ensure legal order autonomy is via a mechanism ensuring the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. The situation is somewhat more promising in this respect. 
The TEAEU provides for a potential limitation in this respect, which can raise the danger of 
alternative interpretations of EAEU law coming from other dispute settlement institutions. 
However, the EAEU Court possesses broad kompetenz-kompetenz to determine its 
jurisdiction. Coupled with the duty of loyal cooperation, it can play a key role in establishing 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Therefore, the necessary preconditions for the Court to interpret it in 
this way are in place. 
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Interpretation of distribution of powers 
The EAEU possesses a number of exclusive competences, where the states lose the 
power to adopt binding decisions in certain fields. Therefore, the scope of autonomy can 
expand, as the more powers an entity possesses leads to wider autonomy. In order to ensure 
legal order autonomy, the organization must be able to interpret its own powers. There are 
limits to that set by the fact that interpretations of the EAEU Court can be overruled by 
interpretations of the Member States. However, this seems to be applicable only to advisory 
proceedings and not contentious proceedings. Thus, the Court is still able to provide for 
relevant interpretations through the latter. 
As explored in Chapter 4, there is a provision, according to which the Court does not 
have power to vest the EAEU institutions with additional competence in excess of that 
explicitly provided in the treaties. It has been argued that this rule intends to limit the ability 
of the Court to define the implied powers of an organization, to a large extent the way the ECJ 
did for the EU, and the ICJ for the UN. Potentially, this is a significant limitation for the EAEU 
Court and encroachment on its ability to interpret the EAEU powers as such. However, it has 
been argued that this limitation is not viable, since it is possible to overcome it through judicial 
interpretation not violating the principle of attributed competences. 
Institutional supranationality 
This research does not confirm that any EAEU institution, including the EAEU 
Commission, possesses institutional supranationality, with an arguable exception of the Court. 
The Commission does not possess the features of supranationality developed in scholarship 
and does not fall under the criteria of institutional supranationality developed in this research. 
The reason is that the Commission has a hybrid structure consisting of the Commission 
Council and Board, which have completely different formation principles and decision-
making system. Thus, if one analyses the Commission not as one institution, but as an 
organization within an organization that has an institutional and decision-making structure of 
its own, the Commission Board can claim to be supranational based on its institutional 
structure, albeit to a limited degree.  
The lack (or limited degree) of institutional supranationality reduces the ability of the 
EAEU legal order to self-reproduce and self-organize. The EAEU Commission is structured 
in such a way that secondary norms of the legal order cannot be adopted without the consent 
or even dictate of individual Member States.  
Self-referential character of law 
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The issue whether EAEU law has the intrinsic characteristic of being self-referential 
is more controversial, and, unfortunately, still an open question. As can be deduced from the 
analysis in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2, establishing a self-referential character of law is not only 
a theoretical exercise as it requires practical validation. And practice is lacking. However, as 
legal scholarship discussed in this research suggests, even though the EAEU Treaty is an 
international law instrument, it does not mean that it cannot be self-referential. As far as 
relations with national legal orders of the Member States are concerned, the fact that national 
legislation of some Member States do not have provisions, which explicitly allow direct 
applicability of decisions of international organizations, while EAEU law does, and the latter 
is being implemented, means that such characteristic may be flowing directly from the TEAEU 
and the EAEU legal order. This favours the interpretation of self-referential character of 
EAEU law within the internal aspect of legal order autonomy. The external aspect of legal 
order autonomy seems to be more problematic with regard to self-referential character of law, 
and not only because of the special status of WTO law within the EAEU legal order. It has 
been shown that, for instance, the effect of international agreements of the Member States is 
not clearly defined in the TEAEU. However, the EAEU Court is capable to solve these issues 
and has already dealt with it to some extent. Thus, it did so in the General Freight case where, 
borrowing from EU case law, it developed conditions for the EAEU to be bound by an 
international agreement. The Court did not make it part of Union law, but ruled to apply it 
along with Union law. 
7.2 Fragile autonomy 
Turning to the table of indicia of an autonomous legal order developed in Chapter 1, I 
can now identify more clearly, which indicia are fulfilled by the EAEU. By default, the EU 
possesses all the indicia identified in Chapter 1, indicated in the Table 5 in green colour. 
 Internal External 
conditiones 
sine qua non 
legal order international legal personality 
indicia per se 
self-referential character of law 
mechanism ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law in all member 
states 
mechanism ensuring exclusive 
jurisdiction over the legal order 
supranational effect of legal norms - 
interpretation of distribution of powers 
institutional supranationality 
Table 5 Indicia of an autonomous legal order as possessed by the EU 
The situation is quite different in the case of the EAEU, as show in Table 6. 
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 Internal External 
conditiones 
sine qua non 
legal order international legal personality 
indicia per se 
self-referential character of law 
mechanism ensuring uniform 
interpretation of law in all member 
states 
mechanism ensuring exclusive 
jurisdiction over the legal order 
supranational effect of legal norms - 
interpretation of distribution of powers 
institutional supranationality 
Table 6 Indicia of an autonomous legal order as possessed by the EAEU 
Green colour means that it has been identified that the EAEU possesses corresponding 
indicium of legal order autonomy. Yellow colour means that this research suggests that 
following certain conditions, the corresponding indicium can be satisfied by the EAEU legal 
order as it stands, without necessity to introduce any normative changes in the form of Treaty 
amendments. This would be done primarily through interpretation of law. Red colour means 
that the EAEU legal order does not satisfy the corresponding indicium and Treaty amendment 
is necessary. 
It is clear that some of the EAEU Court judges are vocally in favour of the narrative of 
an autonomous legal order. As we have seen, at least one judge in the EAEU Court has already 
directly called the EAEU legal order autonomous.1128 On the one hand, it is wishful thinking 
since, as it has been shown above, so many features are underdeveloped. Although the 
conditiones sine qua nons for internal and external legal order autonomy are there, the EAEU 
has certain troubles demonstrating some indicia of legal order autonomy. The most 
problematic points are necessarily the virtual inability of the EAEU Court to maintain the unity 
and uniform interpretation of law in all of the Member States and interpretative limitations. 
Such limitations are a direct attack on the part of the Member States. However, it follows from 
the findings in this research that many of such attacks can be shielded from if the Court takes 
an innovative and firm position. These include the ‘create new norms’ and implied powers 
limitations. The tendency seems to be in favour of such a position, albeit not always and at a 
moderate pace. However, some limitations are outside of interpretative powers, such as the 
absence of the preliminary ruling procedure, inability of the Commission to sue the Member 
States, the issues of institutional supranationality and independence. 
On the other hand, it is this kind of thinking that spurred the process. There is some 
reverse logic here, which in fact can help develop the autonomy features. After all, the ECJ in 
                                                 
1128 Case SE-1-1/1-16-BK, Russia v Belarus (Kaliningrad Transit) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Chaika). 
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the Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL cases used the narrative of special nature of the 
founding treaties to formulate direct effect and primacy. It is only later that the claim reversed 
to invoking direct effect and primacy to justify EU’s special nature.1129  
Where does the EAEU legal order stand in the allegory with which I started the current 
work? The vessel would be much dependent on the sea. The crew would not have enough 
powers and tools to withstand its penetrating force. The surges and contrary winds could drive 
the vessel directly into the hands of the Sirens if timely measures are not taken. Similarly, the 
vessel would be rather dependent on Odysseus. This would be done through stricter control of 
the crew, and it is not clear if the crew would not succumb to Odysseus’s wishes to be untied 
upon his hearing the beautiful but deadly song of the Sirens. 
Overall, the research conducted identified that the EAEU possesses a number of similar 
features of legal order autonomy as the EU does, which allows to say that the organization has 
a certain autonomy of the legal order. However, it is premature and not possible to claim that 
the EAEU legal order is an EU-like autonomous legal order. It is fragile due to the absence of 
certain tools to reinforce and maintain it. However, it has a number of premises which can 
help it develop into one, if such a desire prevails. Some of the steps that can help to achieve 
this have been spelled out throughout this research, and some steps forward are suggested in 
the next section for this purpose. 
7.3 A step forward 
A number of changes to the EAEU law and practices will set the Union on the path to 
an EU-like autonomy. Here are some of the issues that could be tackled in this respect. 
It is crucial to introduce an efficient mechanism ensuring uniform interpretation of law 
in all Member States. The default option is the return of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
Moreover, this procedure must be devoid of limitation it had within the EURASEC legal order, 
which contributed to poor use thereof. However, it should not necessarily be limited to the 
preliminary ruling procedure. It is conceivable to have other mechanisms with a similar effect 
and there are no obstacles to innovate. The crucial point is to put such a mechanism in place 
and make it work. It is similarly crucial to have the ability of the Commission not only to 
monitor implementation of EAEU law, but also to bring the Member States to the Court in 
                                                 
1129 On this ‘circularity’ see B. de Witte, "Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order," in The 
Evolution of EU Law, ed. P.P. Craig and G. De Búrca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 361. 
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case of violations. For a Draft Protocol amending the EAEU Treaty that includes possible 
formulation of these provisions see Annex III. 
Next, the provisions banning the Court from creating new norms and finding implied 
powers. As explained in Chapters 4 and 6, these provisions in themselves do not prevent the 
Court from doing the opposite, since it is possible to bypass them using certain interpretative 
tools. They, however, can play a dissuading role for the Court and only create unnecessary 
tensions. The implied powers provision can be reformulated in order not to have a very 
expansive approach. It can be reformulated as follows: 
‘The Union possesses only the competence expressly provided for in the Treaty 
and/or international agreements within the Union, as well as the competence 
necessary to effectively carry out the express competence and which does not 
go beyond its limits.’ 
This narrow understanding limits the implied powers only with the tools necessary to 
effectively carry out the express competence, and therefore does not contradict and does not 
go beyond the attributed powers principle. It only amplifies the competences conferred by the 
Member States for more efficient achievement of the aims stipulated in the TEAEU.  
It has been argued that due to the Court’s broad kompetenz-kompetenz to determine its 
jurisdiction, it can develop a mechanism ensuring exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. 
However, it would be helpful to include an exclusive jurisdiction provision in the Treaty itself. 
The Court should continue its endeavour in formulating principles of direct 
applicability, direct effect and primacy of Union law and, maybe, step up in this process. It is 
also in its powers to solve a number of problems that remain regarding the hierarchy of the 
legal rules in Union law. Some of them, however, can be better solved in a regulatory manner, 
in particular the rules regarding the effect of international agreements concluded by the 
Member States prior to joining the Union in order to avoid contradictory norms and 
international disputes involving third countries. The respective TFEU provision (Art. 351 
TFEU) could be a good and helpful starting point. 
Last but not least, the issue of independence of judges and officials of the Commission 
must be addressed. 
7.4 Recommendations for practical implementation of research results 
The results of this research can be used by national authorities of the EAEU Member 
States empowered to conduct negotiations with regard to the development of the EAEU and 
Eurasian integration including making proposals for changing the TEAEU and its annexes 
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(Annex III). The results can also be used by the EAEU institutions: 1) by the Commission with 
regard to uncovering its implied powers within the competences attributed by the Member 
States; 2) by the EAEU Court with a view to deploying necessary legal interpretation tools. 
The results of the research can be used in the education process within the topics 
covering EAEU law, EU law, and public international law in general. Similarly, the results of 
the research can be used in conducting further research in EAEU law, EU law, and public 
international law, in particular regarding the legal nature of international organizations, legal 
order autonomy, delimitation of competences, etc. 
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opinion Neshataeva 
Member 
State 
(Russia) 
Member 
State 
(Belarus) 
Customs 
law 
C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (20 February 1979) 
EU:C:1979:42 
 01.11.2016 
Advisory 
opinion n/a 
Grand 
Chamber 
Member 
State 
(Kazakhstan) n/a 
Customs 
law none 
SE-1-2/2-16-AP 21.06.2016 Decision n/a 
Appelate 
Chamber 
Company 
(General 
Freight 
CJSC) Commission 
International 
law 
C-21/72, International Fruit Company 
(12 December 1972) EU:C:1972:115 
C-308/06, Intertanko and Others (3 
June 2008) EU:C:2008:312 
C-301/08, Bogiatzi (22 October 2009) 
EU:C:2009:649 
C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v 
Total France SA and Total 
International Ltd (24 June 2008) 
EU:C:2008:359 
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SE-1-2/2-16-AP 21.06.2016 Decision 
Dissenting 
opinion Chaika 
Company 
(General 
Freight 
CJSC) Commission 
International 
law none 
SE-1-2/2-16-KS 04.04.2016 Decision n/a Chamber 
Company 
(General 
Freight 
CJSC) Commission 
International 
law 
C-183/06, RUMA (15 February 2007) 
EU:C:2007:110 
C-339/09, Skoma-Lux (16 December 
2010) EU:C:2010:781 
C-173/08, Kloosterboer Services BV 
(18 June 2009) EU:C:2009:382 
SE-2-3/1-16-BK 03.06.2016 
Advisory 
opinion n/a 
Grand 
Chamber 
Commission 
employees 
(Kuznetsova 
et al.) n/a Employment 
C-149/79, Commission v Belgium (26 
May 1982) EU:C:1982:195 
T-89/01, Willeme v Commission (11 
September 2002) EU:T:2002:212 
T-137/03, Mancini v Commission (3 
February 20005) EU:T:2005:33 
SE-1-2/1-16-AP 02.06.2016 Decision n/a 
Appelate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Sevlad LLC) Commission  none 
SE-1-2/1-16-KS 07.04.2016 Decision n/a Chamber 
Company 
(Sevlad LLC) Commission  none 
SE-1-2/2-15-AP 03.03.2016 Decision n/a Chamber 
Individual 
entrepreneur 
(Tarasik) Commission 
Customs 
law none 
SE-1-2/2-15-AP 03.03.2016 Decision 
Dissenting 
opinion Neshataeva 
Individual 
entrepreneur 
(Tarasik) Commission 
Customs 
law none 
SE-1-2/2-15-КС 28.12.2015 Decision n/a Chamber 
Individual 
entrepreneur 
(Tarasik) Commission 
Customs 
law 
302/87, Parliament v Council (27 
September 1998) EU:C:1988:461 
SE-1-2/2-15-КС 28.12.2015 Decision 
Dissenting 
opinion Chaika 
Individual 
entrepreneur 
(Tarasik) Commission 
Customs 
law none 
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ANNEX II EAURASEC COURT REFERENCES TO CJEU CASE LAW 
Case No Date Type Subtype 
Type of 
action Author Applicant  Respondent 
Subject 
matter CJEU cases cited 
2-4/8-2014  29.12.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company (Flex-n-
roll) Commission 
Customs 
law 
С-12/10, Lecson 
Elektromobile GmbH (22 
December 2010) 
EU:C:2010:823 
2-4/8-2014  27.10.2014 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company (Flex-n-
roll) Commission 
Customs 
law 
C-450/12, HARK GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Duisburg 
(12 December 2013) 
EU:C:2013:824 
C-568/11, Agroferm (20 
June 2013) 
EU:C:2013:407 
C-288/09 and C-289/09, 
British Sky Broadcasting 
(14 April 2011) 
EU:C:2011:248 
C-376/07, 
Staatssecretaris van 
Financien v Kamino (19 
February 2009) 
EU:C:2009:105 
2-4/8-2014  27.10.2014 Decision Dissenting opinion Baishev 
Company (Flex-n-
roll) Commission 
Customs 
law none 
2-4/4-2014 
(1-7/8-
2013) 29.12.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Angang Steel) Commission Antidumping none 
2-4/4-2014 
(1-7/8-
2013) 09.12.2014 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Angang Steel) Commission Antidumping none 
2-4/7-2014  14.10.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Zabaikalresurs) Commission 
Customs 
law none 
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2-4/7-2014  20.04.2014 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Zabaikalresurs) Commission 
Customs 
law 
C-320/11, C-330/11, C-
382/11 and C-383/11, 
Digitalnet and others (22 
November 2012) 
EU:C:2012:745 
C-288/09 and C-289/09, 
British Sky Broadcasting 
(14 April 2011) 
EU:C:2011:248 
 C-196/10, Paderborner 
Brauerei Haus Cramer 
KG (14 July 2011) 
EU:C:2011:487 
С-12/10, Lecson 
Elektromobile GmbH (22 
December 2010) 
EU:C:2010:823 
C-370/08, Data I/O GmbH 
(20 May 2010) 
EU:C:2010:284 
C-410/08 to C-412/08, 
Swiss Caps (17 
December 2009) 
EU:C:2009:794 
C-173/08, Kloosterboer 
Services (18 June 2009) 
EU:C:2009:382 
C-450/12, HARK GmbH 
(12 December 2013) 
EU:C:2013:824 
C-568/11, Agroferm (20 
June 2013) 
EU:C:2013:407 
C-558/11, Kurcums Metal 
(15 November 2012) 
EU:C:2012:721 
C-524/11, Lowlands 
Design Holding (6 
  
266 
September 2012) 
EU:C:2012:558 
2-4/6-2014 07.10.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Vichunai-rus') Commission  none 
2-4/6-2014 30.05.2014 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Vichunai-rus') Commission  none 
2-4/3-2014 23.05.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Graphite India 
Limited) Commission  none 
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2-4/3-2014 24.03.2014 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Graphite India 
Limited) Commission Antidumping 
С-69/89б Nakajima All 
Precision v Council (7 
May 1991) 
EU:C:1991:186 
Т-462/04, HEG and 
Graphite India v Council 
(17 December 2008) 
EU:T:2008:586 
С-351/04, Ikea Wholesale 
(27 September 2007) 
EU:C:2007:547 
Т-423/09, Dashiqiao 
Sanqiang Refractory 
Materials v Council (16 
December 2011) 
EU:T:2011:764 
С-51/92 Р, Hercules 
Chemicals v Commission 
(8 July 1999) 
EU:C:1999:357 
Т-190/08, CHEMK and KF 
v Council (25 October 
2011) EU:T:2011:618 
С-49/88, Al-Jubail 
Fertilizer Company and 
Others v Council (27 June 
1991) EU:C:1991:276 
Т-462/04, HEG and 
Graphite India v Council 
(17 December 2008) 
EU:T:2008:586 
Т-147/97 Champion 
Stationery and Others v 
Council (19 November 
1998) EU:T:1998:266 
2-4/1-2014 
(1-7/4-
2013) 24.02.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(SeverAvtoProkat) Commission  none 
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2-4/1-2014 
(1-7/4-
2013) 01.11.2013 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(SeverAvtoProkat) Commission  none 
2-4/2-2014 
(1-7/5-
2013)  11.02.2014 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Dzhekpot) Commission 
Customs 
law 
C-341/94, Allain (26 
September 1996) 
EU:C:1996:356 
C-36/94, Siesse v Director 
(26 October 1995) 
EU:C:1995:351 
C-210/91, Commission v 
Greece (16 December 
1992) EU:C:1992:525 
50/76, Amsterdam Bulb v 
Produktschap voor 
Siergewassen (2 
February 1977) 
EU:C:1977:13 
240/81, Einberger v 
Hauptzollamt Freiburg (26 
October 1982) 
EU:C:1982:364 
2-4/2-2014 
(1-7/5-
2013)  31.10.2013 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Dzhekpot) Commission 
Customs 
law 
С-7/08, Har Vaessen 
Douane Service BV v 
Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën (2 July 2009) 
EU:C:2009:417 
С-247/97, Schoonbroodt 
SPRL v Belgium (3 
December  (1998) 
EU:C:1998:586 
С-58/85, Ethicon GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Itzehoe (18 
March 1986) 
EU:C:1986:128 
1-7/2-2013  21.10.2013 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Novokramatorskii 
zavod) Commission  none 
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1-6/1-2013 10.07.2013 Decision  
Preliminary 
ruling 
Grand 
Chamber 
Member State 
(Belarus, 
Supreme 
Economic Court) n/a 
Customs 
law none 
1-6/1-2013 10.07.2013 Decision 
Dissenting 
opinion 
Preliminary 
ruling Smirnov 
Member State 
(Belarus, 
Supreme 
Economic Court) n/a 
Customs 
law 
C-343/90, Lourenco Dias 
v. Director da Alfadega do 
Porto (16 July 1992) 
EU:C:1992:327 
1-6/1-2013 10.07.2013 Decision 
Dissenting 
opinion 
Preliminary 
ruling Neshataeva 
Member State 
(Belarus, 
Supreme 
Economic Court) n/a 
Customs 
law 
Case 48/69, Imperial 
Chemical Industries v 
Commission (14 July 
1972) EU:C:1972:70 
1-7/2-2013  21/10/2013 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Novokramatorskii 
zavod) Commission  none 
1-7/2-2013 24/06/2013 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Novokramatorskii 
zavod) Commission  none 
1-7/2-2012  21/02/2013 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber Company (ONP) Commission  none 
1-7/2-2012  15/11/2012 Decision n/a  Chamber Company (ONP) Commission  none 
1-7/1-2012 05/09/2012 Decision n/a  Chamber 
Company 
(Yuzhny Kuzbass) Commission  none 
1-7/1-2012 29/11/2012 Decision n/a  
Appellate 
Chamber 
Company 
(Yuzhny Kuzbass) Commission  none 
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ANNEX III DRAFT PROTOCOL AMENDING EAEU TREATY 
 
Проект 
 
ПРОТОКОЛ 
О внесении изменений в Приложение № 2 к Договору о Евразийском 
экономическом союзе от 29 мая 2014 г. 
 
Республика Армения, Республика Беларусь, Республика Казахстан, 
Кыргызская Республика и Российская Федерация, руководствуясь статьёй 
115 Договора о Евразийском экономическом союзе от 29 мая 2014 года, 
 
заключили настоящий Протокол о нижеследующем: 
 
Статья 1 
В целях усовершенствования правового регулирования 
Евразийского экономического союза вносятся изменения в Приложение № 
2 к Договору о Евразийском экономическом союзе от 29 мая 2014 г. 
«Статут Суда Евразийского экономического союза» согласно приложению 
к настоящему Протоколу, которое является его неотъемлемой частью. 
 
Статья 2 
Настоящий Протокол подлежит ратификации и вступает в силу с 
даты получения депозитарием по дипломатическим каналам последнего 
письменного уведомления о выполнении государствами - членами 
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Евразийского экономического союза внутригосударственных процедур, 
необходимых для вступления в силу настоящего Протокола. 
 
Совершено в городе    года в одном подлинном 
экземпляре на русском языке. 
 
Подлинный экземпляр настоящего Протокола хранится в 
Евразийской экономической комиссии, которая направит каждому 
государству – участнику настоящего Протокола его заверенную копию. 
 
За Республику 
Армения 
За Республику 
Беларусь 
За Республику 
Казахстан 
За Кыргызскую 
Республику 
За Российскую 
Федерацию 
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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 
к Протоколку о внесении 
изменений в Договор о 
Евразийском экономическом 
союзе от 29 мая 2014 года 
от    20    г. № 
 
ИЗМЕНЕНИЯ, 
вносимые в Приложение № 2 к Договору о Евразийском 
экономическом союзе от 29 мая 2014 г. 
 1. Пункт 39 после части 9 дополнить следующим текстом: 
 «3) по заявлению Комисси: 
 о соответствии международного договора в рамках Союза или его 
отдельных положений Договору; 
о соблюдении государством-членом (государствами-членами) 
Договора, международных договоров в рамках Союза и (или) решений 
органов Союза, а также отдельных положений указанных 
международных договоров и (или) решений;» 
 
 
 
 
 
